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Just to push on that a little bit, it does sound like you are saying that the Government has not articulated its economic strategy in those terms and that it has not drawn that very obvious link between some sectors being more valuable to us in terms of devolved taxes than others and therefore prioritising those sectors. Have you ever heard the Scottish Government express it in those terms?

On that point about the fiscal framework and the incentives that it provides, normally, any Government is incentivised to grow the economy to increase tax revenue. That is not exactly the case for the Scottish Government. If you take two growth sectors in Scotland—video games versus film and television—the number of staff that you require per product in the video game sector is a lot lower than in the film and TV sector. Therefore, the video game sector is much more lucrative in terms of tax revenue when it comes to corporation tax, which is of no value to us, whereas film and TV require far more people on medium-ish salaries and therefore have a higher income tax yield.

Have you ever seen the Scottish Government articulate its economic objectives in terms of—to be cynical—how to game the fiscal framework? In other words, identify which sectors will be the most valuable not just to the Scottish economy, but to Scottish public services in terms of the impact that growth in those sectors would have on devolved taxes versus reserved taxes. We cannot prioritise every sector; one of the criticisms of the NSET is that it prioritises everything. It does not make choices like, “Do we prioritise video games or film and TV, and what would the relative impact on tax revenues be?”

Good morning. I will be happy to be proved wrong on this one because it has been bugging me, although I think that I have I figured it out. In exhibit 10, the two tax policy changes are referred to as changes to the “additional rate” and to the “top rate”. Are you talking about the same rate for both those policy changes? Although the additional rate exists in the rest of the UK, in Scotland we have always referred to the top rate. From what I have been able to figure out, the information is drawn from an SFC report that uses “additional rate” when it means “top rate”. Can I just check that we are, in both lines in exhibit 10, talking about what in Scotland we refer to as the top rate?

That was not my main question; it has just been bugging me and I have been trying to figure it out.

Exhibit 10 is about lost revenue from behaviour change. Obviously, it would be better to have £65 million than £11 million, but it is still £11 million that we would not have had otherwise. What would be useful to know in weighing up the policy change is what if any other negative impacts there have been. Has the behaviour change at the upper end—for example, if consultants in the NHS have reduced their hours to avoid higher tax—had an impact on the provision of services? Does it have an impact on spending in the real economy and therefore a knock-on impact on business? Is it possible to quantify any of that, or are we getting far too far into secondary effects? Without being able to quantify any negative effects of the policy, all that we can say is that £11 million is not as good as £65 million, but it is still £11 million that we would not otherwise have had and where is the harm?

The minister will be glad to hear that I will be very brief.

Amendment 191, in the name of Lorna Slater, would simply change “may” to “must” in section 17(4). The effect is that it would require ministers to issue guidance to the council regarding the composition of the apprenticeship committee and its functions, closing off the possibility of ministers not issuing that guidance. I hope that the amendment is therefore seen as straightforward and that committee members will agree to it.

It is a tricky balance to strike. At the moment, in the region of 90 per cent of all public data in Scotland is not proactively published—it is not immediately available to the public—so we are not at the tipping point into a data dumping situation. There might be specific situations in which us cynical Opposition members feel that, for example, the Government has done a data dump on a Friday afternoon to try and mask something but, on the whole, the balance is skewed massively towards public information not being routinely published and available to the public. The aim of amendment 128 is to provide a clear steer that such publication should be happening routinely, without becoming so prescriptive about what should or should not be published that either we force the publication of something that should not be in the public domain or we get it wrong and give institutions the excuse they need simply not to publish information that they should. It is always tricky to strike a balance. My aim is to set a clear direction of travel and, ultimately, trust institutions to make a judgment about what is or is not appropriate.

I appreciate the length of time for which the minister has been in his current role, but I have raised this issue with the Government in this portfolio and across the board for a number of years.

If the Government believes that this does not need to be in legislation, why has it not just instructed every public body in Scotland, at the very least, to adopt the same open government licence that the Scottish Government itself adopted some years ago?

Will the minister give way?

I do not entirely agree with it, but I understand the minister’s position that penalties for non-compliance should be laid out in grant letters. However, I am concerned that there seems to be a disconnect between what the Government is saying and the SFC’s position. My understanding is that the SFC wants a wider suite of powers than just clawback. If the Government’s position is that the SFC can already set out other penalties, has it engaged with the SFC on that? It seems that the minister’s position and that of the SFC are not aligned. Everybody seems to agree broadly that clawback is not an ideal penalty and other options should be available. The SFC does not seem to think that other options are available to it, however.

The minister has already set out the purpose and effect of amendments 14A and 14B and indicated that he would support amendment 14B. I will not run through it all again, other than to say that I will not move amendment 14A but I will move amendment 14B.

I want to put on the record that I engaged with the SFC specifically on the amendments, and my understanding is that it is sympathetic to the intention of what I am trying to do, particularly given the issues highlighted by the situation at the University of Dundee. The core issue there is one of governance, which resulted in a crisis of financial sustainability, but it is important that we broaden that out. I am glad that the Government is able to support amendment 14B.

I will expand a little on amendment 144. The rationale for it is best explained in the context of the situation at the University of Dundee and the Gillies review. My understanding is that the university complied with that investigation, but ultimately it was not under any obligation to do so. If there was an investigation in the future, the SFC or whoever conducts the investigation could face more significant barriers.

Amendment 144 would provide that the bill would specify that the council may, where it considers it to be necessary, carry out an independent investigation into the compliance of a fundable body, with terms and conditions imposed on any payments made, and that the governing bodies of the fundable bodies, such as university courts, for example, must provide anyone who is carrying out the investigation with the relevant information and documentation.

Clearly, there is a difference between my position and that of the Government on what is already required of the governing bodies.

My understanding is that there was no legal obligation on the court of the University of Dundee to provide the information that it did. It chose to comply, which was absolutely the right thing to do and I welcome it, but there is no guarantee that that would happen in the future.

As I elaborated on in my intervention on the minister, I am keen for the Funding Council to be able to set out non-financial penalties. We have discussed, in the committee and in the chamber, the drawbacks of the financial clawback power. I think that we, collectively, recognise that it is necessary, but it would be a rare situation in which taking money out of an institution would actually resolve whatever problem has arisen.

My understanding is that the SFC itself is keen to have a wider suite of powers available to it. I recognise, however, that, at stage 1, we did not get into the question of what those other penalties might be. I am proposing, therefore, that that is laid out in regulation by ministers. That is the rationale for—