Seòmar agus comataidhean

That takes us to quite an interesting place. There is a large amount of overlap between what you and the previous witnesses have said. We have heard quite a lot of evidence that existing laws cover breach of the peace, harassment and so on. The challenge is that Parliament has been presented with instances, which have been well covered in the media, that the vast majority of the population would regard as unacceptable behaviour, and in which they would consider that harassment and intimidation had taken place, but the police felt unable to intervene under the current legislation.

I am not talking about the vigils, protests, prayer groups and so on that take place; we have heard about images being projected on to the wall of a hospital and into a hospital. We heard evidence about instances outside the Sandyford clinic in Glasgow, where people have used a speaker system so that, as well as their having harassed people who were going in, people inside the building could hear the people outside as they said very provocative things.

The challenge for the committee is to assess why action was not taken in those instances. Was it because the law as it stands is inadequate, or is there a barrier to enforcing the law as it stands? I am interested in Catriona McMillan’s and Eilidh Dickson’s perspective on that. Many of the discussions come down to questions about how we expect the bill to be enforced and about the judgment that would have to be made, as per the example that was given in the previous evidence session about the arrest that did not lead to a conviction, which Stephen Allison mentioned.

I would be interested in your perspective on the extent to which this differs from other areas of law, where we expect, in the first instance, the police to make a judgment and then the procurator fiscal to do so at the next stage. How many of the concerns could be addressed not in the bill but through guidance, which could be either Lord Advocate’s guidance or operational guidance for Police Scotland?

The Rev Stephen Allison’s comments respond in part to questions that I posed in the earlier part of the meeting, and were really interesting. I agree that, in general, we should not legislate on the basis of theology. However, some religious practices are prohibited in law for reasons that we would all generally regard as justifiable, because they are about the balance of rights, protection of vulnerable groups and so on.

I am interested in the Free Church of Scotland’s perspective on a question that Dr Gulhane posed to the previous panel. Do you agree that it is unacceptable for protests that display graphic images to take place in proximity to a hospital or an abortion provider? In the previous session, Dr Pickering mentioned images of dismembered fetuses. I am interested in your perspective on that, given the previous panel’s very valuable evidence, which was largely from the perspective of the Catholic system of belief.

Thank you all.

I want to pick up on Margaret Akers’s point in answer to the first question about this being about prayer, not just protest. The right to prayer and the right to protest are protected differently and to different extents in different pieces of human rights legislation.

My first question, though, comes from my personal perspective as a Christian. As it is a theological one, Bishop Keenan, I hope that you will not mind if I come to you first. How important is proximity to prayer? I have to say that I am not aware of a reading of scripture that emphasises the importance of proximity for the purpose of prayer.

I am obviously not suggesting that you should—

I am very keen to speak to Isabel specifically about the matter—I just do not want to leave the point lying. Obviously, I am not suggesting that you should be allowed to pray only in a private space—that is, a church—but it is certainly what we are encouraged to do from a Christian perspective.

As for your point about our rights, Bishop Keenan, the fact is that people’s rights are conditional, because sometimes they are contested and can clash with each other. Again, on the idea that some should have the unconditional, unfettered right to do some things, that will clash with other people’s right to do other things, and the question is how we balance those rights. I think that we will all acknowledge that there is a balance-of-rights perspective to be taken into account here.

On the question of proximity, before the buffer zone was brought in in Birmingham, you prayed adjacent to the facility. Even before the buffer zone was brought in, you would not have been allowed to pray inside the facility—in the waiting room or, indeed, in the room where the procedure was taking place. Do you agree that placing some kind of limit was acceptable? It would not have been appropriate for you to pray in the room where the procedure was taking place while it was taking place. Do you therefore agree that this is not a black-or-white matter of restriction or no restriction, but that it is about where we place the restriction?

On that point, part of the evidence that the committee has heard—it is important for us to talk about this—is that we are not talking only about women who are going into premises potentially to have an abortion but about all people who are accessing a service. We have heard evidence that women who have had a miscarriage or stillbirth are deeply distressed to see those images. They might be accessing the premises for a completely different reason. In most cases in Scotland, the premises are a hospital, so people could be accessing the building for all sorts of reasons that are totally unrelated to reproductive healthcare. However, seeing those images can be deeply distressing not just for pregnant women but for people who have had that kind of experience.

What is your perspective on that, Eilidh? To what extent can the concerns about judgment be addressed through guidance from the Lord Advocate on prosecution or operational guidance for Police Scotland, and are there parallels with other areas of law?

May, can you explain whether there are significant differences between a referral in relation to a CSP and a claim under the Equality Act 2010 or in what way you would handle those differently?