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I would like to go back to Ivan McKee’s line of questioning with regard to private property. Article 1, protocol 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerns property rights. It is not an absolute right but, for a conditional right, it is really quite strong, because it was written from an anti-Soviet perspective and represents a really important liberal defence of property rights.

I accept that we do not have the right to do anything that we want in our private property, regardless of whether that property is within 200m of a hospital. That said, this is an area in which the balance of rights is really important, so I will pose another example, the context of which is similar to that of the previous example.

You have already explained that, if somebody purchases a private property facing a hospital for the purpose of putting up a big sign that says “Abortion is murder”, it is simple to see the intent. However, I have Catholic friends who are very passionate about their faith; they have a flagpole in their garden and literally fly the flag of the Holy See, because, for them, that is an important expression of faith. I presume that that sort of thing would not be covered by the bill, but I am just asking the question to give you the chance to put that on the record.

I will finish with a general question that is similar to the one that I posed before. What, specifically, makes you confident that the bill would survive a legal challenge on the basis of article 1, protocol 1 property rights? Rather than a balance between the right to access healthcare and the right to freedom of religion, we are talking about a balance between the right to access healthcare and the right to private property.

I have a follow-up question to Ivan McKee’s question about church premises and signage. A church within 200m might have a sign outside with a message about all life being precious, and the church might intend that to be a message about peace in relation to the conflict in Gaza or something like that. If a person going by that church to enter the hospital for the purpose of seeking an abortion sees that it is a Catholic church and knows what the Catholic Church’s position is on abortion, that could cause them fear and alarm. They could find that intimidating.

Am I understanding the provisions in the bill correctly? That would not be that church’s intent, so that part of the provision would not come into effect, but the other part says that even if there is not intent, it could recklessly have that effect. Would that example be an offence under the bill? Under the reasonable person test, nobody would say that the church was behaving recklessly by having such a message on a sign.

I will continue with examples, because the committee is really interested in how the bill would operate in practice. The principles behind it are well understood and, I think, well supported.

For example, if a priest goes to a hospital to visit a parishioner, that is totally normal and is an important part of their role. Let us say, though, that the priest stops outside the hospital to pray. I have prayed outside hospitals, on my way in, for a variety of reasons. If a woman who is accessing the hospital for the purposes of an abortion sees the priest and is familiar with the Catholic Church’s position on abortion, she could be alarmed and feel intimidated by that. The offence of causing alarm or distress could be made out. Would the priest’s behaviour constitute an offence? Even if he were not there for the purpose of influencing a woman who is seeking an abortion, alarm or distress could still be created. I presume that such behaviour would not be an offence, because, at that point, we would be criminalising priests for dressing as priests in hospitals.

It was essentially about that. I will paraphrase your position, but correct me if I am getting it wrong. As it stands, the police might well have the power to act in response to the distress that is happening and to the intimidation felt by women, but current provisions do not provide a deterrent effect. You are seeking deterrence but acknowledging that existing law would allow for action where behaviour crosses the line, whatever the line is.

I hope that it will be very brief.

Megan, on the point about the revision to the code of practice, can you foresee a scenario in which that would address the issue sufficiently and mean that we would not need legislative change? Alternatively, is something more than changing, revising or improving the code of practice required?

I will pick up on that point. I am keen to hear Nicola Dickie’s thoughts on it, too. Could the point about the criterion for 12-month multi-agency involvement be addressed—could we resolve that problem—entirely by revising the code of practice or would it require amending the legislation?

Are you talking specifically about the need for 12 months of multi-agency, intense support, or are there other areas where the criteria do not quite match up with the reality of children’s needs?

When families have used the tribunal process but have not had a CSP, is that because they have made a discrimination claim under the Equality Act 2010 or is it because they have made a placing request? How have they been able to access the tribunal?

Does your office have a position on the solution? We are all now incredibly and wearily familiar with how hard it is to get a CSP and how few young people have them, and with the issues about getting a CSP but it still not making a difference. Does your office have a position on the need for the legislation to change, or is it an implementation issue? Alternatively, is it both, or both/and?