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To start off, I would just say that, as much as I am grateful for the minister’s various offers to take to consultation some of the issues that have been raised as part of this process, the fact is that we are now heading towards the point where the Government is committing to a consultation on dual mandates, residence requirements, deposit reform and by-election reform. Indeed, we are getting to the point where there will be further consultation on more issues than are contained in the bill in the first place, which I think brings us back to the issue that I raised before—that this has been a missed opportunity to take forward a more holistic and substantive package of reform.

Nonetheless, amendment 58 seeks to end the anomaly in which peers, quite rightly, cannot be MPs—they cannot even vote in a general election—but they can be MSPs. This is not a judgment on individual peers who have been MSPs; it is purely about the principle of democratic accountability. In that respect, it is somewhat different from Graham Simpson’s dual mandate amendments, because it is not concerned about somebody's ability to do two jobs simultaneously. Instead, it is more focused on the issue of democratic accountability.

The Lords is not, by definition, a democratic institution. It is unaccountable; it makes law, but it is not accountable to the public. I find that an affront to parliamentary democracy, and I think that it is contrary to the values of this Parliament, too. Peers are absolutely free to become MSPs—they should just resign from the Lords first. This simple amendment follows through on that simple principle. I welcome the Government’s commitment to consult on the matter, although I do not find that, in and of itself, necessarily a reason for Parliament not to move forward with it for the 2026 election. Nonetheless, we are where we are on that.

I should also put on the record that I spoke directly to Katy Clark before lodging this amendment, particularly to emphasise that this is not about individuals but about a democratic principle. Of course, it would apply only from the next election; it would not apply to anybody currently in that position—that is, Ms Clark herself.

On amendments 60 and 62, which relate to the aggravators, I want to give a little bit of clarification with regard to what the minister was indicating. The amendments would give those sentencing someone convicted of an offence against the categories of people involved in the elections the ability—and the option—to reflect on the harm done to the democratic system at large by the offence. It does not mandate the giving of a more substantive or different sentence; it simply gives those sentencing the option to consider the matter. We should recognise that, as well as the harm that is done against the individual, these offences do harm against the democratic process as a whole.

The minister, quite rightly, made the point that we have seen rising concern in recent years. Our democracy is under a bit of pressure—not as much as in some other nations, but increasing nonetheless. Indeed, those who are involved in our democracy face increasing hostility, something that I have no doubt we have all experienced, and the amendments simply give those sentencing an additional option. The measures would apply only to those convicted of an offence that had been directed at one of the six categories of people in question, and there is also the option to consider it as an aggravator in the way that the minister mentioned—that is, with regard to emergency service workers.

With amendment 61, on the disqualification register, I have lodged what I think is quite a simple amendment. As has already been mentioned, there is no list of disqualified individuals. We have a system that relies on self-policing by those who, by and large, have been disqualified because of their conduct in relation to the electoral process and offences committed against those involved in it. These people are generally going to be on the disqualification register because, by definition, they do not particularly respect the democratic process as it stands.

I think that the Electoral Management Board is the appropriate body to maintain such a list and to make it accessible to the returning officers. As I have already pointed out, nobody will be required to check 2,500 names off the list. For a start, that 2,500 gets divided by 32 at the local council elections, but, in any case, you would be checking the smaller list against the larger one, rather than the other way round. I think, therefore, that this is a simple amendment that would come with a small additional cost, as we would be talking about a—thankfully—relatively small list and a small number of individuals.

We are talking about a group of individuals who have already, by definition, disrespected the democratic process, so relying on self-policing by them would seem to be a vulnerability.

Good morning, everyone. It might seem a little odd in the first instance that I, a Green, am moving an amendment to get rid of cash deposits, now that we are finally at the stage of other parties in that we can afford to pay those deposits ourselves. I am moving it because I do not believe that participants in elections should face financial barriers, and cash deposits obviously create such barriers. The ability to pay £500 bears no relation to the demonstration of a reasonable level of support.

Deposits originated after world war 1 as a way to pay for elections. The political parties themselves, combined, had to pay for the administration of elections. Clearly, we have moved well beyond that, and cash deposits are a legacy of a different era of electoral administration.

The Electoral Commission has reviewed the issue a couple of times. Most recently, in 2015, most of the countries that it reviewed—certainly across Europe—had no cash deposit system. Germany, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands do not have such a system. The United States has quite complicated ballot access arrangements but it does not have a cash deposit system. Those countries that had such a system tended to require financial deposits of far less than the equivalent of £500.

The argument that is used now for cash deposits, given that we have moved beyond the point where they are used literally to pay for the administration of elections, is that they provide a barrier to filter out unserious candidates. They limit the length of our ballot papers compared to those in, say, Australia—where, for some senate elections, ballot papers can reach 1.5m to 2m long, with over a hundred candidates on them.

The length of the Scottish Parliament’s regional list ballots suggests that cash deposits are not exactly acting as a significant disincentive in that manner. Plenty of “unserious” candidates can afford £500, but the financial barrier gets in the way of what might be regarded as more serious candidates, particularly independents.

What I propose instead is that we strengthen the system so that it is equivalent to the nominator or subscriber system that is part of the Westminster general election nomination process. That system long predates cash deposits—it has been in place for Westminster candidacies since the 1870s. Currently, only 10 electors are needed to sign each nomination, but that requirement sits alongside the £500 cash deposit.

For some reason—which I have not quite been able to get to the bottom of—when the Scottish Parliament was established, we replicated the requirement for a cash deposit for Holyrood constituencies but we did not replicate the 10 nominations threshold.

I want to emphasise that this amendment is about implementing a long-held recommendation of the Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission’s 2015 report states clearly:

“We recommend removing the requirement to pay a deposit at all elections, as we do not consider that there should be a financial barrier to standing for election.”

Instead, I propose to implement a nomination threshold. For constituencies, the threshold would be 0.05 per cent of voters, or 50 individuals. In practice, in most mainland constituencies, 0.05 per cent of voters would usually be slightly more than 50 people. However, the reason that I include the 0.05 per cent as well is to reflect the fact that island constituencies have much lower populations, and it would therefore be reasonable to have a lower nomination threshold in an island constituency. For the list system, the threshold would be 150 voters, or 0.05 per cent of voters—which would generally be around 150 people.

I have included provision in amendment 57 for ministers to vary those thresholds in the future, to reflect population change. I would also propose that cash deposits still be allowed in the event of snap elections, to recognise the fact that it takes a bit more time to collect signatures than it does simply to lay a cash deposit.

The amendment also includes a provision whereby, if a member of a party is elected, the party gets automatic ballot access at the subsequent election. That is quite common across other electoral systems comparable to our own. The fact that a party has had a candidate elected previously is a clear demonstration of its credibility and a reasonable level of public support—therefore, why should any barrier be placed in the way of its standing a candidate again? For example, all of the parties represented in this committee would have to go through the nomination process once, but, assuming that at least one MSP from each of our five parties were returned at the 2026 election, we would not have to go through that process again in 2031.

For the existing Holyrood parties, the amendment would end what I see as, frankly, a total inefficiency whereby hundreds of thousands of pounds are transferred from all our bank accounts at the start of an election period to a council bank account and then transferred back into the party accounts afterwards—assuming that we reach a vote share of 5 per cent in all the relevant locations.

That is amendment 57. You will be delighted to know that I do not have nearly as extensive a set of speaking notes for all of my subsequent amendments. Amendments 57 and 68 are the substantial ones.

Good morning, all. I want to return to and focus on an issue that has been touched on a couple of times. Professor Mannion mentioned evidence that shows that about 80 per cent of the outdoor education that young people in Scotland currently get is not residential—I think that he said that it averages out at about half an hour a week in total. I am interested in your thoughts on the value of outdoor residential education specifically, as opposed to outdoor education more generally.

Suggestions have been made, when the bill was proposed and in the consultation process, that a wider entitlement to outdoor education would be more appropriate than a specific entitlement to residential education. Obviously, the bill proposes residential education specifically, and I do not think that anyone round this table would dispute the value of that—you have all given a compelling case for it. However, I am interested in your thoughts on the argument about whether we should create that specific entitlement or take the wider approach of entitling young people to outdoor education in the round.

I think that it was you, Professor Mannion, who acknowledged that outdoor learning is expensive. The benefit to the children and young people involved is indisputable, but it is resource intensive. Is there a particular value for money argument for residential learning opportunities, as opposed to the wider approach of an entitlement to outdoor learning? I am specifically looking for the argument for residential learning being particularly valuable.

Thank you for your answers. That is all really useful.

As somebody who vividly remembers my residential experience, I completely appreciate that, although this morning’s meeting has brought me to the distressing conclusion that that was almost 20 years ago. [Laughter.]

Thank you, and thank you for all your work leading up to this point.

Douglas, do you have anything to add on that?

I am interested in the feedback from Peter and Douglas on that as well. We have very much focused, quite rightly, on the impact on the learner—the young person. Are there implications for teachers’ workload if continuous assessment is added on to the current system as opposed to replacing nat 5?

I will follow up on exactly that point. Your recommendation is to replace the current model of a high-stakes, end-of-term, national 5 exam with a continuous assessment model. The Government has decided instead to add continuous assessment to the system as it currently exists. Do you have any concerns about that, or do you think that continuous assessment can work as an add-on to the exam system? Do we have to have one or the other, or can doing both in the same year work?