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Sticking with technology as an example of reform, I totally take on board Stephen Smellie’s point that the key solution is more funding for more staff, but let us be pessimistic for a moment and say that this afternoon’s budget announcement is not going to include a transformational additional settlement for local government that gets passed down to social work.

You have talked about a number of areas of potential reform that would make the system more productive and make it easier for social workers to cope with the workload. Are there any other areas of potential reform that have not been mentioned so far that you would like to raise with the committee?

Does anyone else want to come in on the point about resources and expectation management?

You have made a number of recommendations, as have the SFC and others, about the kind of data that we need to start gathering to get a good sense of the effect on behavioural impact, payroll, monthly payroll and things like that. Could you talk a little bit about how long we would need to gather that data for before we had a robust enough evidence base, and about the impact of the fact that we would be starting to gather that data now, by which I mean years after some of the changes were made? How do we account for the fact that we will always have that initial period of income tax changes without a richer base of data to draw from?

I have two final questions. The first sticks with HMRC and relates to two studies that it did on the potential behavioural impact on migration from income tax. One of them showed an immediate net negative effect on migration in 2018-19 for higher earners, but then essentially no effect in 2019-20. The second study showed positive inward migration of higher earners up to 2021-22.

The first study shows what appears to be, on first reading, an immediate negative behavioural impact on migration for higher earners in 2018-19. Should we discount that, given that, although some behavioural changes happen immediately, that does not generally happen with migration, and given everything else that was happening at that point, particularly around Brexit, as well as the fact that the effect did not reoccur the following year? Should we assume that what appears to be an immediate behavioural impact on migration resulting from the 2018-19 tax changes was, in fact, down to other factors and was probably unrelated to income tax that year, and that the longer-term studies are a better indicator?

That is useful. Thank you. The SFC assumptions about behaviour change and some in your work are because we have limited evidence in Scotland, so far. Are you aware of any UK-wide and international evidence that significant differences in sub-state and state-level changes in tax policy make a difference to people moving over the border from France to Belgium when France increases its income tax rates, for example, compared with people moving between cantons in Switzerland? Is there a significant difference in the effect on behaviour, particularly migration?

Thank you. I am conscious of the amount of time that I am taking up, convener, but I have one last question.

On exactly that point about other taxes, I will pick up on something that you said in response to, I think, the convener around LBTT. You were somewhat critical of the impact that it has had on people’s ability to move, which is fair enough, but you singled out the additional dwelling supplement. Will you expand a bit on that? My assumption is that the rate for the additional dwelling supplement is not having a negative impact on people's ability to move because they do not live in their holiday home—they live in their primary home, and they do not pay ADS if they are buying another primary residence.

Surely, if ADS is set at the right rate, it should have a positive impact on people’s ability to move home because it is designed not only to raise revenue but to have a behavioural impact by discouraging people from buying holiday homes. That will free up more properties for people to live in as their primary residence.

Thanks very much. That was all really useful.

Good morning, guys. Like Craig, I will jump around between a couple of different topics because so many threads have opened up this morning. The first is income tax and the starter, basic and intermediate rates. In your paper, you make a perfectly legitimate point that it would be more progressive to have a zero per cent rate and then go straight to 21 per cent. Therefore, the progressivity point is fair enough.

However, on your other point around complexity—that word is beginning to feature quite a lot in commentary around the Scottish income tax system—I struggle a little bit, because half a dozen bands are still not that many. I have met plenty of workers who are on much higher incomes and who are interested in what their marginal tax rate will be and are somewhat interested in the relative complexity of having that many bands. I do not know whether I have ever met a worker on an average income—in that range—who is concerned by the apparent complexity of a system that has half a dozen tax bands.

Will you talk me through what the problems are? The word “complexity” is used with negative connotations here, so what are the negative impacts of having a number of different bands?

I understand that the SNCT is within the purview of the Cabinet Secretary for Education and Skills, but it is a tripartite body. A lot of the workforce issues that we discuss in this committee in relation to schools are for local authorities, as the employer, to address, and the SNCT directly involves the Scottish Government as the third partner.

I understand that you cannot clarify the situation this morning, but will the Scottish Government give a clear position on that ahead of the stage 1 debate, perhaps in response to the committee’s report? It is really quite important for members, before we vote at stage 1, to understand the Government’s position on the terms and conditions aspect.

Moving on to a not entirely unrelated issue, how do you view the impact of the bill on the relationship between the Scottish Government and local government, particularly in the context of the Verity house agreement? Has the Government given any consideration as to how the bill would fit in with the new agenda that is being attempted and the reset of the relationship?