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Thank you for those answers, which go some way to addressing the point about how you are responding to the audit report, which is welcome.

Paragraph 39, on the next page, has another specific critique that I would like to point you to. It is about the joined-up approach to managing flooding both within and between organisations. Specifically, the report says:

“there is a lack of joint action within and between organisations.”

It refers to a

“separation between engagement with communities on flood schemes and engagement on broader resilience issues”,

as well as

“a lack of long-term strategic planning”

and

“disjointed delivery”.

Those are all fairly negative comments on what is supposed to be a joined-up approach. The fact that we have so many agencies represented on the panel, and that there are many others involved that are not on the panel, is testament to how complex flood management is. Ultimately, whose responsibility is it to ensure that all those disparate organisations are working together, communicating well and agreeing a joint national plan, which clearly does not exist at the moment?

Time is tight, so you will excuse me for not bringing in any more responses, but thank you for the responses that you have given me.

I guess that what has hit me most from your comments on the nature of flood defence systems is that the one-in-200-year efficacy model is based on historical data. Most people will be quite surprised by that. Historical data is of course helpful and useful, but surely we should be designing things based on our knowledge of what the future is going to look like. That is not actually that difficult to do these days—I know that SEPA, for example, has done some good work with the University of Strathclyde on artificial intelligence models—but my point is that if you base your plans on what has already happened, you will be designing a system that is not fit for the future.

Okay—I will not labour the point.

With regard to flood defence systems being fit for purpose, we have already spent a huge amount of money, with costs doubling or trebling from original expectations. Of course, new schemes are in play, and we know how expensive they are, but one of the big tests will be whether they actually do the job that they are intended to. The proof of the pudding will be very much in the eating, because what local communities really care about is whether a system will protect them, their homes, their businesses and their high streets.

The Brechin example is interesting. That scheme, which cost £60 million and was completed in 2015, was described to the people of Brechin at the time as a one-in-200-year defence system, but it lasted only eight years before it was breached. I appreciate that the answer to my question will be, “Well, it was an unexpected and extraordinary weather event that caused the breach”, but you have been talking about all the money that is spent on consultants and how few people with world-class expertise there are. How can we spend tens of millions of pounds on a defence system that does not do its job after less than a decade? My concern is whether it will happen again, and I do not think that simply blaming the size of the waves and the force of the wind is good enough.

But you cannot do that at the moment.

I thank Mr Beattie for covering many of my areas of questioning, which will save some time. I want to ask two specific questions: one is about the college’s deficit and the other is about its capacity to produce reports.

I was struck by paragraph 15 of your report. I am perhaps reading between the lines, but can you explain to me what happened? I am intrigued by the board’s role in all of this. It seemed to be reluctant or unwilling to produce a budget that showed a deficit. There was an appetite for producing balanced books, but that was obviously impossible, because there was a huge deficit. Did you get the feeling that there was any conflict in relation to the management data with which the board was presented? Where did the unwillingness to be honest about the numbers come from?

I look forward to that. There has been a lot of discussion about the wider sustainability of the college sector, and the SFC has reported that 22 out of 24 colleges have an unsustainable financial future. Does that reflect what you saw at UHI Perth? Is this just a small piece of a wider jigsaw of more systemic issues with college funding?

That said, this is not the first time that Audit Scotland has come to the committee with a section 22 report on a college that has had a commercial subsidiary. We can point to numerous examples. The evidence that you produce shows that a pattern is emerging and that there is a direct relationship between some of the commercial subsidiaries that colleges operate and some of the financial issues for colleges or the bodies that are partners to those entities, so there is an effect on college accounts and audits.

In relation to paragraph 18, on capacity issues, I was struck that you seem to make a direct link between the board’s inability to have a broad financial outlook at UHI Perth and a lack of capacity in the college’s finance team. You say that the capacity issues were

“contributing to delays to starting work on the 2024/25 budget.”

You go on to say that that has been an issue since 2018. It was reported back in the 2018 audit that there were capacity issues, so it is seven years, now, that there have been capacity issues, and the knock-on effect of that is where we are today. Is that not a concern?

We know what the deficit was in that year. Do you know what the turnover of the business—I say “business” but I mean the operation—was over that same financial year? We know that it was spending more than it had, but can you put it into context?

Thank you for clarifying the language that has been used.

I am trying to understand the role that the SFC, as the funding body, would have played in all of this and its relationship—or lack thereof—with the board that had oversight and governance. You are probably aware of the session that we had with the Ethical Standards Commissioner—I am sure that you would have paid close attention to that—during which this issue came up in a much wider discussion of the quality and performance of board members across public sector bodies. Intriguingly, Mr Bruce made it clear that it is not part of his role to look at board governance. My question is, whose role should it be?