Seòmar agus comataidhean

It sounds as if you have unfortunately found yourself in a perfect storm.

Of course, the obvious solution to that is to improve the package that you offer your staff. Retention would surely improve off the back of that, although that might come at a cost to your profit margin. Do you get the impression that you have bitten off more than you can chew with this contract here in Scotland?

Well, business class—£5,000 to fly to Boston is quite a lot of money, I would say. However, that is by the by. My wider point is that there is a clear inherent conflict of interest between the work that people are doing on the ground and them forgetting that the cards that they are using are using public money. That is where some conflicts have to be resolved.

Having listened to the evidence, I have a wider issue. I read the commission’s annual report—all 75 pages of it—and, on page 30, it states, in black and white, that

“There have been no governance issues identified during the year that are significant in relation to our overall governance framework.”

If that was the case, why did the Auditor General say:

“The Commission demonstrated poor governance over the approval of expenditure, including insufficient engagement with its Scottish Government sponsor division”?

As we have heard, there was a wide-ranging Pandora’s box of failures in governance.

My problem is that the report says that there were no issues with your internal audit processes, and indeed, your external audit processes—bearing in mind that you pay quite a lot of money to Grant Thornton UK LLP to do some of that work, which begs the question of what role it had in all this—but Audit Scotland and the Auditor General stepped in to say, “Hold on, something smells wrong.” What went so catastrophically wrong for the board to have missed all those governance issues?

But that is one of the four key accountability metrics that you as a board have to sign off. You signed off all four of them. Value for money is one, but there are others, including effective and robust internal controls and high standards of propriety in behaviour—there is a whole list of things that you have to sign off in the annual report. You signed them off and it is there in black and white. It says:

“There have been no governance issues identified”.

If there were no issues, why did the Auditor General produce a section 22 report that said that there were issues? What did you—

You held 10 meetings in the year that I referred to—five formal and five informal. Are you saying that no issues of culture around senior directors and the chief executive arose in those meetings?

It sounds as if you have work to do on your internal audit, though. If the issue was picked up only by the external audit, surely you need to have a conversation with your internal auditors.

I appreciate that time is against us, and I have a specific question. A lot of the conversation today has been about the former chief executive who resigned. It is easy to make a scapegoat of individuals, when there are wider systemic issues, especially if they are not here to defend themselves. Given the issues, he clearly did not resign with a heap of glory, but did he receive any financial settlement on his resignation? If so, how much?

Mr Brannen, I have one final question, which is about a real cause of concern to me. What we have heard today has uncovered quite serious issues in a public body. You said that you are responsible for 28 other public bodies within your directorate. You talked about a new and very welcome process of red, amber and green ratings to identify bodies that may not be fulfilling their obligations. Would you be willing to publish that, in the interests of transparency, so that the public can see where any areas of concern are?

Do you personally have concerns about any of the other agencies that are under your control? There may be similar issues that we have not discovered because Audit Scotland does not have enough time, or a big enough team, to do a root and branch review of every public body, but I would hate to think that what we have seen at WICS might be happening elsewhere and that we would not know about that.

We know the obvious effect on people’s general health of waiting for longer to be seen and for treatment to start; clearly, it will be negative. Have we done any analysis of mortality rates in that respect? I am looking specifically at the numbers of those waiting for long periods of time—that is, over a year or over 18 months—and they are stark. In 2019, around 3,500 people in Scotland were waiting more than a year for out-patient treatment, and that figure is now up to 40,000, which is a massive increase.

As for the 18-month wait target for in-patient treatment, which is presumably for those with serious conditions, the number was only 486 previously—486 too many, it has to be said—but it is now up to 17,000. My suspicion and my worry are that not all of those people will make it to their treatment. Has there been any analysis of that?

That is obviously very sad. We are talking about numbers, but we are also talking about people passing away while waiting for treatment. If the incidence of that is increasing, that is clearly worrying for all of the Government and the Parliament.

One issue that we discuss often and which frequently comes up is that of situations arising in accident and emergency. In your report, you cover specific issues of overcrowding in A and E, ambulances queuing outside and people not being handed over within the one-hour target. An hour is quite a long time to be sitting in the back of an ambulance anyway. Is there any evidence that that target is being substantially exceeded? As politicians, we have access to anecdotal evidence, but is there any statistical or quantitative data to support that? What is the situation in A and E across Scotland?