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In other words, it is a moving feast. If and when inflation reduces, that number reduces, and it has already reduced substantially in the past few days. Is there a possibility that the 8.7 per cent figure could become 5 or 4 or 3 per cent?

We do, and it is certainly moving in the right direction, which is positive. However, it perhaps raises a wider question. I presume that, when a lot of projects were budgeted for in the first place, we were in a different world, where inflation was extremely low and interest rates were almost non-existent, at towards 0 per cent. When the Scottish Government’s various directorates were forecasting the costs of large infrastructure projects, to what extent were they budgeting for a potential rise in interest rates? In other words, was the total cost of a project based on the interest rates that existed at the time? Might it have been more prudent to factor in any potential rise in interest rates, knowing that there was a possibility that they could increase? Where do we sit against that? How realistic were those forecasts?

The consequentials could be used in that way. Have you had a discussion with ministers about that?

Before you do that, other members might want to speak about specific projects, which would give you an opportunity to elicit some of the detail.

I presume that, when you were looking at overall budgets five to 10 years ago, at the conception stage, buffer zones would have been introduced to cover potential rises in costs or inflationary costs—those could be rises associated with pure inflation or other associated rises. However, it seems that all the headroom has gone completely, and that that is the reason why you are now making prioritisation choices as opposed to wondering how to pay for things that have already been committed to.

Let us face it: very few large-scale infrastructure projects come in under budget, and all governments suffer from things tending to overreach massively. It is a common problem.

However, I want to work out what on earth the Scottish Government will do next when choosing where to spend its money. It had a £5.9 billion capital budget last year. Although, arguably, that will reduce over the coming years, it is still a substantial amount of money, but it is clearly not enough to complete the projects that have hitherto been committed to.

The Auditor General was critical that it is unclear how the Government chooses to prioritise infrastructure spending. What process will the Government go through to decide whether to replace a prison or to build a national treatment centre, for example? There are clearly competing calls for both, depending on which objectives it is trying to meet.

So will nothing be built at all?

I am sure that we can delve into that further. That is a worrying response.

On the capital maintenance backlog, the one thing that struck me as really concerning is in paragraph 26 on page 18 of the Auditor General’s briefing paper:

“The Scottish Government cannot currently provide an overall figure for the level of capital maintenance backlog across the Scottish estate.”

Is that because the information is not available or because the number is available but is just too scary? We know, for example, that the national health service backlog is over £1 billion, and I have heard figures of around £500 million for the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. I am sure that there are figures for the prisons, the police estate and the courts. That is before we even take into account things such as uncovering reinforced autoclaved aerated concrete—RAAC—in buildings, which is still happening almost weekly.

Are we looking down the barrel of a complete disaster in maintenance backlogs with which we will never be able to catch up? That is perhaps a question for Ms Stafford.

What are the key take aways, so that a member of the public who is watching this meeting can have confidence in what is happening?

It would be great to have any additional updates that you can provide.

It is interesting that much has been mentioned about workforce issues, and we have talked in great detail about the importance of executive leadership. The other key finding from the external review of corporate governance is about the

“root cause of many of the significant challenges”

that you face as a health board. The review states that one root cause is

“the failure to agree an appropriate business model for the delivery of integrated health and social care services”.

We have not spent a lot of time on that aspect this morning. Have things improved?

Appendix 2 of the report is on the delivery schemes. It seems to be a complicated and complex subsidy environment. There are a number of schemes. We have warmer homes Scotland, which is delivered by Warmworks. We have area-based schemes, which are delivered by local councils. We have Home Energy Scotland grants, which are delivered by the Energy Savings Trust, and so on. The number of households that are getting proper conversion of heating systems out of that is in the tens of thousands, as opposed to the hundreds of thousands or millions.

It seems to be quite a complex landscape, as other members have mentioned. Could it be simplified? The risk is that if you leave things to the market alone and people’s only exposure to accessing improvements is via the private sector advertising those schemes with a view to making profit in their own way, it becomes quite a dangerous environment for the consumer.