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I am very grateful.

For the avoidance of doubt, is there any way that 10 out of 15 could be considered a supermajority?

On the prosecution of murder, I recall that, in its stage 1 report, the committee recommended amending the bill to ensure that any case involving a charge of murder is still prosecuted in the High Court. However, the cabinet secretary’s letter does not indicate that the Government plans to amend the bill in that way. Do either of you take a view on that? If so, do you prefer the committee’s suggestion or the Government’s apparent direction of travel?

That is clear—thank you.

I understand—thank you.

On that exact point, with regard to making decisions and the lack of evidence, you mentioned that the powers available to judges in England are different to those that are available in Scotland in relation to evidence and the ability to deal with the matter. Stuart Munro, I presume that it cannot be as simple as mapping the English system, say, on to the Scottish system without consideration of the wider powers that are available to judges. If that is right, is there a more general risk that this Parliament is being asked to legislate on cornerstones of the system without fully appreciating those wider powers, such as are available to judges in England but not to judges in Scotland?

Simon Brown, on that point, the burden of proof in a criminal case is beyond reasonable doubt, such that, if there is any reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted. Are you aware of any other two-verdict system in which it could be suggested that 10 out of 15 jurors would mean that the decision met that burden?

Stuart Munro, in your opening remarks you talked about a significant judicial ruling in October that seems to have had far-reaching consequences for the court’s view of corroboration in criminal cases, such that a number of cases that would previously have had insufficient evidence might progress to prosecution. That is my reading of it, but you will tell me if I have reflected that wrongly. To pick up on your earlier comments, what impact does that decision have on safeguards, and what impact might it have on taking away what you describe as the key cornerstone of not proven?

I will be brief. I have a question on section 40—I will put it to Michael Meehan, but the other two gentlemen can come in if they wish.

Section 40 concerns the appointment and tenure of judges, and section 40(7) to 40(9) concerns the removal of judges. That can currently be done without reasons being given. The committee raised concerns about the proposed changes in that regard at stage 1. In your view, is there a concern that the threat of removal without reasons could risk impacting the independence of decision making?

In any event, given that the cabinet secretary has signalled a willingness to lodge amendments to the removal process, what would those amendments need to look like, in your view, to ameliorate any risk?

Good morning. I will throw this question to Sandy Brindley straight away, because that was a really important point that she just made. I will follow on from Pauline McNeill’s questioning. The uniqueness of the system in Scotland involves the three verdicts, the jury size and corroboration. If the system is not considered holistically and, in the absence of the evidence that Sandy Brindley rightly flagged in her previous answer, if the bill were to proceed with the removal of the third verdict, is there a risk of unintended consequences that would make the system unbalanced or, indeed, worse for the people who you are talking about?