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The basic principle is relatively straightforward—it is about what we would have got under the block grant and the difference that policy makes—but the implementation of it is fearsomely complicated, which is tricky.

To move on a bit but following my previous line of questioning, it really strikes me that we are now facing inflation, and that it is the first time in around 30 years that that has been a major component of what we are doing. Your point about the contrast between the current context and that of the 1990s is well made.

What difference does that make to the business of forecasting, especially when the anticipated inflation rate is changing quite quickly? Six months ago, we were alarmed at the prospect of a 5 to 6 per cent inflation rate, and it now looks like the rate might well hit higher peaks. What difference does that make to the work of the SFC and to forecasting in general?

You have highlighted the specific case, so, before moving on, I will characterise what is in the Audit Scotland report. From paragraph 20 or so onwards, the report shows that a preferred bidder status was awarded on the basis that the ferries contract would be a standard contract in which the constructer assumed the risk. The contract was then revised so that a 25 per cent risk was assumed by, in essence, the public purse. That issue was flagged up, but Scottish ministers still apparently approved the decision. However, there is no documentation of that approval. That is not acceptable, is it? Do you agree that, when a preferred bidder status is awarded on a certain basis and the contract is then altered, that critical ministerial decision should be recorded?

I am almost tempted to leave that as the final word, because it is so important.

Nonetheless, I want to follow up on some of the points that have been made about freedom of information requests. I challenge the point about the importance of legal advice, because I do not believe that the issue is limited to that.

On 8 April, the Financial Times published an article that resulted from a freedom of information request on communications on its original FOI request regarding the Gupta guarantees. Among those communications, there was an email from 29 September between civil servants in the Scottish Government in which the following was stated:

“Here is the long-awaited decision in the Lochaber smelter appeal. Unsurprisingly, the Commissioner has not upheld our s.33(1)(b) arguments, as we have been predicting since at least the review stage. That said, I imagine this is not what Economic Development colleagues were hoping for. I’ll start thinking about what we say to them”.

The point is that it is very clear that officials in the Scottish Government were knowingly withholding information following requests, when they knew that it was highly likely that that decision would be overturned by appeal. Furthermore, those final sentences seem to suggest that there was internal pressure on them to do so.

It is one thing to withhold information on principle, and another to defend that on request. However, when you start knowingly to withhold information, while knowing that you are highly likely to have to reveal that information on appeal, are you not into slightly different territory? Are you not actually knowingly withholding information, and is that not suppression?

The most recent Scottish Fiscal Commission report, which came out in December, was very interesting and revealing. Some of the issues that it discusses are ones that the committee has pursued vigorously. However, even in the short time since that report was published, a lot has changed. We have seen the war in Ukraine and its impact on energy prices, which has fuelled inflation. That was already a concern, but it has been amplified. It strikes me that we are dealing with times in which we are having lots of black swan events. Further back, we had the credit crunch just 10 years ago, and these things seem to be happening more regularly.

Given that the commission’s role is to forecast, what is your view on how we can anticipate and accommodate such risks? Once such things have happened, how should we revise our forecasts? Will you give us some thoughts on how we deal with that?

Leading directly on from that, and similar to my previous line of questioning, it strikes me that, over the past 10 years, we have had the credit crunch, Brexit, Covid and, now, the war in Ukraine; it seems that our black swan events are turning into a bit of a flock.

Having looked through the Fiscal Commission work to date, I see that it has responded to those things. However, I do not necessarily see, either in the body of its main forecasts or in what it publishes more generally, a risk register, for example, or a forward look at contingencies and potential risks. Are those things that should be thought about in terms of some sort of counterfactual assessment and longer-term forecasting?

I note that part of the recommendations is that an induction or training session should be put in place for ministers. Has that been put together? Is it in place? If not, when will it be in place?

I agree with all that, but there will always be a tension when the questions are centred on the person who is also responsible for deciding whether the code has been broken or whether to apply it. From our previous discussion, I recognise the democratic reasons for that—I do—but there is a tension nonetheless. Is that an area for reflection by the independent advisers, and has there been any dialogue on that?

I have two broad areas of questions. One is about progress and the other is about some of the content of future work, especially on the ministerial code.

On progress, I note that briefings with ministers have taken place, and I wonder if you could elaborate on the form that those briefings took, and whether every minister has received a briefing. I assume that the procedure will be most relevant to those civil servants who have the closest contact with ministers.

On the wider piece of work on information and training, has there been prioritisation among more senior civil servants, such as at director general or director level, and in private offices? If so, what progress has been made with that sort of targeted training?

From the bulk of what we have seen to date as regards how complaints are raised, progressed and investigated, the application of the ministerial code will determine the outcomes of any such process, which will be judged by the code. I note that the independent advisers on the ministerial code will come back within three months of the procedure’s publication. Will the Deputy First Minister clarify when that is likely to happen, even in broad terms?

More importantly, given the sensitivity of the matter and given that, as we discussed previously, it comes down to ministerial discretion—especially from the First Minister—to decide whether the code has been broken, what are the parameters of the review that James Hamilton and Dame Elish Angiolini are undertaking? Will it simply be about the formulation and content of the code or will they also examine its operation?

I do not know what you are implying.