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From looking at the detail that has been presented and from hearing some of the answers today, one of my key concerns is the level of granularity at which the project has been monitored and managed. Mr Carlaw said that it is not possible to specify which bit of spend would have occurred in which year, but I suggest that that is precisely what you should be able to do in a well-run IT project. In a well-run IT project, as I said before, you should understand what levels of effort were required at each phase, and have a project management office that tracks those things, using things such as Gantt charts and projected spend. That seems not to be what we see. I would be grateful if that detail could be provided.

In particular, I am very concerned by the category “non-technical Contractors”, which accounts for almost a third of the total costs. That is a very non-specific category of work. Can you explain why you were using third-party contractors to deliver the project? Managing individual contractors on an individual basis seems to be a very complicated way of managing a project like this, but it seems to be what happened.

The key point of contention is around a person’s status while they are working out their notice—whether they continue to be a civil servant or whether they are an employee of the organisation.

However, I will move on, because we have already hinted at some important things that we need to concentrate on. Your point about people having confidence in the civil service is very important—that is probably one of the most important roles and duties of your office. In a parliamentary democracy, having an impartial and independent civil service is critical. In order to maintain that, in its simplest form, it is important that ministers decide and civil servants act. You preserve that distinction by having clear roles and, importantly—as has been hinted at—accurate record keeping. Do you agree with that principle? Do any issues cause you concern? Is there a need to review and reform that record keeping and that clarity of decision making?

I would be keen to correspond or meet about that. Finally, you have agreed to come back with an outline of your approach on record keeping. Can I confirm that you will include in that your understanding of the requirements in the civil service’s “The Green Book”, the Scottish public finance manual and the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 on record keeping on those sorts of decisions and others.

I do not want to concentrate on this but, to follow on from the convener’s line of questioning, do you accept that, as an office holder, you do not inherit all your predecessor’s knowledge and experience? It is not as though you are Dr Who. Do you accept that it is relevant to ask someone to come to the committee to ask about particular circumstances and their reflections on them?

For example, Mr Johnston, who is sitting next to you, has not always been in communities; he was previously in education and justice. If a particular decision had taken place regarding education, even though he is now working in communities, it would be relevant for us to ask him about that. I do not have anything particular in mind, but do you accept that it is sometimes relevant to ask previous office holders about their decisions and the experiences that they had while they were in office rather than the current incumbent?

I am sorry to interrupt, as I have no doubt that that is very important—in the information age, managing information is incredibly complicated, especially in organisations as large as the civil service—but the question is not about information; it is about ensuring that decision making is recorded correctly. The British civil service has a reputation for, and a heritage of, meticulous record keeping, which is about recording specific decisions—saying what was decided, by whom and when. That is what has gone wrong here.

I accept Mr Marks’s characterisation that there is a lot of documentation about the Ferguson Marine matter, but I have two specific questions. That variation was a clear material change to the contract, which would require not just a ministerial decision but for that specific decision to be documented. Indeed, in his evidence to the Public Audit Committee, Mr Boyle suggested that the Scottish public finance manual would require documentation of decision making, and there are questions about whether the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 and the civil service green book would also require such documentation.

First, do you accept that it was a critical decision that should have been documented? Secondly, do you accept that that might have been a legal requirement?

You have acknowledged that there is a requirement to consider what the legal requirements were. It might be not just merely “regrettable”; there might have been a legal requirement.

I have one final question—I thank colleagues for their forbearance. It strikes me that this is not necessarily an isolated matter. There are similar concerns around the processes and the decision making surrounding other commercial engagements that the Scottish Government has had. From the environmental clean-up indemnities that were extended for the Liberty Steel site to the guarantees that were provided for the Lochaber smelter, there have been a number of key decisions on which it is unclear both who made the decision and on what basis. There has been significant reluctance on the part of the Scottish Government and the Administration to reveal those things, even when they knew that they were likely to have to reveal them. The Financial Times has revealed the email trail regarding the smelter guarantees.

I am making a broader point about how decisions are being made, how they are recorded and the openness about them when people ask what records the Scottish Government holds.

Thank you. I will leave it there.

I begin, in contrast to my colleague John Mason, by saying that I totally understand why someone would be interested in coming to a small country, but one with very strong links to the other countries on these islands and indeed with Europe. However, one of the issues with small countries is that they sometimes do not see far beyond their borders. Especially when we are looking at the challenges that are in front of us right now, it is really important to be alive to the global economic issues.

With that in mind, and given your experience in San Marino, what do you think the issues are and how can smaller countries overcome those challenges and look beyond their boundaries?

Does the Fiscal Commission do those things sufficiently in its forecasting? Does it monitor the risks and incorporate the measures and techniques that you have just outlined?

I first want to follow on from some of the previous lines of questioning. An interesting point was made about public awareness of economic issues and the role of the Fiscal Commission. However, more fundamentally, I wonder whether we need people to understand how the fiscal framework works and, in particular, how block grant adjustment works. Frankly, I am not convinced that most people in the Parliament understand that. How possible is it to achieve that? The block grant adjustment is a very synthetic beast. It is not as simple as just counting up the tax receipts to find out how much money you have, as the UK Government does—it is a very hypothetical system. How do we improve awareness and understanding of that?