Seòmar agus comataidhean

The committee having an understanding of the risk profile and uncertainty would be helpful—thank you very much.

I understand that any financial memorandum is stated broadly. Members are used to such memorandums not necessarily turning out to be 100 per cent accurate, if I might put it that way. However, it strikes me that the memorandum to the bill was published only six months ago or thereabouts. It implied that there would be costs not just in the coming financial year but in the current one of not insignificant amounts. However, you are now saying that the amount that will be spent is almost 50 per cent of the upper end of the range; it will certainly be lower than the lower end of that range. It just strikes me that—

Initially, I want to follow up on the answer that you gave on the cost for the national care service in the coming financial year, which you stated was approximately £50 million, excluding the cost of increasing pay for social care workers.

The current financial memorandum to the National Care Service (Scotland) Bill sets out the set-up costs for the national care service over a five-year period. The costs for the coming financial year, 2023-24, range from £63 million to £95 million, which would be for the establishment phase of the service’s central administration. The running costs for that five-year period would not start to kick in until the five years were almost up. If the plan was to spend between £60-odd million and £90-odd million, and you now say that you will spend £50 million in the coming year, does that imply that there will be a delay in the full implementation of the national care service? If so, what is being held back? What are you rephasing in that plan?

That it is helpful. I will come to energy policy in a moment but, just to round out the conversation on payroll, a number of other costs can be attributed and, again, it is important to manage such things. For example, vacancy rates can have a cost, as they can lead to a supplementation through agency staff, third-party contractors and other outsourced resources. Have you set broad parameters for the use of agency staff and third parties; what is the level of vacancy across the public sector—certainly, in particular, those bits that are directly under your control—and how are you managing those things?

Will you confirm whether that is a formal policy? Have you issued that instruction to the civil service to minimise the use of agency staff? Are formal recruitment freezes in place, or are you taking short-term steps?

Forgive me, Deputy First Minister, but, in my previous life, I spent a long time looking at financial and project plans. If a project or a programme plan was at 20 per cent variance within six months of its being published—here, in essence, we are talking about a variance of 15 or 20 per cent—something would have changed somewhere. You may say that that will not have a significant impact on a programme that is scheduled to cost well over £1 billion. I accept that, but I do not accept that there has been no change and that there is nothing to see.

I am simply trying to understand what has altered in the Government’s planning, thinking and assumptions to result in the projected costs for the financial year undershooting what was in a plan that was published only six months ago. It is not a major point, but I think that something must have changed.

At the risk of continuing a technical line of questioning, I will mention energy costs. Everyone is familiar with the issues around those rising costs. All organisations are facing them, and the public sector in Scotland is no different. What is the total energy bill? What is the exposure in relation to gas in particular? The UK Government is ending its energy support arrangements in April. What will the implications of that be for the public sector? Do you have a broad sense of the public sector’s risk exposure to the volatility of gas prices over the coming budget year?

I am actually making a more fundamental point. What the minister has described refers to behavioural impacts and is to do with direct tax receipts. My point follows on from Michelle Thomson’s question about the assessment of the overall market.

Has the Scottish Government undertaken not just an assessment of the incremental marginal changes in the overall property supply, but more fundamental economic modelling to look at where the investment in housing stock comes from and to what extent buy-to-let results in direct investment?

I will be clear: I am somewhat cynical about the contribution that buy-to-let makes in that respect. In my view, it largely shifts existing housing stock between tenures and does not necessarily contribute to that investment. By the same token, however, I would quite like the Scottish Government to reassure me that it has undertaken such economic modelling and that it has a view.

Ultimately, we need investment in housing stock. That has to be the bottom line from which we view all these measures. Has that economic modelling been undertaken? Will the Government undertake such modelling as part of its review of LBTT?

I will be brief. I broadly agree with the Scottish Government’s rationale for the measure. However, reflecting on the discussion that we have had, I think that it is important that we are evidence led and that we undertake specific analysis of the impact and of the broader modelling. We need investment in increasing our housing stock and in improving existing housing stock. Although I do not necessarily agree with all the sentiments that were expressed in the debate, I think that we need to consider these things in the round, and I am not convinced that that has been done, based on the evidence that I have heard. I will support the measure, but I urge the Scottish Government to consider the broader impact so that we improve our housing stock in terms of numbers, quality and affordability.

I will follow similar themes.

Ultimately, housing supply is a significant issue. We are still in a process of recovery. Last year, the number of housing completions in Scotland was around 15,000, whereas pre-Covid levels were around 22,000 a year. In turn, that was significantly below pre-2008 levels. To my mind, that is the context.

The Scottish Property Federation and others contend that the change will remove investment from housing. What evidence have you seen on whether buy-to-let results in direct investment in housing stock, or the extent to which it simply shifts existing housing stock between tenures? Has the Scottish Government looked at where that investment actually goes? Does it go into existing housing stock? To what extent does it create new housing stock?