Seòmar agus comataidhean

As I say, other jurisdictions operate using prognostic periods and issues appear to be manageable within that context. Nevertheless, the argument is about establishing with any certainty the accurate time of anticipated death. It is an issue that the committee heard about in evidence, and it took the view that it did in its stage 1 report.

Will Bob Doris take an intervention?

In a second, Mr Whittle. I would be concerned that that might create undue delays and prolong the suffering of the person who is seeking assisted death, particularly given that the proposed period of 10 working days following the assessment before the report is produced might pass with no additional protection being provided.

I do not happen to agree with that. As I go through and respond to the amendments, the rationale for that might become clearer.

Amendments 143 and 144 offer alternative options. The former suggests a prognosis period of three months. As well as my general concerns about setting a prognosis period, I add that there are no examples from around the world of a three-month prognosis timeframe. Not only would it risk eligible adults being unable to access the choice in time, it would risk—as I think Daniel Johnson rightly pointed out—placing pressure on them to make a hurried decision. I know that Mr Balfour would not wish for that to happen.

A six-month period, as suggested by amendment 144, is certainly more realistic, albeit that I offer the same general reservations about setting a timescale for prognosis. Amendment 144 also proposes adding, for the avoidance of doubt, that a person should not be considered terminally ill if their

“condition can be controlled or substantially slowed down by medical intervention”.

I remind colleagues—this perhaps addresses some of what Pam Duncan-Glancy was saying—that the definition that is set out in the bill states that

“a person is terminally ill if they have an advanced and progressive disease, illness or condition from which they are unable to recover and that can reasonably be expected to cause their premature death.”

I remain of the view that the definition of terminal illness as set out in the bill is appropriate and captures the appropriate cohort of people.

I am going to make a little more progress, Ms Duncan-Glancy.

Adding terms such as “substantially slowed down” is likely only to add to confusion.

Although I am sympathetic to the provision in amendment 144 that states that,

“For the avoidance of doubt, a person is not terminally ill if ... their illness is a consequence of voluntarily stopping eating and drinking”,

I believe that that is already covered in the existing definition. Indeed, it was not raised with the committee at stage 1.

Daniel Johnson’s amendment 4 similarly seeks to define terminal illness by reference to a six-month time period. I know from my discussions with him that he was keen to open up a debate on that, and I think that he has been successful in doing that.

As I have said, other jurisdictions generally operate with prognosis periods of six months, albeit that there are often slightly longer prognosis periods for neurological conditions. It is therefore entirely right that we are having this discussion. I have set out my concerns about how that might work in practice, but I am interested to hear the debate on it and to see where Parliament eventually lands.

I am happy to work with colleagues ahead of stage 3 on workable amendments that might deliver the intention, but it was important to put on record why I opted for the approach in the bill. I think that it is consistent with decisions that Parliament has taken previously on similar issues. I will listen to what colleagues have to say and, as I said, I am open to having further discussions about this.

I am never ambivalent, Patrick Harvie—you will know that.

I am reluctant to support the amendments as they are framed, but Jackie Baillie raised some reasonable points in relation to the regulation of services, particularly those outwith the NHS. Fulton MacGregor spoke about embedding the service within the NHS and for that to have protocols and all the rest of it. That is the most appropriate route to proceed along. However, as I said, Jackie Baillie’s points about services that are outwith the NHS are reasonably and fairly made.

I turn to Bob Doris’s amendment 128, and note that amendment 138 is a consequential amendment that seeks to ensure that related regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure—or possibly, given his earlier comments, bumped up to super-affirmative procedure. I am keen to ensure the safety and welfare of anyone who is seeking assistance under the bill’s provisions, and I believe that the bill includes safeguards to ensure that that happens.

I note that health professionals who choose to participate in assisted dying are already regulated by the General Medical Council, which provides robust oversight. I acknowledge that there are already mechanisms for raising concerns about health and social work professionals, and I would be concerned about setting up dual-running processes, which would only add confusion.

I am not persuaded of the need for or appropriateness of ministers being required to create an exhaustive list of places where assisted dying can take place, for many of the reasons that Patrick Harvie alluded to in his intervention.

With regard to subsection (3) in amendment 128, I remind the committee that there are already established mechanisms for raising those concerns.

In relation to the linked amendments 141 and 142, I have serious reservations about the commencement of the substantive provisions of the bill being subject to the regulations that are provided for in amendment 128. I believe that, as with other amendments that seek to prevent the act from being properly implemented, that risks an unacceptable delay for those who wish to have and need assistance being able to request it.

I thank Bob Doris for making that point. That was not the implication of my remarks, but it is very helpful that he set that out, and I take that point in the spirit in which it was made.

There are a number of areas in which provisions are contingent on other things happening. I would be very cautious about proceeding on that basis. I am sure that we will have debates about that in future groups, but I have set out my concerns in relation to that point.

I will certainly support amendment 256. As I said, there is an issue about proportionality with amendment 257. There are examples of similar provisions in other jurisdictions for reasons to do with guaranteeing access. I am more persuaded of the rationale for allowing those who are in the sector to develop the model. My evidence to the committee at stage 1 acknowledged that the service will look and feel different in different parts of the country because of the circumstances that each area will need to deal with. That is already happening daily in health and care.

I understand the motivation behind amendment 257 and I understand why the RCN and others seek that provision. As it stands, the amendment may be disproportionate, but I would certainly be happy to work with Fulton MacGregor ahead of stage 3 to see whether something can be worked up that might address those concerns.

I will take a brief one.