Seòmar agus comataidhean

You have to open the book first to see what those are.

After seeing so many failures, I certainly encourage you to consider looking at the whole rather than the individual parts.

I will carry on with one or two more questions. The report raised concerns about the leadership of the former convener of the Crofting Commission and, clearly, that person did not really recognise the distinction between their role and that of management. Do you think that the role of the convener has now been set out clearly enough? Is it understood by the current convener?

The report states that the former convener “retained the confidence” of the board in spite of all the issues around his leadership, such as “failing to appropriately chair” board meetings and arranging private decision-making meetings. That raises a question that was briefly touched on earlier: were those board members offered, and did they attend, the training that is usually made available for board members? That would have equipped them to challenge some of the actions that were taken by the convener.

It would have been the responsibility of the convener to ensure that training took place, of course.

I want to ask about sponsorship. A bit of clarification might be needed here, Auditor General. The report states that the Scottish Government’s sponsorship division

“appeared to view its relationship of consequence as being with the Senior Management Team rather than the Convener.”

Earlier, you said that the sponsorship division’s relationship was with the CEO, which is slightly different. Perhaps you could clarify that.

Could we have clarification as to whether it is in fact a secondment or simply a matter of terms and conditions?

The relationship between the Scottish Government and an NDPB is kind of changed if Scottish Government staff go in and hold a position in the body—at least, it is in my mind—so clarification on that would be good.

During the height of the pandemic, some of the private supply chains that were supplying primary care providers and social care providers fell apart, and the Scottish Government stepped in to provide the necessary PPE to care homes and so on. Has the Scottish Government ever been reimbursed for any of the PPE that was supplied to those private businesses?

Do we know whether the providers are using their private supply chains these days, or are they still accessing PPE from the hubs?

It would be interesting to know the extent to which the private sector is still reliant on the public sector to provide PPE.

Your briefing also states that, in the first five months of the pandemic,

“had NHS NSS been able to buy PPE at the same prices as 2019, it would have spent £37.4 million less on PPE”.

This might be a daft question, but I suppose that it has to be asked. In your opinion, could anything have been done to avoid that additional spend?

Before I ask any specific questions, I will just say this: here we are again with an NDPB in trouble. We have had a series of examples over a number of years, and they all seem to rotate around much the same issues. The big one is governance, but there have been problems with budgeting, technology and all sorts of other things. The issue comes up time and again. Is there a fundamental problem with how NDPBs are run and monitored? Is the system broken? Should we be considering something totally different?