Seòmar agus comataidhean

There is a range of disagreement and agreement. The issue is wide ranging and is one of policy, rather than being one for the lawyers to sort out. The lawyers can argue about it later, but we will argue about it first.

I have one last thing to talk about, which is the domicile of the trust and where it is based. The academic panel of Professor Paisley, Professor Gretton and Yvonne Evans were all pretty much agreed that a protector should not be able to move the permanent residence of a trust outside Scotland. On that basis, and in relation to section 49 of the bill, were the academics correct when they said that permitting the protector of a trust to move the domicile of a trust outside Scotland was undesirable in policy terms? What are your views on whether protectors should be allowed to do that?

That makes sense.

I understand exactly what you are talking about and can see how what you have said provides a bit of clarity on sections 25 and 26. However, is not there a wee issue for beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries in terms of trustees having too much power? Trustees might decide to go forward in a way that means that the beneficiary does not get as much from the trust as they otherwise might have had.

That is very clear, considering how woolly my question was. [Laughter.]

Ross Anderson, do you have anything to add?

If there are no other views, those answers have covered my question. Everyone here seems to be of broadly the same mind. That information will be very useful for us, so I thank you.

I move to sections 25 and 26 of the bill. Section 25 requires trustees to tell a beneficiary that they are a beneficiary—that did not really surprise me, but there you go—and to give all the trustees’ names and correspondence details. Under section 25, those duties are mandatory for certain types of beneficiaries, while trustees have some discretion as to what information is provided for potential beneficiaries.

Section 26 covers the information that must be made available to beneficiaries. A trust deed can override section 26, but a court can later review the reasonableness of that override. It has been said in various correspondence and by the previous panel that trustees’ duties to provide information to beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries under those sections of the bill are too onerous. Do you have any ideas about whether that is the case? Would you amend the sections to address those concerns? Would anyone who is dead interested in the matter like to go first? [Laughter.]

That is another angle. Thank you very much.

My next question is for Laura Dunlop. The Law Society did not comment on the policy underpinning section 49. However, it said that the drafting of the domicile subsection was unclear in terms of its scope. The Law Society also said that the scope of the separate power of the protector to determine the trust’s “administrative centre” was also unclear. Should work be done on whether that should be continued?

I have a question on section 61, which is on the alteration of trust purposes in family trusts, which we have dabbled in slightly already.

Section 61 says that after such a private trust has been in existence for 25 years, the Court of Session will have the power to alter the trust’s purposes—its aims, objectives and so on. A shorter minimum period can be specified in the legal document that creates a particular trust.

In the committee’s call for views, six of the 12 respondents who commented on section 61 said that they thought that 25 years is too long. I do not want to go too far, but Alice Pringle was one of the respondents who suggested that, as was Anderson Strathern, among a number of others. The Faculty of Advocates said that

“The imposition of such a lengthy period ... is notable.”

Section 61 gives the power to apply to the court to alter the trust purposes of a family trust. The views on the 25-year restriction have been mixed and many respondents have said that 25 years is too long. Are you satisfied with that time period?

As soon as that.