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Good morning, cabinet secretary. I will keep this part brief, but you have talked about negotiating positions on a veterinary and sanitary and phytosanitary agreement and youth mobility and whether there is room for an improved position between the UK and the EU. On our visit to Brussels, I picked up some views from the EU perspective to the effect that, as one person put it, “You will have to accept every dot and comma of regulatory alignment”, while from a UK perspective, I picked up the expectation that the Europeans will, of course, give us what we want, because it is in their interests to, really. Is it your view that the negotiating positions are naturally going to begin at those extremes and that the potential for something that is agreeable, even to a pro-Brexit UK Government, is simply a matter of political will?

Hands have gone up, and the order was Mike Buckley, Professor Hall and then Professor Portes.

In that case, I want to ask about the Scottish Government’s policy of maximum alignment. Obviously, the extent to which alignment can be maximised is not absolute. We are going to see some level of divergence from both sides, including, in some instances, on matters that are devolved; however, in many matters that are not devolved, we might well see divergence happening on the UK side as well as on the European side.

You have set out, first, in your letter and, secondly, in your comments today, two key reasons for that policy of maximum alignment. One is to maintain high standards, and the other is to avoid the unnecessary creation of additional non-tariff trade barriers—that is, the sorts of issues that we have been discussing in the TCA inquiry.

Is there not, though, a third objective of the policy, something that will actually become more important over time? Again, some people will disagree with this, but a clear majority in this Parliament—and a clear majority of the public—recognise that Brexit was a mistake and support rejoining, whether that be in the context of Scotland or the context of the UK. It might be a long-term objective—it might not happen in this decade and, to be even more pessimistic, might not even happen in the next—but surely the longer there is some divergence, the more value there is in minimising it and maximising alignment as best we can, so that when a process of rejoining becomes politically possible, it is not more complicated than it needs to be.

That is helpful, thank you.

Does Professor Collins want to add anything?

Are there any other views?

For obvious reasons, there has been a lot of discussion about EU member states. One comment was made about non-EU member states, and the idea that we are now in the position that they are in with regard to trying to work with the EU.

I wonder if that could be drawn out a little bit more. Are we now in exactly the same position as other non-EU member states that want to work with EU jurisdictions? Do those non-EU member states that have a high level of economic relationship with Europe have in place similar arrangements to what is in the TCA? Have those arrangements developed over time? If we are looking for the TCA, or whatever develops out of it, to be deepened and enriched over time, can any lessons be drawn from other countries that are outside the EU and that have some of the same issues around the lack of freedom of movement and the impact that that has on services? Have those countries found solutions?

The situation is comparable to whether one is in the room as a politician or a civil servant. Very often we are in the room, but we have a lesser status or less opportunity to influence discussion.

At the same time, in the EU, there is a kind of move away from the idea that accession is just a binary, in or out process, and the idea is that there is more of a graduated change for countries that seek EU membership to gradually integrate. Even though I might wish that we—Scotland or the UK—become a re-accession country one day, whether or not that happens, I presume that there is space for a level of integration that will address some of the issues that we are discussing today that is comparable to that which the EU now explores with countries that are seeking membership. Am I going too far there?

I thank the cabinet secretary for her response and other members for their contributions to the discussion. I am tempted to press amendment 27, partly to gauge the level of support for it on the committee. I may not have done enough to persuade people on this precise amendment, but I would like to get a sense of whether I have. If I have not, I will perhaps explore lodging something else at stage 3.

However, if the committee is convinced that an amendment is needed to place additional requirements in the bill at this point, if it were to agree to the amendment, the onus would be on the Government, if it wanted to refine the provision, to convince the majority of Parliament of the need for a change. I would prefer to at least put the question to the committee now, so I press amendment 27.

Good morning. As a non-member of the committee, I will speak to my own amendment and leave members of the committee to comment on the other amendments in the group.

Amendment 60 is not grouped with amendment 17, which will come up later, but it touches on a similar issue, and in some ways the amendments should be seen together. They relate to how we examine the carbon impact, or the climate impact, of major capital projects.

Amendment 17 relates to the climate change plan, and amendment 60 raises the same issue in relation to the report that the Government will publish on carbon budgets. Obviously, some major capital projects for pieces of infrastructure that the Government is proposing will be contentious, while others will not be. That will be true regardless of whether those are high-carbon or low-carbon pieces of infrastructure. However, that judgment must be made on the basis of a full, proper assessment of the likely impact of capital projects.

For some projects that the Government continues to support, it has agreed that there need to be carbon assessments. For example, Government policy on the A96 has committed to a carbon assessment and climate compatibility assessment.

Regardless of whether anyone supports or opposes particular projects, we should reach those decisions and judgments on the basis of proper assessments. I think that it is unreasonable that we are still in a position in which we do not have a clear legislative basis for requiring those assessments. I suggest that even the Government recognises that the status quo is not ideal, and I understand that it is working on how it would regard the application of a net zero test for such decisions.

My amendments 60 and 17 seek to find a way for the Parliament to be able to reach a view on infrastructure and capital projects on the basis of a full assessment of the impacts that they would have on carbon budgets or the ability to deliver a climate change plan. I look forward to hearing the Government’s response and to finding out whether it would be open to the amendments that I have proposed, or whether it has an alternative approach to how the issues can be addressed in the legislation before we reach stage 3.

I move amendment 60.