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It is likely that, en route to the final, Scotland will be in Canada at some point. I wonder whether you have taken lessons from what happened in Germany, because that was an astonishing boost to Scotland. As was said earlier, Scotland enjoys a pretty warm reputation there. I certainly remember being in the ambassador’s residence and being embraced by a senior member of the Christian Democratic Union who said, “We like our Scottish friends because they want to stay with us.” Those were her exact words. She was looking at the ambassador when she said it. We have a good reputation there. We often are not aware of the number of Germans who come, in particular, to the Highlands in Scotland. Are your plans as detailed at this stage as they were in advance of the draw for Germany and have you learned from that?

I think that you have answered the question for both sides, in Germany and in Canada. You are quite right to say that the boost is related to the fans and their behaviour and conduct, of course.

John Devine, this committee talks to Historic Environment Scotland and we have just been speaking to people about Creative Scotland, neither of whom—I cannot speak for the whole committee—seem to have a huge presence in North America. In relation to HES, for instance, the diaspora in North America could help to contribute to the refurbishment, maintenance or on-going support of various buildings around the country and I am not aware that HES taps into that much. We have also heard from Creative Scotland that they do not have capital funds and so on, and I am sure that they could do more in North America. Is that something that your office does at all? I know that that may be more based in the US, if it is based at all, but what experience do you have of that?

That is pretty much the same response that we got from HES. I think that you have to go after some of those opportunities and they are quite niche, but thanks for that.

My last question is to Nick Leake, because I do not want him to feel that he has been left out. Obviously one of the main purposes of the international strategy is to encourage investment in Scotland. It is down there in the report.

Scotland currently has the highest levels of foreign direct investment of any part of the UK, apart from the south-east of England, and has done very well for over a decade now on that. We also have lower unemployment than the rest of the UK, a better productivity record more recently, and now a good international credit score, as well. Are you able to measure how our offices have contributed to that?

This committee visited one of the haggis manufacturers not far from here and heard the same story about difficulties being exacerbated since Brexit. I am sorry; please go on.

As he is on the screen, I will go to Professor Renwick.

Unlike yours, Neil, which was pure—[Laughter.]

I do not disagree about ensuring that a referendum is fair and I accept the points about the process leading up to it. However, there is little point in doing that unless you are going to have a referendum, and that is the point that we are stuck at.

On Professor Renwick’s point, empirically the evidence does not support his statement that Scotland is not being treated differently. It was treated differently in 1979, and even in 1997, as asking a second question was a very different mechanism in a referendum. Secondly, we are treating Scotland differently just now by talking about maybe having a coincidental referendum for part of Scotland at the same time, or imposing something like the settled will or a supermajority, or all these different conditions that would apply—none of that was involved in the Brexit referendum. It is fine to say that we should learn from the mess that was the Brexit referendum, but the point that I was trying to make was about the way in which the state is perceived to treat different parts of the UK differently.

However, I am very grateful to the panel for the answers that they have given.

Before I come to other panel members, I have another question. There seems to be no prospect of what you described—of Westminster saying that there have been continual elections that have produced pro-independence or pro-referendum majorities and recognising that that has any consequence at all. Do you see any political consequences from continuing to see ever-more emphatic statements of support in elections for pro-independence or pro-referendum parties? What could be the political consequences of that, if any, for the UK establishment?

This will be my second-last question—feel free to respond quite briefly, if you think that that is appropriate. I do not want to put words in the mouths of witnesses but, in last week’s evidence session, we heard essentially that the act of union was pretty much a dead letter—it is irrelevant to the discussion—yet some of the written evidence suggests that it has a bit more standing than that and that, if there was a successful vote for independence, the act would need to be repealed.

Of course, the idea that there should be a right to self-determination in part rests on the idea, rightly or wrongly, that Scotland and England voluntarily—I would question whether it was voluntary at all—entered into this act of union between two parties, so each party should have the right to end that and have a process for achieving that.

What standing does the act of union have in the debate? I ask that with the view that this will come down to the UK Government putting its finger in the air and deciding what it wants to do—that seems to be how much of the constitution works in this country. What standing does the act of union have? I will go back to Nicola McEwen.

In 1979, I tried to be a proxy for my mother’s vote in the referendum that year, but, at 17, I was too young to do that. I am just thinking about all the different conditions that have been applied. Can any of the witnesses say what is so different about Scotland?

In 1979, we had the 40 per cent rule, which was unheard of, whereby the votes of the dead counted for the status quo. We have talked about confirmatory referenda and, although I see some merit in the final shape of an independent Scotland being subject to a vote, the idea of having to say again that we want the same thing is not something that I could see happening anywhere but Scotland.

The idea has been raised that different parts of Scotland—I know that this has not been advanced by the witnesses, but it certainly was by Jamie Halcro Johnston—could vote differently at the same time. It is funny, because I did not recall such voices during the Brexit referendum, when every part of Scotland voted to stay in the EU and we were utterly disregarded. That idea did not count at that point.

Also, if this is merely a distraction, and the SNP is not serious about it, call its bluff—go for it; have the referendum. That is the best way you can kill it off.

Why is it always that we come up with these strange mechanisms or different conditions? Compare that to the Brexit referendum, when there was no white paper, no background, no conditions attached—and, on the point about a 50.1 per cent result, in the case of the Brexit referendum, the result was 52 per cent to 48 per cent but nobody is questioning its legitimacy; it was a simple majority. Why is it that such conditions seem to be talked about or brought into the equation only when we talk about Scotland? Is it simply because the Brexit referendum was one that, for his own reasons, the Prime Minister of the UK wanted and the independence referendum is a referendum that the UK does not want, or is there something specific about Scotland, which we cannot quite discern, that makes it subject to all these conditions?