Seòmar agus comataidhean

It slightly predates my time as cabinet secretary, but I understand that these were asked for and welcomed by the profession. However, I ask Mr Haccius whether he can confirm that.

When we first proposed the bill, it went further than John Scott’s committee had recommended in a number of respects—and, at this stage, we are going further than this committee suggested in a number of respects. I have taken into account the committee’s view, but I think that limits have to be set, as we could start to devalue the impact of the pardon.

I hope that the committee recognises in my amendments 2 and 3 a genuine attempt to broaden eligibility in a way that is relatively easy for people to understand and which does not dilute the value of the pardon. That might sound fairly abstract, but I do not think that it is fairly abstract to miners or the families of miners who will get the pardon. I think that they will want to know that it has a value that they can identify.

I have tried to address the issues that the committee is concerned about. Amendment 5 recognises that the offence of theft—for which, as I understand it, there were only three convictions—was an act of desperation for people who were very hard pressed during the strike. We have changed our view on that. I cannot say for certain, but I think that three women, all in Ayrshire, were involved. I cannot say, because the records are not there, but it is not hard to imagine that it happened as a result of economic hardship and having to look after families. That is why we have changed our view on that.

As I have said, I cannot support amendment 3A in its current format, because I believe that it would introduce uncertainty. Amendment 3 in my name makes clear the context of the purpose of the activity that a person

“was engaged or participating in”

or responding to during the miners’ strike, with personal matters expressly excluded. I note Pam Duncan-Glancy’s point about the bill covering only those in support of the strike, but we have discussed that issue with the National Union of Mineworkers and others, and they are perfectly comfortable with what we have proposed. Somebody who was against the strike has to be covered for the same behaviours as those who were for it. That is what we need if we are to have any real attempt at reconciliation—which, as I think Pam Duncan-Glancy has said, is a hard thing to do. As I have said, the NUM is perfectly comfortable with that approach. I have listened to Pam Duncan-Glancy’s explanation and I think that there is merit in giving it further consideration; however, it requires further work ahead of stage 3, so I ask her not to move amendment 3A at this time.

For the reasons that were set out previously, I ask Alexander Stewart not to move his amendments 9, 10, 11 and 12 if my amendment 3 is agreed to. In any event, they will, as the convener has said, be pre-empted. For similar reasons, I ask Pam Gosal not to move amendment 15, but I think that she has conceded the point that that amendment would be superseded, too.

I continue to have concerns about Richard Leonard’s amendment 17, given the aspects pertaining to the use of violence and intimidation that are mentioned in the 1875 act. I suppose that I am less concerned about whether it was Benjamin Disraeli who brought in that act than I am about what happened at the time.

To give a little bit of comfort to Alexander Stewart, I suggest that the maximum fine of £50 gives some indication of the level of offence, especially when we compare it with breaches of the peace and breaches of bail conditions. It seems to suggest that the offences were not as serious as might be construed under the act, but a bit of further work is required on the matter.

Richard Leonard and I are not too far apart on this, and I do not think that there will be too much difficulty in coming to agreement. I therefore ask him to accept at face value my offer to discuss it in good faith and not to move amendment 17.

Amendment 2 agreed to.

Amendment 3 moved—[Keith Brown].

I endorse some of the comments that have been made, not least those made by Pam Duncan-Glancy, on the strike. For my part, I was not on the picket line but I supported the strike when I was a student—in the various ways that students support such things. Those that have done that will understand what I mean.

I represent a constituency in which there is a substantial number of ex-miners. Some of them have only recently become ex-miners, because Longannet, where many people who live in my constituency were employed, is just outside the constituency boundary. It is also true that I was on strike in the 1980s, in a different context. I valued the solidarity of the other trade unions and different people at that time. I am very alive to that, and I am sure that there is no intention on Pam Duncan-Glancy’s part to dilute the provisions, although that would be the effect of her amendments.

I have always believed that it was the miners themselves who were the most disproportionately affected by the stigma and often unforeseen consequences of being convicted. Therefore, it is appropriate that it should be the miners who are pardoned if they consider that the eligibility criteria have been met. In my view, that also applies to the loved ones of those miners who are sadly no longer with us—they should be pardoned posthumously.

As Maggie Chapman said, I have extended the categories of people, having listened to what the committee had to say. However, to extend that further in the way that is proposed would start to dilute the provisions, introduce ambiguity, and create uncertainty in the minds of those who are eligible for the pardon.

It has been mentioned on several occasions that there is a lack of records that survive, given the passage of time. There are contesting views and accounts of the events during the strike. The committee will know that, having heard the very powerful testimonies of those who provided oral and written evidence at stage 1.

The report of the independent review group recommended that there should be a pardon for the men who were convicted and there is no robust evidence to suggest that any women or young people were convicted. Therefore, I recognise that there will always be a degree of uncertainty about how many individuals living in the same household as a miner were convicted during the strike. My amendments would broaden eligibility to such individuals that consider that they meet the qualifying criteria for the pardon. In so doing, the amendments seek to address one of the concerns that the committee raised.

I trust that the committee recognises that the amendments in my name are a genuine attempt to broaden eligibility to those who lived in the same household as a miner, close enough to be directly impacted by the strike, and who were convicted for actions that they took as a result of that impact.

Amendments 4A and 13 highlight the challenge of drafting a definition of “family member” that works in the context of the strike. I am willing to consider the matter further but I cannot support amendments 4A and 13 in their current form. I ask the member not to move amendments 4A and 13 at this time.

Amendments 4B and 14 require further careful consideration. I undertake to give them that consideration, in particular to clarify and set boundaries on the relationships that are covered by the term “supporter”. However, I cannot support amendments 4B and 14 in their current format, and I ask the member not to move them at stage 2.

Amendment 1 agreed to.

Amendments 2 and 3 are a response to the committee’s recommendation that the pardon be extended to offences that occurred in the community instead of its applying only to offences in the context of

“a picket, demonstration or ... similar gathering”.

Amendment 5 adds theft to the list of qualifying offences, with an additional eligibility criterion created in relation to that offence.

Amendment 3 is quite complex—I apologise for that, convener. It amends section 1 by removing the original conditions A and B and replacing them with differently worded conditions A and B and new condition C. Replacement condition A broadens the scope of where and the context in which qualifying offences might have taken place under the condition, by providing that the conduct that gave rise to such an offence must have occurred while an individual

“was engaged or participating in ... activity”—

including “ancillary” activity, such as connected travel—either in support of or in opposition to the miners’ strike. That replaces the narrower reference to

“picket, demonstration or ... similar gathering”

in the current version of condition A. Replacement condition A also specifies that any activity that occurred

“for a reason unrelated to the miners’ strike”,

such as “a personal matter”, is excluded from the scope of the pardon.

Replacement condition B provides that conduct that

“occurred in response to conduct that meets condition A”—

well done if you can follow that, convener—is also included within the scope of the pardon. The intention is to cover both parties to an altercation in the community where, for example, strike-related abusive comments made by one party are responded to with more general threats or insults by another. Replacement condition B also specifies that any activity that occurred

“for a reason unrelated to the miners’ strike”—

for example, “a personal matter”—is excluded from the scope of the pardon.

Amendment 3 also introduces new condition C, which sets out that conduct that gave rise to the offence of theft is covered by the pardon if it occurred

“because of economic hardship arising from participation (whether by the individual or another person) in the miners’ strike”.

The economic hardship referred to in condition C could be either the hardship suffered by the person convicted of the theft, or the hardship of another person, which was to be relieved by the item which was stolen—for example, a member of a striking miner’s household who stole an item in order to relieve the hardship of another member of the household.

Amendment 2 amends section 1, so that conditions A or B apply only to the qualifying offences of breach of the peace, an offence under section 3 of the Bail etc (Scotland) Act 1980 on breach of bail conditions, and an offence under section 41(1)(a) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 on obstructing the police. It also amends section 1(1)(b) of the bill so that new condition C applies only to the qualifying offence of theft. That is required, because theft is not activity supporting or opposing the strike, or a direct response to such activity, and therefore the offence needs a separate eligibility criterion. Ultimately, the second group of amendments seeks to respond positively to the recommendation in the committee’s stage 1 report that the Scottish Government consider extending the pardon to convictions for qualifying offences that occurred in mining communities.

I now turn to amendment 3A in the name of Pam Duncan-Glancy, which seeks to replace the reference to “supporting or opposing” proposed in amendment 3 in my name with a broader reference to “relating to” the strike. I am not sure on what basis that wording is considered to be preferable to the wording that I propose in amendment 3, and I look forward to hearing the explanation for that. I also sound a note of caution: the broader formulation suggested by amendment 3A is rather vague and might create uncertainty that could make it harder for people to self-assess whether they qualify for the pardon.

I will turn briefly to amendments 9, 10, 11 and 12, lodged by Alexander Stewart. Taken together, the amendments seek to remove all references to “other similar gathering” from section 1. Given that amendment 3 in my name removes that wording from the bill, I consider the amendments unnecessary. In a similar vein, amendment 15, in the name of Pam Gosal, seeks to remove references to “intended participation, or” in section 1(3)(b). Amendment 3 would also remove that wording.

Amendment 17, in the name of Richard Leonard, amends section 2 of the bill to make an offence under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 a qualifying offence. I fully recognise the member’s wish to include in the pardon an offence that some would argue is not dissimilar to the sort of conduct associated with a breach of the peace, but I continue to have concerns about the proposal, given the violence and intimidation aspects mentioned in the 1875 act. A conviction under that act could cover a wide spectrum of behaviour relating to attempting without legal authority to compel another person to support the strike or not to go to work—for example, the use of violence to intimidate another person or their family or to damage their property.

I am willing to consider the matter further, and I am also happy to discuss directly with the member the wording and basis of the amendment. I should say that further anecdotal evidence indicates that there were 16 convictions for that offence, all of them in Strathclyde, with a maximum fine of £50. Today, however, I urge members to carefully consider whether such behaviour might cross the line between supporting industrial action and intimidating a miner who chose to work, or even intimidating their family. As I have said, I am willing to have further discussions with the member on the issue.

I move amendment 2.

Post-bill, I would be more than happy to meet Richard Leonard and any other members who are interested in discussing how we can better prosecute the case for compensation from the UK Government. In having that discussion, I hope that it will be possible for us to reach a consensus and unanimity. It is important to the former miners to whom I have spoken that the Parliament speaks with one voice on the matter, even if we appear to have a difference of opinion here today.

I will do what I can to explain my view. I recognise that many miners and their families suffered terrible hardship as a result of taking part in the strike. Even now, many of those who are still living have not recovered from the effects of the strike, and subsequent generations have not recovered from the effects on their families and their communities. I understand that point, and it is absolutely right that compensation is paid in relation to that; however, I will explain why I do not think that the bill is the right place to do that. It is not for some of the reasons that have been mentioned, which I do not think that I have advanced.

I agree that compensation should be paid, but the bill is not the place to provide for that. That is not only my view—it is the view of the committee and of John Scott’s review group. The group was in favour of a pardon in order to provide reconciliation, which would be automatic and as easy as possible. That approach would be complicated if we tried to graft in a compensation scheme at a late stage of the bill process. The issue is not so much the time that it would take to introduce legislation; it is the time that it would take to put together a proper compensation scheme, and also the effect that it would have on the people who receive the pardon to which they are entitled.

Amendment 16 provides that some form of compensation be paid by the Scottish ministers to miners who qualify for the pardon. Although the amendment is not being voted on today, I must speak to it, because it is in front of us. The amendment does not specify what would be compensated for, nor does it specify an amount to be paid or the basis for calculating such an amount. Therefore, I have concerns about the lack of specificity in the proposed provisions.

I have other concerns. The bill does not provide the means to compensate miners for the hardships that they endured in a financial sense. The whole point of the bill is to grant a symbolic, collective and automatic pardon, and it focuses on reconciliation rather than on compensation. That is not to say that compensation is wrong, but the bill is not the place for it. Such a provision would undermine the fact that the bill is symbolic and collective; as I will go on to explain, it would divide miner from miner according to who qualified and who did not. In addition, compensation would not be automatic.

A compensation scheme would not be consistent with the proposal to self-assess eligibility for the pardon, which is what we are asking people to do. We are asking people to look at the bill as passed and say, “I’m entitled to that pardon, and I should get it.” A compensation scheme would undermine that, and it would have the potential to create significant practical differences. As the committee highlighted in its stage 1 report, the scheme would be complex to administer. If anybody can point me to a compensation scheme that the Parliament has approved that is not complex to administer, does not require substantial bureaucracy and does not require an application process, I would be happy to listen.

Such a scheme would require qualified people to assess whether an applicant actually qualified for the pardon. We know that, under the circumstances that are prescribed in the bill, it would be difficult for applicants to find evidence of a conviction, given the passage of time. That is why the bill does not propose an application scheme for the pardon; instead, it is for the individual to self-assess.

Richard Leonard mentioned the NUM. I said that the NUM agreed with our proposal in relation to a previous amendment, but I made no mention of the compensation scheme. I have known Nicky Wilson for many years, and we had a very cordial and straightforward discussion about it, although we have different points of view. As the question has been asked, I point out that Nicky Wilson asked me why a pardon and compensation were not approved during 13 years of a Labour Government, and why the miners pension fund lost billions of pounds at the hands of successive Governments, which hoovered up the money that belonged to the fund. Those matters cannot be addressed in the bill, either.

If the committee supports Richard Leonard’s amendment, only miners who meet the qualifying criteria for the pardon would receive compensation, while others who lost their jobs—perhaps on the basis of an arrest rather than a conviction, or because they were convicted of an offence that is outwith the qualifying criteria, which I think we are getting close to agreeing—would not receive compensation. We would be setting one miner and their family against other miners and their families. The scheme could also be divisive in relation to those who could show that they qualified for the pardon and those who could not, perhaps because no remaining reference to a conviction could be found in any records.

I recognise that the intention behind amendment 16 is good, and I agree with the principle of compensation; however, such a scheme would be complex and divisive, and it would be viewed by many people as unfair.

Both employment law and industrial relations are reserved to Westminster. Pam Duncan-Glancy rightly mentioned the aspects of the miners strike that are devolved and for which the Scottish Parliament has responsibility, but there are very serious areas in which powers are reserved. Employment, industrial relations and pensions are reserved to Westminster, and any Scottish Government that tries to compensate or to provide financial redress to miners who were dismissed by the National Coal Board and lost out, for example, on redundancy payments and pension rights risks straying into that reservation and not being within competence.

An issue that is raised by people such as Richard Leonard and others who support his point of view is that there was political interference in the strike, which is a commonly held view. However, we do not have the ability to look at UK Government Cabinet papers or to call before us people who can speak on behalf of the National Coal Board, if there are still people who can do that. The reason for saying that we will continue to press the UK Government for a UK-wide public inquiry is that we must have regard for what miners in Wales and the north of England would want to seek. Any compensation system should be properly thought out, uniform and fair.

If the compensation is for miscarriage of justice—do not forget that we have agreed that we will not go back to second guess what the courts did; whatever our view on that, that is the basis of the review by John Scott QC—it would not be appropriate for the Scottish Government to make a payment that would, in effect, undermine past judicial decisions and possibly pre-empt future decisions. Those decisions are for the judiciary.

I have huge sympathy with miners who have lost at least thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands, of pounds in redundancy and pension payments that would have made a massive difference to them and their families, but it is not possible for me to support the amendment to create a compensation scheme, because the bill is simply not the place for that. It would be regrettable if we as a Parliament were to divide—it will not be today, because there will not be a vote on the amendment—on the issue when there is so much that we agree on.

Such a compensation scheme was not proposed by John Scott’s review. The independent review group took the issue into account and made a carefully constructed set of proposals, which we have tried to take forward. We have expanded the proposals to include more people in the pardon. It is a fine balance, but it is the right balance, and it is for that reason that I would not support the amendment, if it were to be voted on at this stage—not that I would ever vote in this committee anyway.

The intention behind amendments 1, 4, 6, 7 and 8, when taken together, is to try to broaden eligibility for the pardon to a person who was convicted of a qualifying offence that is related to the strike and which meets the other conditions of eligibility, and who, at the time of the offence, was a miner or lived in the same household as a miner. The term “miner” is already defined in section 4.

I should say that, with these and other amendments, we have attempted to address and reconcile issues that the committee has raised and to stay true to the original spirit of reconciliation that the review, led by John Scott, spoke of. We have listened to what the review and this committee have said.

Amendment 1, which seeks to amend section 1 by replacing the reference to “miner” with “qualifying individual”, is linked to amendment 4, which seeks to introduce a definition of “qualifying individual”. Amendment 4, which is the principal amendment in the group, would broaden eligibility to those close enough to be directly affected by the strike and its impact on a mining household of which they were part. That would, of course, cover spouses, dependants and other family members.

Amendment 6 defines the term “household” as

“a group of people living together as a family or other unit (whether or not related) in a private dwelling, who ... share living accommodation and cooking facilities”

with a miner as currently defined in the bill, and whose dwelling was

“their only or main residence”.

Amendment 7 is a consequential amendment to the definition of “miner” in section 4, while amendment 8 makes a consequential change to the bill’s long title.

Ultimately, as I said, those amendments in my name are intended as a positive response to the committee’s recommendation in its stage 1 report that the Scottish Government consider extending the range of people who could qualify for the pardon, particularly to family members of miners.

I will address amendments 4A and 13. Amendment 4A, in the name of Pam Duncan-Glancy, seeks to amend my amendment 4 by replacing the words

“member of the same household as”

with the words “family member of”. It is linked to amendment 13, which seeks to define the term “family member”. I recognise the intention behind the member’s amendments, given the committee’s recommendation in its stage 1 report, and I look forward to the member’s explanation of why the definition that she has put forward is preferable to my definition of household member.

I have some concerns about the amendment. The proposed definition requires further consideration, given that it seeks to extend eligibility to a considerable number of family members of a miner. The risk is that the amendment could have the unintended consequence of diluting the effect of the pardon for miners and—if the committee were to agree to my amendment—the immediate members of their households, who are arguably the people most likely to have been directly affected by the impact of the strike on the household.

I also sound a note of caution with regard to the broader formulation of the family connection as suggested by the member. Amendment 13 is not consistent in its treatment of different family members. For example, should “sibling” include half-siblings and step-siblings? The term “step-parent” implies a legal marriage and would not cover the living partner of a parent. Should step-grandchildren be included? Does “cousin” also cover first and second cousins? Why is “cousin” included but not “uncle”, “aunt”, “niece” or “nephew”? The amendment also refers to

“an individual ... in a civil partnership with ... a miner”,

but such partnerships did not exist at the time of the strike. Moreover, the member’s definition of “family member” includes only that list, and it is not clear how much further the definition would extend. I will be interested to hear the member elaborate on that.

Amendment 4B also seeks to amend amendment 4 and I think that I have covered that point. I recognise the intention of the member’s amendments, given the committee’s recommendation, and I look forward to hearing the member’s reasoning as to why these amendments are considered to be more appropriate.

I note also that the definition of “supporter”, in amendment 14, includes only the categories of people listed. However, the definition is not limited to those groups, so, again, it could be very hard for an individual to determine just how far eligibility for the pardon would extend if the amendments were accepted. As I have said previously to the committee, there is a real need for clarity so that those who are eligible for the pardon know that they are eligible—that should be straightforward. It is also necessary that eligibility is not diluted such that it negates the impact of the pardon for miners. There is a risk—it could be argued that it is a greater risk—that amendment 4B could have the unintended consequence of diluting the effects of the pardon for miners and those closest to them. Again, I sound a note of caution.

I move amendment 1.

We get regular updates that go down to individual prison level. During the worst of the pandemic, they set out the increases in individual prisons and the movement between wings when people had to be isolated. The updates that I get also mention new prisoners coming in and give some background on where the virus is thought to have started and whether it was brought in by someone new coming into the prison. They give details of the number of prisoners who have been vaccinated once, twice or three times, and details about levels of testing. They also give levels of testing among prison staff. They are pretty detailed, regular accounts.

I have asked lots of questions that might have encroached into other systems that the Government has put in place for the general management of the pandemic, but apart from asking for more information, I cannot think of any time that I have had to intervene to impose a political steer on things.

Yes, Allister Purdie might be best placed to answer that. However, the number, which Allister will be able to confirm or otherwise, includes quite a high level of remand prisoners, for reasons that we are all aware of, as well as people moving in and out of prison. The Prison Service is more susceptible to and not at all immune from the wider increase in the figures that we have seen in the past week or so.

It will not need the annual review. Even in advance of an annual milestone, it is possible for the Government to decide that the powers are no longer needed and, if the committee thinks that the situation has changed sufficiently, it can request that of the Government.

I do not wholly agree with that. The backlog is a direct consequence of the pandemic. Therefore, we can legitimately try to address it through the powers. I have said before that virtual trials would have a beneficial impact on the backlog but that is not the principal reason for wanting to pursue them. The powers that we are discussing are being taken to address the Covid situation. That includes the backlog. It is legitimate to do that.