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I think that what Philip Lamont said was that, if part of the case against a person is related to non-appearance, it can be taken into account at summary level. However, we will write with clarification on that.

As Philip Lamont said, there will be demand—you are right—for justice social work services to step up. However, there is also demand on the court service, as has been described. I have mentioned the steps that we are taking to improve justice social work and the relatively uneven provision across the country, and we have seen improvements over the past year. Those have been achieved by providing additional resource. We have been involved in discussions on the bill with local authorities and Social Work Scotland. As ever, it will be for local authorities to decide how to deploy the resources that they have, but, at the bottom of this, there will be the statutory requirement for the court to have the services, and we will have to meet that. Our task is to make sure that we build on the additional resources that we have already provided to make sure that justice social work has the resources to do that across the country. That is the challenge.

As I said, we currently invest a total of £134 million in community justice services, including £123 million to local authorities. We have made a specific investment this year of £3.2 million to support bail assessment and supervision services. That is having an impact, as I said, in more local authorities. I cannot remember what we started from at the beginning of the year, but the service is now available in 30 authorities. Gearing up has already started. We know that it has further to go and that we have to provide the resourcing for it, but that will be detailed in a financial memorandum and will be a result of discussions that we will have with COSLA and Social Work Scotland.

It does not do so in the detail that you mentioned, but yes—the principle is that, when sentencing, courts should be able to take into account not only time served but a diminution of rights. I tried to answer this point earlier. If someone has been subject to electronic monitoring, that is a diminution of their rights, and it should be taken into account by the court in sentencing.

There is no plan to amend the bill, because the issue that has been raised by the chair of the Parole Board is not a result of the bill. He has raised it, and it is a concern for him—I do not deny that—but it is not an effect of the bill. That is the existing situation. We are willing to be and are engaged in discussions with the chair and, I think, the Parole Board—I am happy to confirm that—on the issue. It opens up other issues, which is why it is probably not suitable to be dealt with in the bill, but it is a live issue that we have been and are discussing with the chair.

Once again, it would be useful to hear from Jennifer Stoddart. You have probably gathered from contributions that I have made today, including the previous one and the one on Rona Mackay’s point about exclusions from emergency release, that there are areas on which we are listening to people. It is the way to do this. Through the bill, we are genuinely trying to find solutions that we all agree on. We are still involved in the discussion, but for the reason that you mentioned, directing the Parole Board is a very tricky area for us to get involved in, given its independent powers. Perhaps Jennifer wants to add to that with specific reference to the evidence that has been mentioned.

If you think about the emergency release powers that were used two years ago, you will recall the caveat that prison governors would essentially have a veto for an individual prisoner whom they did not think it was right to release. It is about recognising, as Jennifer mentioned, the Prison Service’s expertise. There is closer experience in the Prison Service than anywhere else, in fact, so it is important to keep that expertise.

It is not stated in that level of detail, but the principle is there.

Perhaps Philip Lamont will add to that.

If I am getting this right, I think that, if somebody is released on temporary licence and they breach that licence, they can be recalled for that reason. If they commit an offence, that is a breach of their licence conditions. It is the same if someone is paroled: they are paroled on licence and, if they breach their parole requirements, they can be subject to a recall at that stage. That power is there in law. I am not sure that it has to be exercised by either the Parole Board or the Prison Service; it is a consequence of them breaching their licence.

Given that we are talking about a point of law, perhaps Jennifer wants to add to that.

To return to the first question that was asked about the issue, it is not an effect of the bill.

On Philip’s point, one of the criticisms that was rightly raised last year is that somebody might be on remand for a period that is longer than the sentence that they eventually receive; that somebody who was on remand and kept in custody with other criminals could be found not guilty; and that somebody on remand could receive a non-custodial sentence, meaning that we have kept them in custody for that period even though the crime for which they were convicted was judged by the courts to be deserving of a non-custodial sentence. The measure is to capture that as well.