Seòmar agus comataidhean

This will be my second-last question—feel free to respond quite briefly, if you think that that is appropriate. I do not want to put words in the mouths of witnesses but, in last week’s evidence session, we heard essentially that the act of union was pretty much a dead letter—it is irrelevant to the discussion—yet some of the written evidence suggests that it has a bit more standing than that and that, if there was a successful vote for independence, the act would need to be repealed.

Of course, the idea that there should be a right to self-determination in part rests on the idea, rightly or wrongly, that Scotland and England voluntarily—I would question whether it was voluntary at all—entered into this act of union between two parties, so each party should have the right to end that and have a process for achieving that.

What standing does the act of union have in the debate? I ask that with the view that this will come down to the UK Government putting its finger in the air and deciding what it wants to do—that seems to be how much of the constitution works in this country. What standing does the act of union have? I will go back to Nicola McEwen.

In 1979, I tried to be a proxy for my mother’s vote in the referendum that year, but, at 17, I was too young to do that. I am just thinking about all the different conditions that have been applied. Can any of the witnesses say what is so different about Scotland?

In 1979, we had the 40 per cent rule, which was unheard of, whereby the votes of the dead counted for the status quo. We have talked about confirmatory referenda and, although I see some merit in the final shape of an independent Scotland being subject to a vote, the idea of having to say again that we want the same thing is not something that I could see happening anywhere but Scotland.

The idea has been raised that different parts of Scotland—I know that this has not been advanced by the witnesses, but it certainly was by Jamie Halcro Johnston—could vote differently at the same time. It is funny, because I did not recall such voices during the Brexit referendum, when every part of Scotland voted to stay in the EU and we were utterly disregarded. That idea did not count at that point.

Also, if this is merely a distraction, and the SNP is not serious about it, call its bluff—go for it; have the referendum. That is the best way you can kill it off.

Why is it always that we come up with these strange mechanisms or different conditions? Compare that to the Brexit referendum, when there was no white paper, no background, no conditions attached—and, on the point about a 50.1 per cent result, in the case of the Brexit referendum, the result was 52 per cent to 48 per cent but nobody is questioning its legitimacy; it was a simple majority. Why is it that such conditions seem to be talked about or brought into the equation only when we talk about Scotland? Is it simply because the Brexit referendum was one that, for his own reasons, the Prime Minister of the UK wanted and the independence referendum is a referendum that the UK does not want, or is there something specific about Scotland, which we cannot quite discern, that makes it subject to all these conditions?

This is my last question. We have an off-the-shelf agreed solution as to how this should be conducted, but it will not be agreed to by the UK Government. You made the point earlier that it is at times of relative calm that you can perhaps have more chance of an agreement. Also, I think that you very helpfully mentioned the extent to which, if you want to see a referendum, broadening it out and having a more discursive approach to it could be beneficial. Patrick Harvie and I are involved in the early stages of setting up a convention to that effect.

However, if the UK Government continues to say no up until the election, and if the election returns the majority that I certainly would hope for, there is very little chance at of getting any agreement at that stage. I can see the UK Government coming straight back and saying, “Let’s discuss the ground rules again.” The chance will have gone. It will be very similar to 2014, when it promised all sorts of things, such as enshrining the Sewel convention in law, putting the Scottish Parliament on a firm footing and making it a stronger Parliament. The exact reverse happened afterwards. Would you agree that there is very little prospect after the election of getting the kind of calm that you say is necessary to ensure agreement and it would be straight into a binary approach again?

Good morning. I proposed this inquiry, and when I did so, I posed the following question. Given that the current constitutional arrangements are said to be voluntary and democratic, what is the route or the mechanism through which Scotland could choose independence? I do not know whether we are any further forward in answering that, other than to simply say that it will happen when Westminster decides that it will happen. I am happy to be contradicted, but that seems to be where we are at, given the evidence of today’s panel and our previous panel.

I completely agree with Professor Rodger’s point—I have to call him that, because I did not catch his full name—that politics is much more the driver on this, rather than constitutional nostrums. I think that politics will be what drives it. However, am I missing something? Is there a mechanism other than saying that there will be a route when Westminster decides that it will happen?

On that point—

Just before Dr Minto comes in, I want to raise another point about something that we heard in London during the committee’s visit. It relates to the ad hoc nature of some of the changes, with the council of nations and regions being overlaid on top of the top-tier meetings and the British Irish Council.

In relation to the JMC on Europe, there is now no consultation whatsoever with the devolved Administrations—for example, there was none in relation to the EU trade deal and Scotland’s fisheries. It just seems to be going a bit backward.

Sorry, Dr Minto—please come in.

Following on from the points that have been made about the so-called reset, I will make a number of points on which it would be useful to hear your comments. My points add up to my belief that the reset has not really worked or happened. In fact, from speaking to a number of ministers, I am aware that it seems to have gone backwards in recent weeks after a more promising start.

You will be aware that in around 2005-06, the then First Minister, Jack McConnell, commissioned a report that showed that there was appalling ignorance and something of a contempt for the devolved Administrations at the centre. When we were down in London, the committee considered a report from the Bennett school of public policy, which talked about centralist chauvinism. I would link that to Professor Wincott’s point about the perceived powerful position of Westminster and how that governs things.

From my point of view, the representations of both the Welsh and Scottish Governments made no impact on the repeal of the United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020; indeed, they were not even considered. We have not yet seen any outcome from the review of the Sewel convention. The UK Government’s position at the time of the independence referendum in Scotland was that the convention would be strengthened and put into law. However, its position now is that, as it said before the Supreme Court, the convention is merely a self-denying ordinance.

The most telling instance, though, is the pride in place initiative, which involves spending in devolved areas at the discretion of the UK Government without any real basis for that spending. For example, the constituency that I represent gets no money from the initiative, despite being one of the most deprived in the country. A central role in disbursing those funds is given to MPs, and the moneys will be disbursed during an election process in Scotland. I also learned yesterday that the Welsh Government was told about the initiative, whereas the Scottish Government was not.

I wonder whether there is a mix in there, with the Westminster system not adapting to devolution. I am conscious that we have been here now for 26 years, yet on Monday we heard from somebody who said that we are still in the early foothills of people learning about devolution, and that it took Canada 160 years. Surely it cannot take that long to learn that there are some devolved Administrations that people might have to take account of.

I know that I made a series of points there, but I would be interested in the witnesses’ views on them. I will go to Professor Wincott first.

Thank you.

With regard to the legal route, we have heard evidence on Saint Kitts and Nevis. However—I could be wrong about this, and I am happy to be corrected—a more recent precedent seems to be the Turks and Caicos Islands. I think that, last year, the UK Government passed a law allowing the Turks and Caicos Islands to have a referendum and move on to independence, if it chose to do so. I am just stating that because I am sure that I heard it somewhere. It would interesting to know whether any of the panel can tell us anything that they know about that particular situation.

Not the Act of Union?