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I thank Professor McHarg for the paper that she sent us, which is really helpful. It goes into detail and made me think beyond the headlines. There are a couple of interesting issues that I would like to explore about reforming the devolution statutes, to follow on from Donald Cameron’s questions. This is prompted partly because we had the Saxon State Parliament constitution committee with us this week. It has a legal constitution but with an intergovernmental framework, a mediation committee and horizontal devolution. It was interesting to see its framework.

Looking at your suggestion about having

“a fuller set of principles to guide the interpretation of limits on devolved competence”,

I note that you say that there are arguments for and against. I was interested in your suggestions that could potentially add clarity: the principle of subsidiarity; clarification of the extent of primary legislative competence under reserved powers; and principles of union. You said that it could go the other way but, when we pass legislation, there is a policy memorandum, and what ministers say in the Parliament can be interpreted by judges. Is there something about being really clear about the intent of devolution to reinforce the importance of devolution, given the experiences that we have had post-Brexit?

I was going to come back on the same issue.

Thank you. I might want to come back in later, but it is over to you, convener.

That is really helpful. The “not normally” issue has definitely come up in a lot of evidence, and your idea about a more explicit set of exceptions is interesting. Of course, the intergovernmental negotiation is interesting, as long as you have a degree of interparliamentary involvement, accountability or transparency. There is also the issue of stakeholders, which we discussed in relation to the retained EU law issues.

Akash, do you have a view on how we can embed a more decentralist approach, moving decision making out of Whitehall and towards local communities, as well as to our devolved Parliaments and institutions?

What you said about revenue raising at the local level and what powers councils have is really interesting.

I was also thinking about the cross-UK issues. If you look at energy production, for example, you see that there are intergovernmental issues that are not being addressed. The UK Government sets the legislative framework and the management framework for the national grid. The Scottish Parliament and other devolved Parliaments have significant powers over renewables, but, at the local level, the councils have to get on and do the heavy lifting. There are interesting issues about intergovernmental work that should not just be seen as being parliamentary.

On your earlier comments, Nicola McEwen, do you have short-term and longer-term views of what needs to be fixed? You mentioned Sewel a lot, which is a subject that has come up in a lot of our evidence. What are your priorities for the short-term fix? What longer-term issues need to be addressed?

I picked up on that in the Welsh constitutional work that is going on, which is not just about more powers for the Welsh Government and changing the Parliament but about relationships with local government. It feels like the centralisation agenda, which John Denham picked up on, is quite powerful in terms how governments work. The people at the centre have that view of the world, rather than a more consultative approach.

That was really helpful. Thank you very much.

I want to reflect on the conversation that we have had today about the top-down versus co-design way of government and the need to change post-Brexit, because what was a convention is now being swept under the carpet. What are the short-term and long-term solutions to change that? I am interested because, underpinning that, there is a centralisation issue that came out in some of the evidence that we have had.

Professor Denham, you talked about ministerial accountability in an English context. Is there not also an interesting issue to do with centralisation? When you look at the House of Lords, you see that the majority of lords are London based. We have similar tensions in Scotland on centralisation. Is there an issue that it is to do with moving from what we have now, which Professor Jim Gallagher nicely summed up as “constitutional carelessness” last week, and refreshing how accountability works in the UK and in the House of Commons? What are your short-term and longer-term priorities? I will kick off with you, Professor Denham, and work round the other witnesses.

That is very helpful. I am thinking about things like community wealth building, municipal ownership of energy and how the national grid works. There is something about best practice, and there is potentially something about whether the actual framework suits different parts of the UK in not only a subnational sense but geographically, in terms of different opportunities. It does not feel like there is political support for a more cross-Government approach—at not just the UK devolved nations level, but the local level—to tackling the climate emergency that could make the big difference that we really need.

It has been really insightful to hear the collective experience and different perspectives that you have all given us this morning. It is very welcome.

I want to go back to the opening comments about the impact of Brexit on devolution and what needs to be fixed. I am thinking through those issues. Jim Gallagher, your paper contains a really interesting phrase: “constitutional carelessness”. William Wragg, a committee convener, said last week, “It’s politics”. This morning, Philip Rycroft said that it is the way that we have got used to working.

How do we move from here, where we feel that it is not working, to a system that will work? I am keen to hear your perspectives on what would be your priority. The evidence that we have had has included changing how the Governments work together; deciding whether the Governments should have to work together; dispute resolution and what that would look like; the possibility of entrenching Sewel; and interparliamentary work. What would be your priorities? How do you incentivise respect to make devolution work? You have been on the inside, in the civil service. If the question is too difficult, you do not have to answer, but I am thinking about how, practically, we can move on from here. What solutions should the committee be looking at to generate a bit of progress?

I am not sure who I want to come in first. Who looks most nervous about it? I am trying to be constructive and get solutions. Andrew McCormick, would you like to kick off?