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Have we lost James Chalmers, or is he still with us?

My final question is for anyone, but I should ask you first, Simon Di Rollo, as you have a different perspective on the proposal for single-judge trials.

Given what has been said about the experiences that victims might have in front of a single judge, notwithstanding the fact that you might prefer a panel of judges—we are talking about there being no jury—would there be a need for single-judge trials and a specialist court? If a specialist court is about trauma-informed practice and making sure that the jury understands that there are myths about the crime of rape, do we need a specialist court and a single-judge arrangement? It seems to me that one might cancel out the other.

Can I stop you there? I am trying to get this straight in my head. That is a different question. How juries are directed or trained is an entirely different measure as to the outcome. A single-judge pilot is quite a different measure. Is that right?

That was very helpful.

Thank you.

In your submission, you talk about something that has not been mentioned until now—the use of pre-recorded evidence under section 28 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

I think that the suggestion is that that provision is being used more readily in Scotland than it used to be, and it seems to be going well. It gives victims and witnesses the opportunity to give evidence outwith court. Does your evidence suggest that we should look at whether that is impacting on conviction rates? You seem to be saying that, where pre-recorded evidence is used under section 28 of the 1999 act in England and Wales, it has an impact on conviction rates. Is that right?

I understand that, but as one of the parameters is to ascertain the effectiveness of the change, there must be one or two benchmark measures. I am struggling to see what they would be.

Good morning, Professor Thomas. My first set of questions are to you. In your submission—this is on page 9 of committee paper CJ/S6/24/4/1—you talk about why there appear to be substantial differences between England and Wales and Scotland in both jury trial outcomes in rape cases and juror attitudes. You have already explored that with the committee, but I want to focus on how you have qualified that. You say in your submission:

“there is a lack of clarity in Scotland about jury conviction rates.”

Am I correct in saying that, because we do not have clarity on the conviction rates, it is very difficult to come to a determination on which of the two factors results in that apparent difference, or are you suggesting that you would not really expect to see substantial differences between the two systems?

However, the two issues that you have brought to the committee are the lack of clarity on conviction rates and your concerns about our drawing conclusions without any baseline knowledge of how juries actually work. Would that be fair?

Would you see objections from the profession if, to change the experience of victims, it would be a requirement for the victim to be able to speak to those legal representatives—however it is legislated for?