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That is another area of great complexity and sensitivity. On one hand, we do not want victims to feel that they are being forced into anonymity, which goes back to the point about choice and control. On the other hand, I am also conscious that, for loved ones who are left behind, there can continue to be traumatic and on-going intrusion. It is therefore a complex and difficult issue.

The starting point is that a person’s general data protection regulation rights to privacy expire on their death. Therefore we are not talking about changing or making a wee tweak in one bit of legislation. However, we have started the process of considering the matter, following representations that I and others have had from victims organisations. I have also discussed it with Dr Andrew Tickell, whose evidence the committee has heard.

We are also considering the experience in other jurisdictions. It is an area in which we need to proceed with great care. We do not want to criminalise families who want to speak and give testimony to the loved one whom they have lost, and who might also want to be critical of the justice system, the court process or the sentence. A lot of lessons can be learned from other jurisdictions—for example, from the state of Victoria in Australia and from Ireland—that have gone down one road towards legislating on anonymity continuing beyond a victim’s death, and then, on the back of further representations from victims, they have had to revisit all that.

Members will have seen—as have I—Dr Tickell’s written correspondence with the committee. A week or so ago, I wrote to this committee and also to the Education, Children and Young People Committee, which has been considering the Children (Care and Justice) (Scotland) Bill.

As regards finding a way forward, I have made a few commitments. The first is that I will not make false promises on the issue. There is no way that I would make such promises to victims and then have to make a big retreat. I just will not do that. However, I can commit to genuinely engaging with the issue, while acknowledging that it is not an easy one.

We will hold a round-table meeting on 20 February. I know that invitations have gone to members of the committee who are spokespeople for their parties. That meeting will involve a wide range of stakeholders, including people who might have a view on the issue from a press perspective, legal experts—for example, Dr Tickell has been invited—and victims organisations.

I have also had my own engagement with people who have been affected by the greatest levels of intrusion. We will undertake further engagement that will focus on families, in which we will explore with them their views on how we could overcome the various difficulties. For example, a set of parents might have differing views on whether anonymity should be waived. That is a live issue in today’s world. There is a whole host of other complexities.

While making absolutely no promises, I want to empower people who want to speak, but protect the privacy of those who are left behind.

No, other than that I look forward to reading the committee’s stage 1 report and to the debate that will be held in due course. I have no doubt that the committee will provide further food for thought on how we might achieve the very best of legislation for victims, both here and now and in the future.

I have worked hard to listen to a range of views on all aspects of the bill. I genuinely believe that what complainers, the accused and we all require is a debate of the highest standard. I have set out that we prefer to go to a two-thirds qualified majority, because we need to ensure that we have the right protections and balance in the system. Bearing corroboration in mind, our judgment is that unanimity or near unanimity would be more than is required.

Just for clarity—I really hope that I have not misheard Mr Findlay—I stand to be corrected, but I do not think for a minute that the Lord Advocate in her evidence last week was in any shape or form arguing for unanimity or near unanimity.

Yes, a qualified majority.

The short answer to your question is yes. The Scottish Government firmly believes that our law and legal processes must meet the needs of modern 21st century Scotland. Clearer and more transparent decision making is an important part of that.

As the committee heard during its evidence sessions, many people do not trust a verdict that cannot be adequately explained. It causes trauma to victims and can leave the accused with lingering stigma. The proposed reform is a historic one, and it is based on significant and long-standing concerns. The fundamental point is that we should always strive to increase confidence that verdicts are returned on a sound and rational footing, while ensuring balance and fairness to all parties.

I believe that there is broad support for the measure. At the most recent Scottish general election, four political parties’ manifestos contained commitments to abolish the not proven verdict, and the idea attracted strong support in the Government’s consultation.

Convener, are you asking me about jury size, jury majority or both?

In terms of—

It would always have to be based on a parliamentary decision, because, irrespective of its merits or otherwise, the right to a retrial would be a significant departure from what we have now. That is not to say that it should not be considered or scrutinised, but it would nonetheless be a significant change that I contend would need to be looked at properly and considered fully.

I am trying to assure the committee that we will consider the Lord Advocate’s evidence—we have started that process—but that, as with all legislation, we also need to look at the detail. Where there would be significant departures, we would have to think carefully about whether stage 2 or stage 3 amendments would be appropriate for such changes. The answer to that question might be yes or no. I am trying to convey to the committee that we all need to be collectively invested in the understanding and debate around these very complex and difficult decisions.

Some people have argued for the retention of the not proven verdict on the basis of its uniqueness.