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I support the intention behind amendment 240, which seeks to expand victims’ ability to have their voices heard by the court by making an impact statement about how a crime has affected them physically, emotionally and financially. A previous consultation was carried out on the issue, the findings of which made it clear that there is an appetite for change, such as widening the list of eligible offences and piloting new ways for victim statements to be made. There was also support for moving to a position in which all victims should be able to make a statement in all cases.

Currently, as Mr Greene said, the right to make a statement, which the judge must take into account in considering sentencing, is limited to certain offences in solemn procedure. I am very supportive of moving beyond that position, but there are significant operational and resource considerations, particularly for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, which co-ordinates the process of contacting victims and ensuring that the statement is available to the court, and is responsible for ensuring that statements do not contain any inappropriate material. There are also considerations for victim support organisations, as composing a statement can be difficult for victims because it involves asking them to revisit the most traumatic aspects of the crime.

Those considerations were behind the introduction of a new power in March 2021 to enable the piloting of changes to both the range of cases in which statements can be made and the way in which they can be made. Piloting enables those aspects to be tested and resource and operational implications to be better understood. I assure members that an expansion of the victim statement regime is currently under consideration.

I support the ambition of amendment 240 and I agree that we want to move to giving victims the right to make a statement in all cases. However, I do not support making that move in one step at this time, due to the need to ensure that the resource and operational aspects are properly considered. That is particularly the case in relation to summary cases, as the volume of cases and therefore statements would be significantly greater, with associated resource implications.

There are also particular operational issues. For example, in summary cases, it is more likely that an accused can plead guilty and be sentenced at the same hearing. A statement would be sought from the victim only following the guilty plea. To do so beforehand would raise false expectations for the victim and put them through the experience of revisiting the impact of a crime, potentially for no benefit, if there is no plea or the accused is found not guilty. That would also be an inefficient use of resources and would potentially lead to significant delay in such cases, as a statement would be sought and the plea and sentencing could then not happen on the same day.

Those types of issues underlie the necessity of taking a stepped approach to widening the scope of the victim statement regime and considering at each point the variety of issues relating to introducing the measure in practice. Those issues include the resource implications for justice agencies and victim support organisations; the impact on court programming; and, importantly, the impact on victims.

However, I recognise that there is a compelling case for ensuring that the voices of victims are heard and that victims are given the opportunity to advise the court on the impact that an offence has had on them.

I am particularly keen that we take the first step of expanding this right to all solemn cases, where there is an established process in place and where there will therefore be fewer additional operational considerations. There will be some resource implications. However, this is an area that I would be keen to discuss further with Mr Greene with a view to lodging an amendment at stage 3 to make that initial change to the legislation.

I am also happy to commit to the committee that we will carry out further engagement with the Crown Office and victims organisations to inform the use of the piloting powers, which would test further expansion.

I acknowledge Mr Greene’s long-standing interest in these issues and, indeed, his commitment to securing improvements for victims and the families of victims, particularly in their interactions with the Parole Board for Scotland. I absolutely share Mr Greene’s ambition for a victim-centred, trauma-informed approach. Although there is much to commend in current practice, I absolutely accept that there is much more that we can do.

However, in embarking on reform, we must do so holistically and in a way that reflects and maximises all the levers that we have for effecting change. That is why I can confirm to the committee that I will be publishing a consultation in August, with work being carried out over the summer, on parole reform in Scotland, building on the changes to the Parole Board rules that were made in 2022. I hope that my committing at the outset to consult on some of the wider issues makes it clear that I am not only open to, but willing to make, the necessary changes to the parole process that will command the confidence of victims and their families.

That is not to say that I do not see a role for the bill in bringing about such change. I have looked constructively across the suite of amendments in the group to identify where I think we can commit to legislative reform that will make a meaningful difference. However, there are some intricacies that I would want to work with Mr Greene on before I could support the amendments. I cannot support them today as drafted, but there are many that I am keen to work with him on ahead of stage 3.

Turning to the specific amendments in order, I absolutely accept the principle of amendment 246, which seeks to ensure that victims or their families are given the opportunity to attend oral hearings. As Mr Greene has mentioned, I recently met survivors, who talked compellingly about the importance of having that opportunity. Some victims are already afforded such an opportunity in the current system, and what is proposed can be achieved through reform of the Parole Board rules. I fully intend the upcoming consultation to include consideration of whether that aspect of the system is working as it should or whether we need to revise those rules. I therefore ask Mr Greene not to press amendment 246 and to allow the consultation to run, so that we can gather the widest possible range of views on the matter.

I also agree with the principle of the provision of victim statements and written representations as it is set out in amendments 247 and 248. Victims should have their voices heard and should not have to repeat their presentations unnecessarily. I agree that there is more that we ought to do to ensure that processes are effective, and it might be that primary legislation has a role to play in that respect. However, we need to ensure that the amendments have the intended effect. Therefore, I ask Mr Greene not to move them now but, instead, to discuss them with me in advance of stage 3, to see whether we can come to an agreed position.

I hope that, as I go through the group, I can indicate the areas on which we can work ahead of stage 3—that is the progress that we could make in the context of the bill. I think that I am correct in saying that, if we have the consultation in August, any revision of the Parole Board rules would require only a Scottish statutory instrument, which would be less onerous than primary legislation. However, that will obviously depend on the consultation responses.

At the risk of giving a “Mibbes aye, mibbes naw” answer, which I appreciate might be less than desirable, it could be possible, depending on the nature of the responses, for a further revision of the Parole Board rules to take place prior to the 2026 election. However, I do not want to be hard and fast about that until we proceed with the consultation, because some of this should be considered holistically and in the round.

I have considered amendments 252 and 253 very carefully, and, although we have no difficulty with the underlying objective of seeking to reduce delays in oral hearings, these are, ultimately, operational matters that would be most effectively addressed through improvement work rather than through being mandated in legislation. I know that, where possible, the Parole Board already takes steps to prevent delays in hearings taking place, but, to be fair, there will always be circumstances that are outwith the Parole Board’s control and that are difficult to foresee or plan for.

I am also satisfied that every attempt is being made to ensure that all parties have access to the appropriate documentation in advance of parole hearings when that is possible. I find the endless loop that Mr Greene outlined in his opening remarks utterly unacceptable. What victims need from all parties in the justice system is people working together in a spirit of collaboration, and I find it deeply unhelpful when different parts of the system point the finger at other parts. We need to embed a different culture of collaboration, and I am committed to supporting all parties to do that.

All parties in the justice system are working under tremendous stress—I do not want to be interpreted as chastising in my remarks—but it is fair to say that all parts need to do better. We cannot have people passed from pillar to post. We need to clearly articulate the different roles and responsibilities of different agencies and partners in the justice system, and the endless loop of passing folk from pillar to post is just not acceptable.

Mr Greene is right that no statistics on delays are available, and I would be willing to explore whether performance management-type data would give us better information on the matter. Again, I do not see that as an issue for legislation. For those reasons, I ask Jamie Greene not to move amendments 252 and 253. If he does, I ask members to oppose them.

Amendments 254 and 255 seek to ensure that, when a hearing to consider a prisoner’s release is delayed, or when cases are delayed, victims are informed

“of that delay and the reasons for it”.

Again, I broadly support the intention behind those amendments and would like to discuss further with Mr Greene whether anything could and should be done through primary legislation ahead of stage 3 or whether his intention could be achieved though reform of the Parole Board rules. Therefore, I ask Jamie Greene not to move those amendments and to work with me ahead of stage 3.

I acknowledge the on-going need to review and improve the parole system and to help to ensure that it is more trauma informed and inclusive of victims. However, I do not consider a statutory review, which amendment 262 would dictate, to be the most effective way of supporting that, and I think that it could delay existing improvements. In addition, I remind members that part 2 of the bill makes important changes to the reporting requirements for the Parole Board for Scotland. The board already has to report annually on how, and to what extent, the standards of service for victims and witnesses have been met, and the bill will now include reporting in relation to its standard for trauma-informed practice.

To conclude, convener, I ask Mr Greene not to press or move the amendments in this group and to work with me as I have indicated in advance of stage 3. I also ask him to note the upcoming consultation and the on-going improvement work.

What I think that I am clearly saying is that, in the work that is done with offenders to address their offending behaviour, a very prominent strand in any assessment of someone’s rehabilitation is their attitude to their offending history. Although some of us might have thought that we were very good at that work, we ultimately have to recognise the complexity of assessing people. I have no doubt that the Parole Board, because of the way in which the rules are drafted, can—and does—take the matter into account.

My concern is that the practical effect of amendment 251 will not, on one level, have the impact that I think that you are striving for. It is the amendment that causes me most anxiety, because, at the end of the day, this is all subjective, and, in particular, I do not want to tilt the system in favour of our more socially adept, slicker-at-communicating, more deviant offenders. Of course, assessments can take account of someone’s neurodiversity and all the rest of it, but, as someone who has worked in the field, I genuinely think that this is a deeply problematic area. Of this group, it is amendment 251 that causes me most concern.

In summary, then, given the Parole Board’s capacity to address the concern where it arises, I do not support the amendment. I ask Mr Greene not to move it, and, if he does, I ask the committee to oppose it.

I very much understand the intention behind amendment 91. The committee has heard from victim support organisations and from survivors about the distress that the uncertainty of floating trials can cause. Indeed, the issue was explored in the policy memorandum for the bill.

You have also heard from the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service that abolishing floating trials in the High Court would add, on average, 22 weeks to reaching a trial date. That was reflected in the committee’s stage 1 report, which stated:

“we do not think it is realistic to legislate to prohibit the use of floating trials completely. Instead, we recommend that the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service should make every effort to keep the use of floating trials to the absolute minimum that is required.”

I agree with that position, and I would like to see the use of floating trials reduced, but not at the expense of people needing to wait for justice.

The courts service also recognises that there is a need for greater transparency and awareness of the use of floating trials, and I understand that it is considering ways that it could provide more information on that. It might also be worth being aware that the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service and the Crown Office are trying to improve estimates of how long trials will run for. Two years ago, around 50 per cent of cases lasted longer than anticipated; that has reduced to 33 per cent.

It is also worth highlighting that the bill already requires the courts to consider trauma-informed practice when business is being scheduled. In the new sexual offences court, there will be a presumption that complainers pre-record their evidence before the trial, helping to reduce the direct impact that a distant or uncertain trial date has on them.

I understand Ms Dowey’s desire for greater accountability over how floating trials are used and for more to be done to recognise the negative impacts that they can have. However, I do not believe that the amendment would give us meaningful information. It would capture floating trials only in the High Court, not solemn trials in the sheriff court, which account for a greater number of trials without a fixed start date. More importantly, it would require the courts service to report every year on the impact that floating trials have on victims, but the courts service has very little direct engagement with victims and so could not report in a way that gives us any real insight into victims’ experiences. I therefore urge the committee to oppose the amendment.

I assure members that I view all three amendments on this aspect with the same seriousness. I have endeavoured to keep the committee informed of progress on the pilot, which enables free access to court transcripts for victims in rape and serious sexual assault cases. It is the first such pilot in the United Kingdom, and it has attracted interest from elsewhere.

I have been open with the committee about the challenges involved, in particular the level of demand, the need to meet our obligations under data protection law, and the current limitations of technology redaction and artificial intelligence, in particular as regards accuracy. I recognise that, in the future, there will be an opportunity for such areas to be considered as part of the pilot’s extension.

I remain mindful of concerns that have been expressed about how such an approach might see a change in behaviour, through transcripts being shared through social media. I am therefore ever conscious of ensuring that we consider any unintended consequences of our actions and that we are confident about how we might respond if those concerns were to be realised. The evidence to date does not support the concerns, but the pilot is still in relative infancy.

I have also been reassured, through the detail provided by applicants, that the reasons behind requests for transcripts accord with the Scottish Government’s wider aim of delivering a truly person-centred, trauma-informed justice system. However, some of the feedback suggests that more needs to be done. I have therefore extended the pilot for a further 12 months so that we can resolve any issues ahead of assessing changes that might be required in legislation. It is worth reiterating that I want the pilot to provide information that will support any future legislative change to the general position under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, on which the three amendments in this group are founded, and the specific secondary legislation—the Transcripts of Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Order 1993 and the Transcripts of Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) Amendment Order 1995—all of which are pre-devolution legislation.

I have already outlined to the three members with amendments on this matter that, although I do not support the amendments as they stand, I am entirely sympathetic to their aims and want to work with all of them ahead of stage 3, as there will be an opportunity to include aspects of all their intentions at that point.

Amendment 145, in the name of Pauline McNeill, would significantly increase the number of free transcripts that are being produced and create a major capacity issue for the Scottish Courts and Tribunals Service and the company whose services have been procured for that purpose. In turn, that would create a significant cost to the public purse.

However, I would like to discuss the matter further with Ms McNeill, alongside Jamie Greene’s amendment 263, which is an innovative proposal that recognises the costs that are associated with free transcripts that are paid for from the public purse. Therefore, over a longer time than we have had to consider the amendments, I would like to consider what the proposal for a regulating power, which Jamie Greene’s amendment would introduce, would look like in practice and how it could enable the aspiration of wider access that is outlined in Pauline McNeill’s amendment 145.

On amendment 179, in the name of Audrey Nicoll, notwithstanding my words of caution, I consider that there is an opportunity to build on the premise of the amendment, subject to some further refinement. I fully understand the desire to ensure certainty around the pilot and the limited opportunity that remains to achieve that in this parliamentary term. I would also like to place the current pilot on a statutory footing. It is important that we get this right and that we recognise that there might be a need for further legislative changes, informed by and evidenced from a range of areas, including those who have participated in the pilot to date.

I think that that delivers a level of cross-party consensus and, therefore, recognition of how we can deliver and acknowledge our respective positions. Noting that and that I will work with members, I ask the three members to withdraw their amendments and to work with me and collectively ahead of stage 3.

I add my thanks to members for their diligence in this area and put on the record my thanks to the many survivors whom I have met on this and other matters.

The amendments seek to achieve something that we are all committed to. They seek to ensure that victims are fully supported by the justice system and that appropriate sentencing options are available and used by the independent court to protect victims. I cannot support the amendments as drafted, but I have written to Pam Gosal, Maggie Chapman and Sharon Dowey to indicate that I am sympathetic to their clearly well-intentioned amendments and to suggest that we work together ahead of stage 3 to deliver the underlying policy aim of improving protection for victims.

The role of our independent courts in considering the need for protective measures for victims is a critical part of the criminal justice system. That role is especially relevant in cases that involve sexual offending. Mandatory non-harassment orders, or NHOs, were debated during the passage of the Domestic Abuse (Scotland) Act 2018. It was argued at that time that mandatory NHOs in all domestic abuse cases were not appropriate because the Crown prosecutes a broad range of domestic abuse cases, and removing all discretion from the court might result in NHOs being made when, in the circumstances of individual cases, they were not appropriate.

During those debates, concern was expressed that mandating the use of NHOs in all cases might risk undermining the credibility of NHOs if the court was required to make them in cases in which there was no reason to consider it necessary to do so. However, I acknowledge that the protection of an NHO will be required in a great number of cases, and the court has the power to impose an order under the existing law, but not all cases will require imposition. The court makes that judgment as part of its independent sentencing duty.

I can give the committee information on the application of non-harassment orders in DASA convictions under the 2018 act. The figures for 2024-25 thus far show that an NHO was made in 82 per cent of cases. The 38 per cent figure that Ms Gosal quoted is for offences with a domestic abuse aggravation, which has increased from 11 per cent in 2019-20.

On Ms Gosal’s amendment 85 in its current form, it is unclear how a court would go about deciding what conditions should be included in an NHO in cases in which the court’s view was that an NHO was not required to protect the victim, but the law nonetheless obliged it to make one. It is also worth noting that a court can make other protective orders in respect of some of the offences that are listed in the amendment, such as a human trafficking prevention order, a sexual harm prevention order or a female genital mutilation prevention order. One of those orders might be a better way for the courts to deal with the risk that is posed by the offender, rather than there being mandatory imposition of an NHO.

I also want to touch on a significant risk that might arise through requiring a victim to give consent for an NHO to be imposed, as there might be unintended consequences. Scottish Women’s Aid and Rape Crisis Scotland have raised that during our engagement. Although I understand why the provision is there in the context of a mandatory requirement to make an NHO, that would mean that there would be a risk that an offender might seek to pressure the victim not to agree to the making of a non-harassment order, especially in cases involving coercive control. That is not something that any of us would want to see.

Although I do not, for those reasons, support amendment 85 in its present form, I consider that there is a strong case for affording victims of offences of the kind covered by the amendment the same protections that exist for victims of domestic abuse offences. Therefore, I urge Ms Gosal to work with me on a suitable amendment ahead of stage 3.

The same arguments apply to amendment 241, in the name of Sharon Dowey, which seeks to make it mandatory for the court to impose an NHO in all domestic abuse cases. As I have said, the court is already required to make an NHO in any domestic abuse case unless it concludes that there is no need for the victim to be protected in that way. Amendment 241 would require the court to make an NHO notwithstanding its conclusion that it would not be required to protect a victim; however, in such cases, it is not clear what restrictions it would or could make in an order. There are no standard conditions that must be included in an NHO. Typically, an order could include conditions such as not contacting or approaching the person protected by the order or not coming within a certain distance of where they live or work, but it is not clear that such conditions would be applicable in cases where the court did not consider that protective measures were needed, yet an NHO had to be imposed.

Amendment 242, in the name of Maggie Chapman, seeks to make the imposition of an NHO mandatory in any sexual offence case where the victim does not take steps to indicate that it should not be made. In other words, if the victim does not offer a view, the NHO has to be made. In circumstances where the victim indicates that an NHO should not be made, the court can still make an NHO if it concludes that the degree of risk posed by the perpetrator to the victim is such that the making of the order is necessary. That second element is exactly how the current law operates, with the court having the discretion to make an NHO, even where the victim does not wish them to do so.

I acknowledge that such an approach seeks to address the concern that I highlighted with regard to amendment 85, in respect of which perpetrators could be encouraged to pressure a victim into not agreeing to make an NHO. However, in light of the removal of discretion from the courts in individual cases, I have the same concern about how the court goes about making an NHO in a case where it does not consider that it is necessary to do so, either because it does not consider that the perpetrator poses a risk of harm to the victim or because it considers that an alternative protective order might be more appropriate to manage risks posed by the offender. Perhaps I can highlight some examples of when a court may decide that an NHO is not applicable, particularly in relation to sexual offences. We might be talking about, say, an online offence where the victim was not known to the perpetrator, but the making of an order would result in their becoming known to the perpetrator.

Amendment 242 also provides the victim with a right to apply to the court to vary or revoke a non-harassment order. Under the current law, only the prosecutor and the person against whom the order has been made, as the parties to the original criminal proceedings, have that right. Again, although I do not support amendment 242 in its current form, I have sympathy for what part of it seeks to achieve, and I am confident that Ms Chapman and I can work together ahead of stage 3 and consider further whether it would be appropriate to provide victims with a right to make an application to the court to vary or revoke an NHO without having to go via the prosecutor.

I therefore urge Ms Gosal to withdraw amendment 85 and Ms Dowey and Ms Chapman to not move amendments 241 and 242 in favour of our working together on amendments on which we can seek agreement at stage 3.

Happy birthday, Mr Greene. You caused me some anxiety when you said that there were 11 amendments in the group. I put on the record that there are eight.

For clarity, I will summarise, if that would be helpful. On amendment 246, we accept in principle that that is an important issue for the consultation that will take place in August. We have the vehicle of a statutory instrument, and I hope that I have demonstrated that, without prejudging the consultation, there is a willingness to proceed thereafter. We should look at amendments 247 and 248 ahead of stage 3. The provisions in amendments 252 and 253 are not appropriate for primary legislation. I accept in principle that we should discuss amendments 254 and 255 at stage 3. Finally, I am resistant to amendment 262, on the statutory review.

I understand how difficult and emotional it can be for victims and their families when the prisoner who is linked to their case comes up for parole and potential release. I have met with a number of victims who have shared their experiences with me and told me how they feel the system can be improved to better support them though that part of the justice process.

We all want to ensure that victims and their families are informed about how and why decisions are made and to have an effective system in place for the release of prisoners that keeps victims and their families informed and supported while maintaining the confidentiality and integrity of decisions and the safety of all involved.

The issues raised in this group are deeply sensitive and so I will take time to state my reasonings on my positions.

I start with Jamie Greene’s amendments 249 and 250. I accept that there is a strength in the sentiment that has been expressed. However, I urge Mr Greene not to press amendment 249 or move amendment 250 and to instead work with me in advance of stage 3 to develop alternative drafting to ensure that the legal and operational aspects are fully considered.

The intention behind amendment 249 is that the Parole Board for Scotland

“must take into account the ... impact of its decision on the safety and security of ... any victim”

and any of their family members. The decision on whether to release a person on parole licence is a matter for the Parole Board for Scotland, which is independent of ministers. The safety of the victim and of their family members is already taken into account in existing rules regarding the consideration of public safety, which means that the Parole Board must assess when a prisoner may be released without posing a risk to the community, including a risk to victims. Amendment 249 would pose an operational challenge for the Parole Board when it comes to identifying victims who are not signed up to the victim notification scheme.

Amendment 250 would require that prison governors, when considering whether to grant a prisoner temporary release, must take the safety of the victim or victim’s family into account. There are already clear directions in the prison rules that instruct prison governors to assess the risk that the prisoner may pose a danger or cause harm to the public.

The Scottish ministers’ directions on the operation of temporary release reinforce the requirement that the governor must assess whether the prisoner might cause harm to the public. The governor must also consider the views of victims where those views are known to them.

As I said, there is a strength in the sentiment, but we should consider the effect of the amendments—legally and otherwise—in advance of stage 3. I am happy to do that.

I acknowledge the important concerns that motivated Jamie Greene to lodge amendments 256 and 257, and Sharon Dowey to lodge amendments 258 and 259. However, I cannot support those amendments today.

The Parole Board operates with the primary aim of assessing whether an individual is suitable for release, based on their readiness to reintegrate into society and on the risk that they might pose. The process is conducted carefully and with all relevant evidence being taken into account. Although transparency is important—I stress that it is important—there must be a balance to ensure that the Parole Board’s decisions, which involve highly sensitive information, are made independently and based on a thorough assessment that is given without fear or favour. It is also important to ensure that sensitive personal information about the offender and about victims and others involved in the case is not disclosed unnecessarily and does not unintentionally compromise safety.

We all very much agree on the desire to ensure that victims and their families feel informed and supported. It is absolutely essential that those who are impacted by crime can engage meaningfully with the process and we all want to ensure that they are treated with dignity and respect. However, I do not believe that the proposed changes require primary legislation. Instead, they should be considered as part of the broader Parole Board for Scotland rules. I fully intend to include consideration of the issue in the consultation on parole reform that I discussed when commenting on the amendments in group 13. One reason for that comes from some of the issues that Ms Clark touched on regarding the status of information.

I ask Mr Greene and Ms Dowey not to move amendments 256, 257, 258 and 259, and to allow the consultation to run and gather the widest possible range of views on the matter. If those amendments are moved, I ask the committee to oppose them.

I turn to Mr Greene’s amendments 251, 260 and 261. Once again, although I recognise that the issues raised in the amendments are deeply sensitive and are a cause of on-going concern for victims’ families, we must, even with regard to such emotive issues, also consider the practical and legal issues that arise.

Amendment 251 says that, when deciding whether to grant parole, the Parole Board

“must take into account any remorse shown by the prisoner in relation to the impact of the ... offence on any victim”.

I understand that Jamie Greene does not intend the measure to require the prisoner to admit guilt through that expression of remorse in order to be granted parole if no such admission has previously been made. As he says, that would clearly raise other legal concerns.

Release on parole does not depend solely on the individual admitting guilt or showing remorse for their actions. The board takes into account the full circumstances of the case, including the offence itself and the trial judge’s report as well as the individual’s behaviour in prison. The board can also examine whether the prisoner has taken steps to address any underlying issues that may have contributed to their behaviour or that could inform their future actions. In part 2 of the Parole Board (Scotland) Rules 2022, section 11 states that the board

“may take into account any matter which it considers to be relevant”.

In this context, there is already scope for the board to take account of the individual’s overall actions and behaviour when considering release. Those could, where applicable, include any expression of remorse or contrition.

I will pick up on points made by Ms Mackay and Fulton MacGregor. I can speak with some certainty on this as someone whose bread and butter was compiling parole reports and other assessments, including the old RA1-4 spousal assault risk assessments.

Remorse and empathy are interwoven into the many assessments that social workers, prison officers and psychologists make. However, the difficulty is that about 80 per cent of the prison population has, we believe, a communication difficulty, whether it be neurodivergence, a learning disability or mental health issues. Where we need to take great care is with those who can learn the language of therapy, who can absorb the language of social workers, psychiatrists and psychologists, and who can be very slick at communicating remorse, when what lies underneath it is a whole other matter and different motivations.

Also, to be blunt, I think that it is not clear how the board would assess an individual’s expression of remorse, given the subjective nature of these matters and the difficulty of applying a consistent approach across different cases.