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It leads me on to my next question, which is exactly on that point. This inquiry has been prompted by a concern about proliferation of commissioners, in which there are overlaps and gaps. We need to understand the current landscape so that we can identify overlaps, gaps and inefficiencies—not to get rid of them just for the sake of efficiency but for the sake of effectiveness.

You have already made a suggestion as to how a gap in patient safety could have been filled. Are you aware of other overlaps and gaps that maybe we are not?

I would love things to get moving with Sheriffhall roundabout in whatever direction. I might write to you on that point and to ask whether facilitation could be undertaken to improve that collaboration.

It would be interesting to know whether you would be willing to come back in 18 months to 2 years, to give us an interim update.

We have heard a lot of positive evidence about the benefits of all three levels of government working together on long-term, multiyear projects. To my mind, the city region deal projects sit broadly in two categories: infrastructure or community and innovation. Both types of projects have quite different business models, impacts and delivery processes, and it might make sense to manage them in different ways, instead of lumping them together under the same scheme with the same governance. What are your thoughts are on what city region deals are for, particularly if another tranche of those deals were to be on the table? Are they best suited for infrastructure or for innovation?

Thank you. My second question is related to the ways in which the deals might not work so well, such as when projects get stuck. I am thinking specifically about the Sheriffhall roundabout project. When I speak to local councillors about the project, they say that they cannot do anything to change, fix or unstick it because it is part of the UK city region deal and the UK Government needs to do that. However, we had the Secretary for State for Scotland in to give evidence and he said that the power to make a decision to move forward or to change the project sits with the Scottish Government. There is a lot of finger pointing. That is where collaboration goes wrong—when it is always somebody else’s fault or responsibility.

The evidence that we have collected as a committee suggests that the relevant report and the decision on that project are sitting on the transport secretary’s desk. The DFM said earlier that there is no desire to hold up things, but that project has been in limbo for months and months. Does the Scottish Government have the power to make that project work or to redirect funds if it decides that it is not to go ahead? What is the hold up?

Minister, thank you for coming back to the committee. Last week, my questions were about the particular SSI on the registers. Thank you for the reassurance in your letter on the mechanisms for correction, accuracy and third-party data and for accepting that no system is perfect or free from error and that bad actors can abuse any system. I am content to support the progression of the instruments, but will the minister or his officials commit to coming back to the committee or its successor in 18 months to two years, to provide an update on how things have gone, whether the corrections procedure is working and how many people have required to use it?

Of course. In addition to looking for gaps, we are looking at whether there are ways of consolidating or imitating models that are used in other countries. We want to ensure that we have all the functions that we require to maintain standards in public life, with the system performing as it should, but we are looking at whether those functions need to be in quite so many places. Could you imagine the investigative and adjudicative functions being part of the same body, or is it really important that there be separate bodies?

I will come back to that in a second. In relation to public trust, I will loop back to the earlier discussion about your objections around the potential combination of an adjudication function and an investigative function. Your objection to that proposal seemed to be not so much structural but about routes of appeal and public trust. If we were to come up with a framework that combined those functions, provided that public trust could be maintained and there were straightforward one-stop shop or portal routes for appeal, would that structure even be feasible, or is there some major objection to that?

That is brilliant. I liked what you said about the portal and the one-stop shop. The committee should continue to consider that, including whether that might mean creating, for example, an office of public trust that has all those things, so that people do not need to know whether they have to go to the ombudsman or the Standards Commission, for example.

I want to look in more detail at the relationship between your organisation and the Ethical Standards Commissioner. We have talked about the investigative function versus the adjudicative function, and you feel that it is really important that those are separate. I wonder how much of that is packaging. You said that your organisation performs as the board for the Ethical Standards Commissioner. You are already part of the same organisation, but there is this sort of separate—