Seòmar agus comataidhean

I chose the route of explanation to be as empathetic as possible for CPGs. If a CPG has failed to comply and if, having been given an option and depending on the facts, the committee’s view was that the CPG could not maintain or return to its existence, the recognition would be removed. That would not stop the same MSPs or others coming back to the committee to say that they felt that there should be a CPG for whatever the area was. We have dealt with a significant number of recognitions of CPGs.

There is no automatic process whereby something happens without the committee’s involvement, and there are not specific things that automatically trigger a reference to the committee, which speaks to Stephen Kerr’s comments about the individual reasons why some groups might be struggling and some are not. The process allows a reality to get behind the situation that the public can see from the document, which is in the public record, as all the minutes and other items are.

That is sensible. Subject to the committee’s agreement, we could return to this report in three months to see what has changed or improved, notwithstanding the other work that the committee will look at with regard to CPGs.

Yes. For their own compliance, they ceased to be—

Well, because everything had been successfully achieved, they decided—

That is excellent.

This set of amendments, which relate to data collection and reporting the outcome for children, are all intended to ensure, as we have discussed with a number of amendments, that the recognised outcomes that we seek from the bill are achieved and accounted for. I understand that there are challenges with regard to anonymisation and identifying individual young people. However, if we do not collect and analyse the data or have reports on the outcomes for our young people, there is a real risk of unforeseen consequences.

I am grateful to the Scottish Government, which has indicated a willingness to discuss the matter before stage 3. Therefore, unless other committee members have any questions, I do not intend to take this element of the debate much further forward.

I move amendment 218.

Good morning to the committee and to those attending. Amendment 213 relates specifically to the provision of services that need to be made available to children in secure accommodation. I thank the minister for dealing with the context in her comments, which allows me to address some of the issues that appear to be of concern to the Government.

It is absolutely right that secure accommodation provides an integrated delivery model whereby individual assessments are made for each child, because those are unique individuals who are presenting in the system. Of course, secure accommodation has child protection policies in place. It is also true to say that some of the children who present have some of the most complex needs of any individual who comes into contact with the state.

With respect, however, I disagree with the Government’s assertion that amendment 213 is too open and could require the secure accommodation providers to have an on-going obligation to individual children. The reference in the amendment to “secure accommodation” is drawn from the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011, which defines secure accommodation only as far as it extends to those providers accommodating young people. The 2011 act specifically says:

“for the purpose of restricting the liberty of children”.

The secure accommodation provider cannot, therefore, be held responsible beyond that obligation to secure the restriction of children’s liberty.

I respectfully disagree with the minister, therefore, that that would open an on-going obligation. If that was the argument, there would be an on-going obligation on primary schools, nurseries and local authorities, ad infinitum. There is a period of time in which an emanation of the state ceases to be the responsible party for a young person. That is defined and understood in almost all interactions between young people and emanations of the state.

Amendment 213 seeks to provide a baseline to provide an opportunity to achieve the intended outcomes, which we have discussed over the past three weeks and at stage 1. It would allow us to stand a chance of achieving a better outcome, because it would place on the secure accommodation provider a specific obligation in respect of those young people who come within that provider’s area of influence to take responsibility to ensure, where appropriate, the provision of

“advocacy services … education … emotional and mental health support … health care … support to maintain contact with the child’s family”

and

“transition and aftercare support.”

The minister confirmed in her submission that only some of those elements already sit within the secure accommodation provider’s responsibilities. The purpose of amendment 213 is to bring together a holistic overview to ensure that there is a baseline for every young person who comes within secure accommodation that will be looked at by the person who is engaged in the most important of tasks: restricting the liberty of the child. It should surely be for that secure accommodation provider to undertake that responsibility.

I am grateful for the indication from the Government. Under those circumstances, I seek your leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 218, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendment 219 not moved.

Sections 28 to 30 agreed to.

Schedule

Amendments 114 to 118 moved—[Natalie Don]—and agreed to.

Schedule, as amended, agreed to.

Section 31—Commencement

Amendment 220 not moved.

Sections 31 and 32 agreed to.

Long title agreed to.

Is proposed new section 90B expected to extend to transportation of young people by justice services? I am not talking about transportation between secure accommodation or to or from secure accommodation, but about transportation by law enforcement officers during the course of their duties.

I am grateful, convener. Is the minister prepared to share the response that her officials have received from, in essence, the judiciary? The minister raised a number of matters that fundamentally boil down to the Scottish Government’s apparent disagreement to adding “and rights” after the word “welfare” throughout the bill. When we are talking about legislation, we are talking about the rights that are given or, indeed, taken away in response to the coming together of a young person and the criminal justice system, the welfare system and most aspects of a young person’s life.

The rights of a child sit above that. We debated the UNCRC long and hard in this Parliament over a long period of time, and, across the chamber, there was very strong agreement about the hierarchy of protections that young people have. Sitting at the top are rights, but there has always been the question of a challenge between one individual’s rights and another individual’s rights. The entire process of the court system and the environment of that decision making is about balancing those rights, but we heard across the chamber during the enactment that, across Scotland, we put children’s rights at the top of that. That does not mean that those rights will be applied every time, but it means that those rights will have to give way to other individuals’ rights only in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional reasons. Even with the amendments that I have proposed, there are facilities whereby that can happen.

With regard to comments about the court and resources, I say with respect that, again, the minister appears to be saying, “We can’t do this because of resource.” Of course there are challenges, but there are always challenges. There were challenges when a number of courts across Scotland were closed, with people making representations in that respect, but it is a very dangerous position to take if we are saying to our young people, “The resources aren’t there for the particulars of your case, so it’s not important.”

That issue arises particularly with regard to amendment 204, which relates to the co-accused and the acts of adjournal in the courts. Even with my amendment, there would still be exceptional circumstances in which the court could act according to what is right, but the presumption would be that the procedure adopted by a court should accord with the child’s needs, which I would suggest in a co-accused case must always take priority over the needs of an adult co-accused. I have thought and struggled long and hard to find a situation in which the rights of an individual child who has been co-accused with an adult would give way to the rights of an adult, simply from the point of view of competency, understanding and age.

In this space for questions—I am sorry, convener; I am adjourning—