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Good morning. I want to probe a little bit deeper into the additional costs of delaying the census, to ensure that the costs have arisen because of the delay and not because the project was going off kilter prior to that. Your report says that moving the census from March 2021 to 2022 will cost an additional £21.6 million, which is about 20 per cent of the programme’s overall costs, and that £14.4 million of that increase is due to

“an increase in the cost of goods”

and

“extending supplier contracts”.

Can you provide more detail on the costs? Are you concerned that, perhaps because of the way in which the contracts were framed, people are being paid for doing nothing as a result of the delay instead of producing more?

Do you see merit or benefit in giving a committee such as this one or the group of parliamentarians who look at the regulations some authority also to probe the impact of the policy? Should that committee or group consider not only whether the regulation or instrument is well drafted, but ensure that it leads to good outcomes when it is applied in policy terms? Is there merit in bringing those two functions together within the same group?

Dr Fox, I have a question about the differences between the ways in which Holyrood and Westminster look at such instruments. We were able only to ensure that the Covid passport regulations were soundly framed; we could not dig deeper into the policy, although some members of the committee thought that that was defective and deficient. How does that differ at Westminster? Would those who were looking at the instrument also look into the policy, or would they look only at how the legislation is framed?

I will backtrack a bit. Is there a contradiction or tension between the necessity for emergency legislation to be urgent and of significant importance, and the fact that it gets the least, or a limited, amount of scrutiny? One example, to which Ms Ross might have been alluding, is the recent Covid passport scheme regulations, which were before this committee. As a new member of the committee, I was concerned that, although the regulations might have been framed exactly as they should have been, the policy to which they gave effect was sadly deficient. The passport did not prove that the person who presented it was the person to whom the passport had been issued, so there was an element of possible impersonation. In addition, when we introduced lateral flow tests to the scheme, it did not involve proof that a person had had a negative test; they could simply declare themselves negative, whether or not they had had the test.

The question that I am getting at is this: how do we manage the tension between the debate that is held and what seems to be an absence of scrutiny, both of the detail of the made affirmative instrument and, more importantly, of the policy to which it gives effect? How do we manage that tension between the debate and the lack of scrutiny when the legislation comes forward?

Do you foresee that there would be more recourse to the courts as a result of continued application of the made affirmative procedure if we carried on in these circumstances? Would that be a route that industry would look to utilise if Parliament is not effectively scrutinising instruments or holding the Executive to account for those laws?

Good morning, Mr Mathieson and Mr Barron. The impression that I am getting from what you have said so far is that, in effect, what went wrong was circumstantial rather than systemic or attitudinal. Mr Mathieson, could you say at what point you got the impression that the leadership and governance arrangements had broken down after a period of apparent stability?

What was your response to the vote of no confidence? What is your understanding of why it has now been withdrawn?

Do you accept that there was a weakness in the arrangements beforehand?

Is there now a formal appraisal mechanism for board members?

Do you wish to add anything, Mr Barron?