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Is there a fear that, much in the same way as happens with rejected referrals in child and adolescent mental health services, the data that we have, even if it is accurate and was properly captured, does not necessarily represent the true scale of the problem, because people are falling out of the system and we no longer have any further data for them? Is that a legitimate concern?

Good morning. Mr Huggins, the 2019 report suggested that a single individual be made responsible for overseeing Government ICT projects. The Government took that recommendation on board and said that it would consider it. You are the director of digital, so is that your role? If it is not, can you give us an indication of where the Government’s present thinking is in relation to the creation of that role?

I have a final question on a specific project. Earlier, you mentioned the Covid status app as an example of agility in the Government’s IT and, I assume, procurement processes. I just want to interrogate the dynamic of how the spending control process would work in practice. The initial estimate for that project was something in the region of £600,000, but my understanding from recent media coverage is that the cost ended up at £7 million. How would the spending control process ensure that such a project worked? I am not sure that that level of spend even counts as a major ICT project, but I want to understand how such a project evolves and what spending control mechanisms are in place.

One of the other key innovations and developments was the creation of the Scottish Drugs Death Taskforce. The original chair and deputy chair resigned citing serious concerns that the pace at which the task force was being asked to operate risked the implementation of sustainable change. In effect, they said that speed did not equate to effectiveness. Do you share concerns that, after a period of inactivity, we might mistake activity for progress?

Ms Matthew slightly pre-empted me in relation to the considerable delays in the implementation of the drug and alcohol information system—DAISy—and that database. There are still considerable data gaps in the system. Will you elaborate on the work that is under way to address those gaps? What timescale are we operating to in order to ensure that we get the important information into the system?

Mr Huggins, I think that Mr Coffey referred to the major projects that are currently under way, which are critical to the delivery of the digital strategy. At this point in time, are there any that are giving you further sleepless nights?

In relation to how comfortable you feel, can you provide the committee with an update on how the social security software components are progressing?

I presume that that talks to the point that the control mechanisms in Government maybe still need to be tightened up.

The Auditor General’s report explains that, in 2012, the network was transferred to Scottish Canals as a

“heritage asset, with no value attributed to it in the financial statements.”

It goes on to state that

“the canal network has never been valued in its entirety or disclosed in Scottish Canals’ financial statements since”

that transfer took place. Why has no value ever been attributed to the canal network? Did someone drop the ball at the beginning of the process?

It is obviously quite a technical accounting issue. For people watching the committee, could you explain the impact of the present situation on the day-to-day operation of the organisation and on the integrity of the financial statements?