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I note the concerns that we expressed last year about the increased levels of fiscal fines and, more generally, the lack of information that is available to the victims of crimes.

The second issue concerns the increased time limits, especially for prisoners who are on remand. In the same year, up to 500 prisoners have been released early due to catastrophic overcrowding in prisons, but I have not really heard from the Government today any sense of urgency or any evidence about what has been done in the past 12 months to remedy the problems so that we would not need additional 12-month extensions for both issues. I therefore cannot support the SSI.

The other issue of concern relates to the power that the Crown Office has been given to extend how long it has to put someone on trial. Previously, it was 80 days from the serving of an indictment in a solemn case, which, of course, are the more serious cases. However, that was increased by way of these temporary Covid measures to 320 days for those who are not on remand and 260 days for those who are held on remand. That is a huge increase and, as we know, was supposedly temporary, but if the motion is passed today, the extension will now run until 2025. Does the cabinet secretary agree that those extensions, which keep people in remand for so much longer, are only adding to the crisis in the prisons, which are already dangerously overcrowded?

I have a final question. Do you or your officials have any data on how often the extensions have been used since the temporary measures were introduced?

A couple of issues that we raised at this time last year are still of concern. The first relates to the increase of fiscal fines from £300 to £500. At this time last year, the cabinet secretary asked for a one-year extension to that. We objected and put the matter to a vote. Labour supported us but, nonetheless, the Government got its way. Here we are again: the cabinet secretary seeks another one-year extension to what was supposed to be a temporary power that was necessary only because of the pandemic.

When we raised that matter last year, the cabinet secretary told the committee that there would be a public consultation. The findings from that were published in July. Some respondents raised concerns specifically about the increased use of fiscal fines. Comments were made that that would

“negatively affect the ability of the criminal justice system to deliver its public protection function”.

Concerns were also expressed that those fines were being used for more serious offences that would normally be prosecuted in a court. That has been borne out by recent reports that a number of serious crimes, including assault, are being dealt with by way of fiscal fine—there is no trial and no conviction and, often, the victims are not informed of the outcome.

Does the cabinet secretary genuinely think that further extension is appropriate, given the misgivings about the use of fiscal fines?

I am sure that we would like to see those statistics. It is interesting to see that fiscal fines appear to have reduced significantly, but that should be seen in the wider context of all direct measures. If we are being provided with those figures, they should also include recorded police warnings, antisocial behaviour, fixed-penalty notices and any other such measures, because it might well be that some of them have reduced but others have increased.

Last year, I suggested that, if the Government wanted to extend the provision, it should introduce primary legislation. The cabinet secretary has today said that she does not intend to extend it after this one-year extension, I believe. Is that correct?

When you asked the committee last year for a one-year extension, did you tell the criminal justice agencies at that point that they had one year to sort themselves out, or did you intend to come back to the Parliament again this year to ask for one more year?

I understand the point that the cabinet secretary makes in respect of amendment 60, but would amendment 61 give the Scottish Government time to do that work properly?

I am extremely concerned about these amendments. The bill was published on 6 June, and here we are, 12 weeks later, considering a load of amendments from the Scottish Government that fundamentally broaden the scope of the legislation.

These amendments were published only a week ago today, and the proposed changes are so broad that they have required the Government to change the introductory text of the bill. Based on the evidence that we have heard, these are not small, tinkering amendments.

This morning, I spoke with David Kennedy, the general secretary of the Scottish Police Federation, and he shares our concerns. He described the amendments as “deeply concerning and frankly dangerous”, and he believes that they

“risk the creation of a fundamentally unfair system”.

The amendments would allow the chief constable to dismiss an officer for failing vetting. On the face of it, that might sound reasonable, but there appears to be no definition of what that vetting would look like; that would be decided only by way of regulation after the legislation is passed.

The committee has not taken any evidence on these amendments, and there has been no consultation with any witnesses, including from the SPF. I know that the cabinet secretary said that the SPF would be consulted after the event, but there is no real requirement for its position to be heard. If we accepted the amendments, we would, therefore, in effect be giving the Government carte blanche to come up with a system that could be fundamentally unfair.

The SPF’s other concern, which I share, is that vetting regulations that could lead to whistleblowers being targeted could be introduced by way of these amendments. Police officers, as whistleblowers, could have legitimate points to raise, and a decision could be taken to weaponise the regulations against them. I have seen that happen in the past with police officers, some of whom have given evidence to this committee. They had done nothing wrong, but having attempted to draw attention to wrongdoing, they felt the full force of the police regulations being used against them.

I urge the cabinet secretary, therefore, to press pause on these amendments today, and to give the committee and interested parties, including the SPF, time to submit a formal response to them. That would be sensible and reasonable, given that we have had just a week in which to consider them.

If the cabinet secretary insists on pressing the amendments today, I would urge all committee members to vote against them at this stage. That would allow us to revisit the proposals at stage 3 in a measured and sensible way.

Will the cabinet secretary take an intervention?

My colleague Sharon Dowey has asked me to point out that the Government supports three of her amendments in this group. In the earlier part of her speaking notes she identified eight. I do not want to spoil any future revelations, but five of them are in the next group. I say that for the record, so that there is no confusion. The three of her amendments in this group that are being supported by the Government are amendments 12, 13 and 14, and I am speaking to amendment 57, in my name.

Amendment 57 would give the power to the chief constable to dismiss an officer whose conduct is considered to amount to gross misconduct, even when there are on-going criminal proceedings against that officer. It is important that the chief constable is able to do so where it is irrefutable that the officer should be sacked—if they have acted in a way that is inarguably incompatible with continued employment.

As we all know, especially on this committee, criminal proceedings can move very slowly, and there is no reason why an individual should not be dismissed, as in most workplaces, while there are separate and parallel criminal proceedings that will play out in due course. It seems sensible to introduce such a provision, which would prevent the very low number of guilty police officers from exploiting the system by remaining on full pay for prolonged periods when the evidence against them would result in instant dismissal in any other circumstances.