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::I will speak to amendment 111, in the name of Davy Russell, who sends his apologies because he is at a friend’s funeral and cannot attend the meeting today.

Amendment 111 would require the Government to evaluate whether the bill has accomplished what it sets out to do. After reviewing the amendments in this group, Mr Russell believes that that can be broadly accomplished by amendment 59, in the name of Maurice Golden, and by amendment 109, in the name of Carol Mochan, and so he would like to add his support to those amendments.

The only outstanding issue concerns the production of the evaluations: one on whether non-surgical cosmetic procedures have become safer, and one on whether there has been an adverse effect on the NHS workforce. Mr Russell would like the Scottish Government to be compelled to lodge a motion to repeal the bill within 12 months of the publication of both those reports—in other words, after the later of the two reports has been published—and seeks an assurance that the Scottish Government can commit to putting that in the bill.

::Amendment 121 seeks to provide for a delay that is very similar to that set out in amendment 63, in the name of Jeremy Balfour, with the exception of the length of that delay. The argument for having a delay of three years is to ensure that, in the event that other amendments to the bill do not pass, current practitioners would still be able to seek clarity on training requirements and make arrangements to qualify as registered prescribers, have an existing trained member of staff qualify as a prescriber or make provisions to hire a registered prescriber. Such a timeframe could also mean that price increases caused by the bill could happen gradually, and it could avoid the rug being pulled out from beneath practitioners.

The three-year delay is about balancing the bill’s safety aspects and the time that it takes to qualify as a prescriber. Mr Russell also notes that current practitioners are concerned that, if the bill were to pass without sufficient amendment, non‑medical practitioners could not possibly function in the sector, and that a longer wind‑down period allowing them to close rental and other contractual agreements, such as with medical waste management, would therefore be beneficial.

I should say that we would also support the 18-month delay period proposed in Mr Balfour’s amendment 63 as an absolute minimum.

Integration joint boards have been subject to increasing financial pressure in recent years. Disagreement and possibly divisive votes are more likely on boards when difficult decisions are being made and dilemmas are being faced. How would the shift in voting composition affect responsibility for budget setting and public accountability? Perhaps Councillor Kelly could set out the implications of that.

It seems to me that the issue is the question of what mandate the members of the IJB have. Previously, there have been debates about whether health boards should be directly elected—we have not had a recent debate on that. However, it seems that your point is that there should be a direct public mandate for any representation on these IJBs, given that the IJBs make financially significant decisions about public services.

I assume that the nearby Marriott would not have the same problem, so why does the hospital have that problem? Perhaps there are benchmarking opportunities there.

Thank you, convener, and thanks to members of the panel for joining us today. Supporters of the order to change the voting composition of integration joint boards suggest that giving those with lived experience and the third sector voting rights would close a democratic deficit for those voices, which have a significant stake in decisions made by IJBs. How do you define that deficit locally, within an IJB area, and what practical change in accountability do you expect if those representatives are given voting rights?

My colleagues might ask questions that will allow you to elaborate, but we need to keep the discussion pacey.

Are there any further points about whether the changes will dilute or strengthen accountability?

Several local authorities and COSLA have argued in correspondence that the amendment risks diluting democratic accountability by placing elected councillors who sit on integration joint boards in a minority. Will you explain and outline why the change would be viewed as undermining the mandate of local government representation and what consequences you therefore see for democratic oversight of the boards?

Mr Smellie, do you have a perspective on that?

I also want to look at your role in implementing recommendations. As a parliamentary office-holder, do you see any role for yourself in reviewing the implementation of public inquiries and reviews that are relevant to patient safety and making sure that their recommendations are being delivered?