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My understanding is that the definition that has been used is one that is used across the piece in legislation; I understand that it is derived from European Union retained law. I am pleased about the fact that we have the ability to amend and add to the list. If there are specific issues with regard to the definition, I am happy to address them, but those were the main points that came up. The fact that we have the flexibility to add and remove things from the list is important.

It is a good point. We are working with two core offences and a suite of exceptions, and then we are working with two exceptions to the exceptions. Regarding the four original exceptions—this is where I get tongue-tied—I think that they are right and reflect the realities that exist when people are required to undertake control of wild mammals.

As I mentioned earlier, the RSPB has welcomed one of the exceptions—the environmental benefit exception—because that was not part of the 2002 act. I do not have the quote in front of me, so I do not want to misquote the RSPB, but I think that it said that the exception was a welcome addition to its range of tools for the landscape-scale management of our land that it undertakes.

With regard to the licensing scheme, I very much come from the position that it is correct. I think that it would be wrong for the Government to see what the Bonomy review had said—that there will be circumstances in which two dogs are not sufficient to undertake a legal activity of flushing, because of terrain—and then not to act on that. It is correct that the Government does so.

I want the licensing scheme to be workable; I do not want people who ought to be entitled to use it to feel that they cannot do so, or to feel frustrated by the process. Equally, however, a licence has to be construed as the option that is available when there are no other options. That is how we will seek to design the scheme with stakeholders.

I can include more on that when we write to you about our considerations in developing the two-dog limit, but I have to say that it largely reflects what we have been told about what is necessary. By the same token, if I am being told that it is not going to work, my mind is not closed to that. After all, I do not want this not to work or its availability to undermine what we are trying to do. That said, where it is needed, I do not want it to be a fudge.

Did you mean loss of livestock?

What is in the bill reflects our understanding of how people are operating right now. I mentioned what we might call environmental schemes, whereby, for example, invasive non-native species are being controlled on the islands. The way that we have expressed it in the bill tries to reflect how people are using dogs now. There is a difference between people who might set out on a year-long activity of eradicating an invasive non-native species on an island and, for example, a farmer who finds evidence that there is a fox in his or her fields and has to call on support in order to control that. I would not refer to the latter as a scheme; I would refer to that as the on-going workings of the farm.

I do not think that I am trying to draw a great distinction here. I do not disagree with you that there will be times when what someone is undertaking in order to protect lambs could be referred to as a scheme, but the bill seeks to reflect how people are using dogs in real life.

That is an interesting point. As with some of the other points on definitions that we have discussed, the team, the drafters and I thought carefully about the words that are used.

I am comfortable with the word “reasonably” because the judicial system—the process from start to finish—is well acquainted with the idea of reasonableness and with making assessments based on that. The wording allows us to take the circumstances into account, which those who interpret the law must be able to do. We have therefore used the term “reasonably believed”, and the bill mentions people having to take “reasonable” measures to prevent two dogs from joining another pack to form a larger group. The wording is quite standard, and the judicial system is well acquainted with reasonableness.

That is a good question. There is always a balance to be struck. I have been talking to Mercedes Villalba and Karen Adam about the risks of having a definition and then finding that we are outwith it. There is also the risk of having so many terms that the definition could become broader than we anticipated. I do not think that that is the case with what we have set out, and I think that “searching for”, “stalking” and “flushing” are terms that people readily understand and will understand as being part of the intentional act of hunting.

I do not think that it is “woolly”; I think that it is deliberately not closing off what could constitute hunting. That all comes back to the fact that we found ourselves, with the 2002 act, with interpretations being taken outside the bill and prosecution and behaviour not following what was expected under the bill. The definition is deliberately non-exhaustive.

Hugh Dignon is telling me that that is correct, so I will let him come in and expand on that.

Your last point touches on the issue that, if there were not differences in how long people can apply for the licence for and the terms thereof, the difference would be theoretical. However, where the terms exist, I see that people might say, “Should I apply under the protection of livestock clause or under the environmental protection clause?”.

The terms of the licensing scheme are still to be developed, so it is difficult for me to give concrete responses to that. However, our purpose has been to reflect the ways in which people need to call on the use of dogs in land management throughout Scotland. Finding that there is a fox present in fields—and having to call on support for that—is a different matter from a large-scale environmental project about an invasive non-native species. We are not deliberately pursuing the idea that protection of livestock is not an environmental issue, because it is an environmental issue. There is a theoretical distinction—