Seòmar agus comataidhean

I have completed that section, but I am more than happy to keep talking to Christine Grahame about it to try to clarify her points. However, if I can, I will move on, because I am conscious of the time.

Rachael Hamilton’s amendments 204, 209, 231 and 234, which would insert the word “group” into section 4, are not necessary. They do not add what she hopes they would. As I have said, “person” is not limited to individuals and, under interpretation legislation, it includes bodies such as clubs, companies or partnerships. As we have discussed, the singular includes the plural unless the context requires otherwise. Therefore, it is already possible to grant a licence to more than one person if they meet the requirements, so I ask that those amendments not be moved.

Again, I am not entirely clear what amendments 205 and 232 in Rachael Hamilton’s name seek to achieve. However, they could create inaccuracies in the bill. Sections 4(4)(b) and 4(5)(b) work together. The former sets out what a licence can or must do and the latter sets out what must be specified in the licence. Amendments 205 and 232 would break that relationship, which would cause confusion. However, I am not entirely clear what the intention of the amendments is and, if Rachael Hamilton wants to work with me to clarify that, I am more than happy to do so.

Okay, thank you.

I will try to proceed as quickly as I can.

Amendment 33, in Rachael Hamilton’s name, would remove the tests for the relevant authority to grant the licence, which are that the work would need to contribute towards a significant or long-term environmental benefit and that no other solution would be effective. Amendment 33 would remove those two key tests that have to be met before the granting of licences under section 8, which are the need for the activity to contribute to long-term environmental benefit and for there to be no other effective solution.

The “no other effective solution” test is the foundation of the licensing scheme that we are proposing, and it is designed to ensure that the use of more than two dogs is kept to an absolute minimum and that more than two dogs are used only when it is absolutely necessary. Likewise, the long-term environmental benefit test is important in section 8 because licences could be granted for up to two years, so we need to remain strict on how that test operates.

Without those two tests, it is hard to see what criteria NatureScot would apply before deciding, and I think that it would loosen a great deal of what we are trying to achieve under that section of the bill.

Thank you for the intervention. If I understand you correctly, my response is that the consultation has been happening from the beginning. It has got the bill to this point, and it has taken us through the scrutiny period in the Scottish Parliament, so it is not as though consultation—

I will respond once we have been through the amendments, convener.

Apologies for omitting that—it slipped my mind—but I do not support that aspect of the proposals, either. There are already well-established review processes inherent in NatureScot’s operations, and NatureScot is best placed to take a view, not Scottish ministers. Referring back to my conversation with Rachael Hamilton, the expertise lies with NatureScot and not with me.

Thank you, and good morning.

I will begin with comments regarding amendment 131, in the name of Liam Kerr. I reassure Mr Kerr that a key concept of the bill is that hunting is an intentional act. A person cannot accidentally or unintentionally hunt, just as a person cannot accidentally or unintentionally run. That is important. Lord Bonomy described at length the complications that arose from the mental state provisions in the 2002 act, which Liam Kerr referred to, and the particular difficulty that arose from trying to prove a person’s intent when enforcing legislation.

With that in mind, I cannot support amendment 131 for two reasons. First, it is unnecessary because intention is implied in the act of hunting. Secondly, the amendment would create uncertainty as to when intent would be assessed. For example, if a person allowed their dog to chase a wild mammal and, instead of recalling the dog, encouraged it to pursue and kill the mammal, that person could argue that they did not know that that was their intended use of the dog when they set off but that that had changed at some point. There is dubiety that could lead to the enforcement problems that Lord Bonomy talked about.

Ultimately, amendment 131 would weaken the principal offence and could take us back to the enforcement problems that are associated with the 2002 act. For those reasons, I ask Liam Kerr not to press amendment 131.

I will move on to amendments 58 to 62, which are in the name of Edward Mountain. As has been said, the amendments would insert a new exception that could allow the use of a pack of dogs to chase and kill rabbits if a person had permission from the landowner. Amendments 58 to 62 would do that by creating a new exception which, in effect, would remove rabbits from the scope of the bill. The proposed new exception is not subject to the same conditions that are found in the other exceptions, including the important two-dog limit. The only requirement would be that of obtaining landowner permission. It would then not be an offence to hunt rabbits, which would include chasing and killing rabbits with a pack of dogs.

I have spoken at length about why rabbits were purposely added to the definition of “wild mammal” in the bill for reasons of animal welfare. Edward Mountain said that rabbits do not suffer more than other animals. That is slightly beside the point—which is that they suffer in the same way as other animals and ought to have parity with other animals, such as hares. We also chose to include rabbits in the bill to close the loophole whereby persons engaging in hare coursing were claiming that they were hunting rabbits.

I will just finish my point. The term “sport” distinguishes between the recreational nature of these pursuits and wildlife management for economic or environmental reasons.

I was just concluding, but I am happy to take any comments from Edward Mountain.

That will be in the eye of the beholder.

Amendments 156 and 159 from my colleague Christine Grahame seek to remove the ability of NatureScot to license “a category of persons”. I very much understand the intention to tighten up how licences can be granted. However—we have discussed this a lot this morning—I do not want to create inconsistencies with the wording of the bill, which the two amendments could do, as the approach that we have set out is as set out in the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981.

I will try to cover each of the points that have been made in turn. On the point about “person” and what that can be taken to mean, the law already states that the word “person” would include bodies such as a company or club, so those types of bodies could be granted a licence even if the bill were amended to only include “person”.

Yes. I was just going to come on to the point about categories. The other reason why that is important is that excluding a category would prevent a situation in which a set of neighbouring farmers, perhaps with hill ground stretching between them—exactly the terrain where Lord Bonomy said the provisions would be required—would be able to do what we have discussed with them: apply for a licence that runs with the terrain, not the individual, over that area of land.