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It is absolutely a challenge, and I have committed to further discussion on that, because we must overcome those challenges. It is not about placing more importance on one member of a family over another; it is about considering how we get this right.

It is essential that we learn from the experience of other comparable jurisdictions that have had to actively amend or repeal legislation on anonymity for deceased victims following changes made in haste and without proper consultation with all those affected. Bereaved families in such jurisdictions—for example, in Ireland and in Victoria in Australia—have likened such laws to gag clauses and have expressed anger at not being able to speak freely about their loved ones.

Another concern is the potential for anonymity for deceased child victims to operate as a shield to protect the identity of those who commit offences. As I said in relation to the previous group of amendments, there might well be times when it would be hard to understand how you could identify one without that leading to the identification of the other. That, again, is something that needs to be considered further.

It is also unclear what would happen if there were no consensus among family members as to whether an application should be made to the court that sought to dispense with reporting restrictions in respect of a deceased child victim. Amendment 131 would enable a broad range of family members to apply for such a dispensation, including a parent, sibling, child, spouse or civil partner of the deceased child victim. Not all bereaved families will have a unified view on whether they wish the identity of their bereaved child to be made public. One family member might wish the child’s identity to remain anonymous, while another might wish to speak publicly about the child, whether to remember and celebrate their life or to raise awareness and campaign. It is hard to envisage a non-traumatising process by which family members would have to apply to court and argue either for or against the waiving of anonymity.

Amendments 139 to 146 are in a similar vein in seeking to extend reporting restrictions in relation to the publication of information that could identify deceased child victims of a crime and their families once court proceedings are under way. The issues that I have already outlined apply equally to those amendments.

On amendments 152 to 154, which concern the court’s powers in respect of the retrospective removal or reinstatement of published information that was not subject to reporting restrictions at the time that it was published, I have concerns about how such provisions could work in practice. I will not reiterate what I have already said about amendments 137 and 138 in group 13, but I will say that I have the same concerns about how amendments 152 to 154 would work in practice and their enforceability, which would impact on the benefits that they could bring to those whom they sought to aid.

I will, however, reiterate what I said in relation to group 13. The Government is keen to seek a solution to the issues that bereaved families and victim support organisations have raised and to engage on them in an open-minded way, but it is essential that we fully explore the complexities involved in order to avoid the unintended consequences to which I have alluded.

I would also note that the issue has potential implications, too, for the Victims, Witnesses, and Justice Reform (Scotland) Bill, which also includes provisions on reporting restrictions with regard to the protection of other victims of offences under the legislation. That bill is currently at stage 1. As I mentioned, the round-table event with a range of partners in February will provide the crucial forum for discussing experiences and options, and the cabinet secretary and I are absolutely committed to working with Ms Maguire and any other members on the matter.

For the reasons that I have outlined, I am unable to support the member’s amendments, and I again urge her not to press or move them in return for the Government’s commitment to having discussions and engaging on this extremely important issue. That would allow time for us to have the level of detailed consultation and consideration that such an important and complex matter warrants beyond the bill itself.

This is not a case of the issue being kicked into the long grass. I hope that I have made clear how seriously I take the issue and that I appreciate the difficulties that it causes for many families. I have highlighted numerous times that, because of the importance and potential unintended consequences, it needs further consideration. My discussions with the cabinet secretary are on-going, and there absolutely are other vehicles for it.

The Cabinet Secretary for Justice, Angela Constance, is arranging the round table. She has, I believe, had a series of engagements with numerous stakeholders on the matter. I cannot speak for her on the date for the round table; I know that a lot of different organisations and stakeholders have been involved in the process, and I cannot comment on why the date is when it is. Nevertheless, I assume that every effort has been made to get that done in a timely manner so that those discussions can take place as quickly as possible. There could be a number of reasons why it is taking place when it is.

The round table is a very important step in the process, but it might not be the be-all and end-all. Other things may come out of the round table that require further discussion. I do not want to rush the process to fit in with a timeline for stage 3. As I said, the most important thing is to get it right—

Sorry, convener—I will just finish if I can.

I have made it clear that I am more than happy to work with the committee and other members on the issue and that I am open to considering further legislative opportunities for the matter to be addressed. That is not to say that stage 3 of this bill is not the place to do that; I am simply saying that there are options to consider in that regard.

I am happy to.

I would be grateful, convener.

The judiciary’s response to the consultation is already publicly available, but I am more than happy to share it after the meeting. As for the comments about the balancing of rights and the words “welfare and rights” not being included, I would point out that the rights of the child are currently enshrined in the ECHR and the UNCRC—and I know that the member is aware of that—but the courts have a duty to act on those and I am confident that that is what they will do. It will be for the courts to look on a case-by-case basis at these cases, acting on their responsibilities under the UNCRC and the ECHR.

Yes.

My thoughts about that go back to the idea that the victim impact statement challenges the whole ethos of the children’s hearings system. I really do not think that I can be any clearer about that.

I thank Ms McCall for her explanation of her amendments.

The remittal of a child’s case to the hearings system provides the opportunity for them to be afforded more age-and-stage-appropriate, welfare-based and holistic support to meet their needs. In the consultation on the bill, the majority of respondents supported further exploration of the proposal to enable all children under the age of 18 to be remitted from a court to the principal reporter. The rationale was that it would lead to improved outcomes for children in recognition of the trauma, abuse and other adversities experienced by so many children who are in conflict with the law.

Respondents also recognised that reform in this area would allow the rehabilitative potential of the children’s hearings system to be maximised. Fundamentally, amendments 85 to 88 would remove the ability of 16 and 17-year-olds in solemn proceedings to have their case remitted to the PR to arrange for the disposal of the case by a children’s hearing. I understand that Ms McCall intends to withdraw or not move those amendments.

Turning to Russell Findlay’s amendment 206, I note that there are parallels with amendments debated last week that sought to take and have regard to views of the person who has been affected by the child’s offence or behaviour in the children’s hearings system. I note in particular that amendment 168 was not supported in the vote of the committee. I do not believe that amendment 206 is appropriate.

The legislative framework for victim impact statements, which concerns the criminal justice system, provides that they can be made in certain courts and in relation to certain prescribed offences only. In cases in which it would be possible for such a statement to be provided, as we have heard, the statement might have already been received and considered by the court ahead of the case being remitted.

Amendment 206 does not specify which offences it is intended to apply to. If it is all offences, it would go even wider than the existing measures in the criminal justice system. In addition, the purpose of victim impact statements is to inform sentencing and, as the committee is aware, remittal to the children’s hearings system does not constitute a sentence, and nor does the hearing impose a sentence.