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As I have said, it will be up to the panel to determine what information it requires to deal with an individual child’s case, and that will be done on a case-by-case basis.

Do you mean if there was an overcapacity problem?

As noted, the amendments in this group are all minor and technical. Although I am happy to explain any of them in detail, if committee members wish, I am equally happy to move amendment 99 and to invite members to support it.

I am confident about that, although, given the extra attention to the matter, with the whole-system approach, if it became something that I was not confident about, I would certainly look to take action or look at what could be done.

Things would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Every child’s situation is different. I probably could not give an example in this meeting, but, as we have established, welfare and rights are different things, and welfare is the basis of the children’s hearing. I would be worried about putting anything else above the idea of welfare, just in case that had an impact on children’s hearings. An example could be the right to family relationships. Welfare concerns might suggest that family relationships are not a priority due to a family member’s behaviour. There could be issues with family conflict, for example. I would be willing to discuss that further with Martin Whitfield, but, at the moment, we cannot support the amendment as it is worded. However, we can certainly work on that.

We understand that amendment 167 seeks to ensure that, when decisions are being made about a child under the 2011 act, decision makers do not discriminate against the child on any of the grounds that are mentioned. Although we agree with the principle, we do not think that the amendment is necessarily workable or necessary.

What is meant by discrimination and the referenced characteristics is not set out in the member’s amendment. That would make it impossible in practice to effectively enforce the obligations that it seeks to impose. In addition, there is a range of statutory duties that already apply to public authorities, including the courts, the Scottish Children’s Reporter Administration and Children’s Hearings Scotland, which oblige them to protect children’s rights and not unlawfully discriminate. Those include non-discrimination duties and the public sector equality duty in the Equality Act 2010, the requirement under the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with ECHR rights, including article 14, on non-discrimination, and duties to act compatibly with requirements under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Incorporation) (Scotland) Act 2024, which include duties in relation to non-discrimination and will come into force this summer.

All of those duties have been carefully framed and do not cut across the established law and principles of the children’s hearings system. They preserve the ability of decision makers to recognise that it might be necessary to treat children differently on the basis of characteristics such as age. For example, it would be appropriate to share information only with a child who is old enough to understand it.

I am discounting amendment 189 altogether, given the way it is worded. I have already been very clear about victims’ rights and information for victims. I have already gone through the Government’s amendments in relation to more information for victims, and I intend to cover that at the end of my remarks.

If the convener is happy for me to continue, I will be happy to respond to any other questions at the end.

Amendment 190 would allow

“any person who is or appears to be a victim”

to seek a review when a child is referred to the principal reporter under the decision-making process governing joint referral.

As well as going against the grain of the bill, the amendments in this group fly in the face of existing law and practice. For example, amendment 3 provides that the principal reporter should refer the matter of alleged serious offending by a child to the Lord Advocate, but that is unnecessary. Current law and guidance mean that both will receive a report of the alleged offending behaviour from the police. The Lord Advocate will carefully consider the case for prosecuting the child in the light of that, taking into account all factors relevant to the public interest, including the rights of any potential victim.

My response will be quite lengthy, given the number of amendments in the group, but I will try to be as concise as possible. I will take each amendment in turn.

The Government has a number of concerns about this group of amendments. Amendment 165 would change the focus of the test that is to be applied across the scope of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 and would, by definition, imply that children’s rights are to be given the same weight as their welfare. We know that, in some cases, that simply cannot happen, as there may be an unavoidable conflict between welfare and rights. We must remember that welfare is the primary indicator for safeguarding children who are referred to the hearings system, and it has been for many years.

More broadly, on the issue of rights and existing requirements, the children’s hearing or court will also consider the potential impact of any decision, as they already have extensive obligations under the European convention on human rights and the UNCRC, and, as public authorities, they must act in a way that is compatible with those conventions. Therefore, the necessary balance of rights is already achieved under the existing provisions in the bill. On that basis, I could not support amendment 165.

I just needed some water.

I appreciate that amendment 171 intends to mitigate concerns about 16 and 17-year-olds as they transition to adulthood. However, the Government has issues with the amendment. As is noted in the policy memorandum for the bill, it is desirable to smooth the transition with regard to the supports available to children as they move into adulthood.

That is particularly relevant when a child has required statutory intervention on a compulsory basis. That is why the bill as introduced made provision to ensure that the local authority has a duty to provide support should the hearing decide that on-going supervision and guidance are likely to be helpful to the young person whose order will be terminated. If the young person is in agreement, the local authority will continue the relationship without compulsion on the young person up to the age of 19.

That makes appropriate provision to ensure that the young person does not fall through the cracks, as they will already be known to the local authority. The provision strikes the right balance by allowing a children’s hearing to place duties on local authorities to provide support for children who have required compulsory supervision measures when their order is no longer needed or has to be terminated due to the age of the child.

I recognise that the member might think that amendment 171 could fill a gap for older children who are referred to a hearing when an order is not made. However, the principal reporter must consider a child’s case in those instances and, in doing so, might make a determination for voluntary support and guidance as needed.

It should also be noted that amendment 171 does not define the term “transition to adulthood”. In practice, that will mean different things to different young people. It will be achieved in various ways and to varying timescales from child to child. Therefore, I am not able to support amendment 171.

Although I am sympathetic to the sentiment behind amendments 119, 120 and 121, which are well intentioned, there are a number of issues with the proposals to legislate for particular medical assessments. I thank Miles Briggs for his contribution and for the account that he provided this morning.

First, we must be mindful that children’s hearings are decision-making forums rather than responsible for ensuring the assessment of children with identified medical and neurological needs. Secondly, the responsibility to provide relevant, timely and appropriate information to inform decision making by a children’s hearing lies with authorities that work in the hearings system, such as social work, health and education authorities. Thirdly, there are existing well-established mechanisms under part 6 of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 for requesting further relevant information, where necessary and appropriate, to inform decision making. Moreover, those mechanisms are not prescriptive and, in contrast to the scope of the amendments, allow for a range of circumstances that are relevant to the case.

The additional duties proposed in the amendments could also inadvertently cut across medical expertise that has determined that existing diagnoses are not relevant or that further assessments are not necessary. That, in turn, could delay decision making or subject a child to medical examination or assessment that is neither relevant to, nor appropriate for informing, decision making by a children’s hearing.

We are now more aware than ever of issues of neurodivergence, and I want to be clear that the Government is fully committed to children with additional needs being appropriately supported in the hearings system. However, ensuring that those issues are considered does not necessarily require additional specific legislative duties to be placed on the children’s hearings, and nor should we place an additional statutory duty on the children’s hearings or the courts when it might not be relevant to the circumstances of a case or the circumstances of a decision by a hearing or a court.

On that basis, I ask the member not to move amendments 119, 120 and 121. If the member moves the amendments, I ask the committee to vote against them.

Turning to amendment 172, again, I am in full agreement with the member about the fundamental principle of ensuring appropriate and timely access to support services in cases of domestic abuse. However, I do not necessarily agree that placing a duty on the principal reporter to ensure appropriate referral and access to providers of domestic abuse support is the right way forward.

Ensuring that those who are involved at any stage of the children’s hearings process have access to specialist services at the earliest possible stage of proceedings is, of course, the right way forward, but I am not convinced that we should legislate as suggested. In common with my comments about amendment 170—on which I said that it is not the role of the hearing to provide support services—I similarly do not see it as the role of the reporter to make a determination about a referral to support services.

I am sorry, Mr Whitfield—I do not follow.

There have been a lot of discussions around the rights of victims, and I will certainly get on to that issue later. A range of support measures will be available for victims or children who are at the heart of the children’s hearings system or who have experienced something like that. I feel that, if their views were sought or impacted on the decision of the children’s hearings system, that would take us too far towards turning the children’s hearings system into a mini-court setting.

We just need to ensure that the child at the heart of the hearing is being appropriately supported and that those measures are in place for them—and, equally, for any victim. You gave me two examples—one where one victim is involved in the hearings system and one where they are outwith it. As I said—we will get on to this later—even the young person or victim who is outwith the system would have a range of support measures available to them, although they would not necessarily have their views taken into account in the children’s hearing. I do not see such an approach to victims is congruent with a welfare-based system that is trying to ensure the welfare of the child at the heart of the system. I hope that that answer helps.