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I just needed some water.

I appreciate that amendment 171 intends to mitigate concerns about 16 and 17-year-olds as they transition to adulthood. However, the Government has issues with the amendment. As is noted in the policy memorandum for the bill, it is desirable to smooth the transition with regard to the supports available to children as they move into adulthood.

That is particularly relevant when a child has required statutory intervention on a compulsory basis. That is why the bill as introduced made provision to ensure that the local authority has a duty to provide support should the hearing decide that on-going supervision and guidance are likely to be helpful to the young person whose order will be terminated. If the young person is in agreement, the local authority will continue the relationship without compulsion on the young person up to the age of 19.

That makes appropriate provision to ensure that the young person does not fall through the cracks, as they will already be known to the local authority. The provision strikes the right balance by allowing a children’s hearing to place duties on local authorities to provide support for children who have required compulsory supervision measures when their order is no longer needed or has to be terminated due to the age of the child.

I recognise that the member might think that amendment 171 could fill a gap for older children who are referred to a hearing when an order is not made. However, the principal reporter must consider a child’s case in those instances and, in doing so, might make a determination for voluntary support and guidance as needed.

It should also be noted that amendment 171 does not define the term “transition to adulthood”. In practice, that will mean different things to different young people. It will be achieved in various ways and to varying timescales from child to child. Therefore, I am not able to support amendment 171.

Although I am sympathetic to the sentiment behind amendments 119, 120 and 121, which are well intentioned, there are a number of issues with the proposals to legislate for particular medical assessments. I thank Miles Briggs for his contribution and for the account that he provided this morning.

First, we must be mindful that children’s hearings are decision-making forums rather than responsible for ensuring the assessment of children with identified medical and neurological needs. Secondly, the responsibility to provide relevant, timely and appropriate information to inform decision making by a children’s hearing lies with authorities that work in the hearings system, such as social work, health and education authorities. Thirdly, there are existing well-established mechanisms under part 6 of the Children’s Hearings (Scotland) Act 2011 for requesting further relevant information, where necessary and appropriate, to inform decision making. Moreover, those mechanisms are not prescriptive and, in contrast to the scope of the amendments, allow for a range of circumstances that are relevant to the case.

The additional duties proposed in the amendments could also inadvertently cut across medical expertise that has determined that existing diagnoses are not relevant or that further assessments are not necessary. That, in turn, could delay decision making or subject a child to medical examination or assessment that is neither relevant to, nor appropriate for informing, decision making by a children’s hearing.

We are now more aware than ever of issues of neurodivergence, and I want to be clear that the Government is fully committed to children with additional needs being appropriately supported in the hearings system. However, ensuring that those issues are considered does not necessarily require additional specific legislative duties to be placed on the children’s hearings, and nor should we place an additional statutory duty on the children’s hearings or the courts when it might not be relevant to the circumstances of a case or the circumstances of a decision by a hearing or a court.

On that basis, I ask the member not to move amendments 119, 120 and 121. If the member moves the amendments, I ask the committee to vote against them.

Turning to amendment 172, again, I am in full agreement with the member about the fundamental principle of ensuring appropriate and timely access to support services in cases of domestic abuse. However, I do not necessarily agree that placing a duty on the principal reporter to ensure appropriate referral and access to providers of domestic abuse support is the right way forward.

Ensuring that those who are involved at any stage of the children’s hearings process have access to specialist services at the earliest possible stage of proceedings is, of course, the right way forward, but I am not convinced that we should legislate as suggested. In common with my comments about amendment 170—on which I said that it is not the role of the hearing to provide support services—I similarly do not see it as the role of the reporter to make a determination about a referral to support services.

I am sorry, Mr Whitfield—I do not follow.

There have been a lot of discussions around the rights of victims, and I will certainly get on to that issue later. A range of support measures will be available for victims or children who are at the heart of the children’s hearings system or who have experienced something like that. I feel that, if their views were sought or impacted on the decision of the children’s hearings system, that would take us too far towards turning the children’s hearings system into a mini-court setting.

We just need to ensure that the child at the heart of the hearing is being appropriately supported and that those measures are in place for them—and, equally, for any victim. You gave me two examples—one where one victim is involved in the hearings system and one where they are outwith it. As I said—we will get on to this later—even the young person or victim who is outwith the system would have a range of support measures available to them, although they would not necessarily have their views taken into account in the children’s hearing. I do not see such an approach to victims is congruent with a welfare-based system that is trying to ensure the welfare of the child at the heart of the system. I hope that that answer helps.

I mentioned that a handout amendment or something similar would be possible. Again, I cannot go into details on that today, because I need to see where we get to by the end of stage 2. However, my commitment to work with Pam Duncan-Glancy is on the record.

Yes.

Yes, and on other grounds, as I have just laid out for the member.

Amendment 190 allows

“any person who is or appears”—

I do not think that that is a decision for me, as a minister, to take. That is what I am trying to lay out here.

I have just done that—I have articulated my reasons for opposing the amendment. I do not see how I can be any clearer.

I do not believe that it is incorrect. I think that we are agreeing to disagree here.

I would just say, in all honesty, that something unexpected could happen. I am talking about one example and one situation here—this will happen on a case-by-case basis, and every situation will be different. The chair might make that decision initially, but that does not mean that difficulties will not arise in the hearing that follows, based on that decision. Therefore, I do not think that it would be right to allow such decisions to be made.

Mr Kerr referred to open justice and the Scottish courts in his opening for the amendment. Yet again, I reiterate that the children’s hearings system is not a mini-court system. It is based on the welfare of the child and the outcome that would best rehabilitate that child. I am sorry, but I do not agree with the premise that what Mr Kerr is looking for would be congruent with those aims.

Children’s hearings must be conducted in accordance with article 8 of the ECHR, which requires respect for private and family life. That is why attendance should be restricted to those persons whose presence is necessary for the proper consideration of the case.

Furthermore, the UNCRC, which is supported by all parties, places obligations on children’s hearings to uphold every child’s right to privacy and says that

“No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference”

with their private and family life. Allowing any member of the public to attend a hearing, with no justification, would be a regression in children’s rights and would potentially be incompatible with them.

Amendment 179 fails to consider the fundamental differences between the approach of the children’s hearings system and the approach that is taken by the criminal justice system, as I have just outlined. Amendment 179 does not take account of the fact that the majority of hearings deal with highly sensitive care and protection cases, often for very young, vulnerable children. They are not simply juvenile courts dealing with young offenders.

On the basis that such an approach would disregard the child’s wellbeing, rights and best interests, as reflected in the legislation as it currently stands, I cannot support amendment 179. I ask Mr Kerr not to press the amendment to a vote, but, if he does, I strongly urge the committee to reject it.