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Many of the areas that I am interested in have been covered. I want to explore the main theme of this evidence session. Thus far, the evidence has highlighted the considerable complexity that is illustrated by the fiscal framework. It also points to the fact that there is a bit of a johari window issue in that politicians are driven to look at very nearside issues in relation to the budget in hand at this moment in time, although our earlier conversation was about the lack of long-term infrastructure investment—capex and so on. Public sector net investment was 8 per cent of gross domestic product in the 1960s and had dropped to 0.5 per cent of GDP by the 1990s. That big thematic framing of the UK macroeconomy tends to be forgotten when we are looking at this exercise.

That is a long explanation for what is a simple question. Given that this evidence session is about a strategic approach to the Scottish budget, in summing up, what areas would you like to pull out that have not been considered thus far to genuinely attempt some consideration of a strategic approach to the Scottish budget?

You looked at me, Professor Bell, so I will go to you first.

Good morning. I have a few random questions. David Lonsdale, I want to ask you about your intriguing comment about competitiveness pertaining to the tax strategy or framework, as you described it. Can you give us a bit more flavour of that? For the record, you said that tax strategy should include an additional principle of competitiveness

“to stimulate greater levels of private sector investment and consumer demand, to ensure a strong economic recovery.”

That is an excellent response. In asking that question, I was not making a singular plea for hypothecated taxes—it was merely a question.

Have David Lott and Vikki Manson anything to add on that? I appreciate that it is a bit of a left-field question.

You have touched on the subtle point that I was making, which is less rigid than the one on hypothecated taxes. It is about following the funding of such measures.

Thank you everyone. That helpful thread has taken us back to the complexity of the big picture.

That is interesting and I suspect that it will be picked up further.

Vikki Manson, there is an intriguing bit in your submission, which I will quote for the record:

“It is simply impossible to expect to see an increase in economic activity when the proposed Economy National Outcome intends to deprioritise economic growth.”

You go on to refer to the wellbeing economy. That is being looked at and we know that work is under way, but I would like to get a little more flavour of what you mean by that. Also, given that you made your submission prior to the budget, do you now have more confidence that the budget will encourage economic growth?

I suspect that some of those themes will be picked up by the Economy and Fair Work Committee, of which I am also a member, which is convenient.

My final question picks up on a point that my colleague Ross Greer alluded to. As we are taking a strategic look at the budget, I am interested in the panel’s views on hypothecated taxes, by which I mean those that are aligned to particular purposes. Through the use of the term “ring fencing”, we have seen such an approach being passed on to councils, yet it is not being applied to the Government itself. Ross gave the example of minimum unit pricing. There has also been a suggestion that the £640 million of ScotWind moneys would just go on building supply-side infrastructure and so on for renewables. This is a bit of a throwaway question, but what are your thoughts on the principle of hypothecated taxes? Would that intrigue you, given that this session is about strategic budgets? David Lonsdale is going first on that one.

Many of the areas that I am interested in have been covered. I want to explore the main theme of this evidence session. Thus far, the evidence has highlighted the considerable complexity that is illustrated by the fiscal framework. It also points to the fact that there is a bit of a johari window issue in that politicians are driven to look at very nearside issues in relation to the budget in hand at this moment in time, although our earlier conversation was about the lack of long-term infrastructure investment—capex and so on. Public sector net investment was 8 per cent of gross domestic product in the 1960s and had dropped to 0.5 per cent of GDP by the 1990s. That big thematic framing of the UK macroeconomy tends to be forgotten when we are looking at this exercise.

That is a long explanation for what is a simple question. Given that this evidence session is about a strategic approach to the Scottish budget, in summing up, what areas would you like to pull out that have not been considered thus far to genuinely attempt some consideration of a strategic approach to the Scottish budget?

You looked at me, Professor Bell, so I will go to you first.

As things stand as regards our understanding of those ifs, we are light years away from being able to definitively state that there will be Barnett consequentials as a result of that UK Government policy. That is what I am trying to get at.

You illustrate the complexity of the issue, which can probably go only one way. To counter that complexity—I think that my colleague Ross Greer was getting at this—assumptions should be stated, where that is possible and feasible. The more planning, the better, even though we all accept that the only certainty is that, ultimately, all plans will be wrong. However, from a behavioural perspective, we need to try to track things.

On that point, I note that we will not have a medium-term financial strategy, and we do not anticipate that we will have an updated infrastructure investment plan. That seems to me to be counter to the dawning realisation that everyone has had that we are in the position that we are in because of a failure to plan—or, rather, to scenario plan. Given that pay policy informs the MTFS, what are your thoughts on planning and what we need to do in that respect?