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I am grateful for that.

I accept that there will be other significant differences in their legislative provisions and in the wider context, but you said that other jurisdictions that do not have such a timescale with regard to the diagnosis have seen a gradual increase in numbers, too. Are there any particular examples that you would cite in that respect, recognising that there will be other important contextual differences?

Thank you very much. That was very useful.

Good morning—sorry, good afternoon. We have been here a while.

I will return to the timescale in the definition of terminal illness, because I did not quite follow your argument earlier, Liam. You project that the number of people who would choose an assisted death would start off small and then increase. That is based on the experience in Oregon and Victoria, but those jurisdictions have a definition of terminal illness that includes a timescale of six months or 12 months. At any given time, there is only a certain number of people with a terminal diagnosis that would see them likely to die within 12 months. Your proposal does not have that timescale.

My assumption would have been the opposite. If the bill were to pass, in the first year of people being able to access assisted dying, I assume that you would start off with a much larger number, being, for example, people with a prognosis that indicated that they might pass away in the next three to four years but who wanted to access assisted dying in case there came a point when they were no longer able to pass the capacity test. The number would therefore start off larger and might then decline for a couple of years before increasing again.

Will you talk us through why the projections are based on jurisdictions that have a definition that includes a timescale of six months, 12 months or, in another case, 18 months?

I totally understand why, if the bill were to be passed, there would need to be a transition period and a debate about how long that would be. I understand why the CMO, for example, would want it to be longer. However, that line of argument suggests that, at least initially, the system will not be able to meet demand, which would inevitably result in a significant amount of political pressure to increase funding to increase capacity.

Regardless of what anyone thinks of this particular proposal—I am genuinely undecided on the bill at this point—if the Parliament were to pass a law to give people the option of ending their own life, people would have an entirely reasonable expectation that they would be able to choose that option. If they were then to find that they could not choose it simply because the system lacked capacity for them to do so, that would quite understandably result in political pressure to increase funding to increase capacity. That leads me back to the core question on the financial memorandum, which is that costs might increase quicker than is projected, because there will be pressure to meet demand quicker.

Are there any examples of other jurisdictions that do not have a timescale but which are still quite similar to what you have proposed with regard to the definition of terminal illness, and which have seen a gradual increase rather than the inverse trend that has been suggested?

I have one other question on that. Correct me if I am wrong, but I think that, in response to the convener’s initial line of questioning, you suggested that, in part, the ceiling on the number of people accessing assisted dying would be the capacity of and constraints on the system and the number of clinicians who are qualified, trained and willing to do it. Given that that is the case across a range of public services and entitlements that people have already, I found it somewhat strange that you were, in essence, arguing that the FM was based in part on an assumption that the system would not be able to meet demand. Will you elaborate on that a little? Is it that it might not be able to meet demand at least in the first few years?

On the basis of the cabinet secretary’s remarks, I am happy not to press amendment 61. I understand the legal point about Education Scotland’s status as an executive agency, which means that responsibility rests with ministers, but there is a governance point that the committee has encountered on lots of occasions in relation to Education Scotland, in that duties on ministers simply have not cascaded down effectively.

I understand the legal issue around drafting, so I am happy not to press amendment 61 and for us to work on the matter ahead of stage 3. We will need to take into account that duties that are placed on ministers are, quite frankly, often not fulfilled by the executive agencies that are accountable to ministers, so perhaps we need to tighten that up in this specific regard. Of course, there is a wider governance issue that is not for this committee to consider right now.

It is an anticlimactic end, I am afraid, convener: I will not move the amendment.

Amendment 75 not moved.

Sections 36 to 38 agreed to.

Long title agreed to.

I understand the Scottish Government’s perspective and the need to strike a balance, particularly for a relatively small public body. However, given the reason why we are debating the matter and the urgency of the situation, is there any scope for compromise at stage 3 to allow a reasonable level of discretion for the bòrd but perhaps set a minimum timescale—not necessarily a year, but perhaps no less than every two or three years? Would the Government be amenable to an amendment that would at least set a minimum standard?

On the basis of those comments from the cabinet secretary, I am happy to withdraw amendment 38 and to not move the other amendments in the group. We will look to reach some form of agreement ahead of stage 3.

Amendment 38, by agreement, withdrawn.

Amendments 39 to 41 not moved.

Amendment 42 moved—[Ross Greer]—and agreed to.

Amendments 43 to 46 not moved.

Section 8, as amended, agreed to.