Seòmar agus comataidhean

I think it can be squared pretty easily, actually, drawing on what I have just said. I do not know how many of the papers you would have seen personally at the time, but at that point, we were not in a position where we had decided whether we would definitely use private finance, because we did not have a clear private finance route, or opt for publicly funded straight capital provision.

The situation at that point was that, had we gone down a private finance route, the 2025 target would not have been capable of being met, but we had not closed the door to the design build capital funded option. If memory serves me correctly, it was only at the end of 2022 or thereabouts that it became clear that there was no route to a 2025 target being met. With any kind of target, as you get closer to it, there is a diminishing prospect of it being met, but, until that point, there was, at least in theory, a route to meeting the 2025 target. That closed off around the end of 2022 or 2023. Clearly, there were other factors at play around then as well.

Let me try to answer that as best I can, perhaps in a general sense. On any particular points, I am more than happy to look at the paperwork after this meeting and come back with specific answers in writing, if that would be helpful to the committee.

I will say two things in general. First, it is not the case that the issues with the A9 were down to the Greens’ involvement in the Government. People can read the Bute house agreement for themselves to see that the commitment to the A9 was not affected by that agreement. As First Minister during that time, I can say that that was not the case.

With the caveat that I will look again to see whether I can throw some light on other issues, my second point is that we are talking about a period when our revenue and capital budgets were under significant and growing pressure. Members of the Parliament have heard statements that various finance secretaries have made during recent times about the need for savings and the need to reprioritise. We all know the reasons for that. The overarching reason is the funding challenges that we have been confronted with in relation to the on-going work to try to find ways to make progress on sections of the road through either direct capital or a private finance model. In my view, the funding challenges are the overarching reason. However, as I said, I am happy to go away to see whether there are further comments that might be helpful.

I will do my best to respond to that question and, in the course of today’s session, to answer questions as fully as I can.

My starting point is to agree with your starting point: I do not think there is any smoking gun or anything deeply sinister for the committee to uncover. Clearly this is from my perspective, but I do not agree that there was a diminution of focus and drive behind the A9 project. During my time as First Minister, the two sections of dualling that have now been completed were completed, and there was, and there continues to be, an incredible amount of work to progress things.

In preparing for this session, I have had the opportunity to go back and read all the relevant paperwork—I thought that I had left behind reading Government papers when I stood down from Government. When the 2025 target was set back in 2011, we were absolutely committed to it, in good faith. The question in my mind now—this will undoubtedly also be a question in the committee’s mind—is whether there was sufficient rigour and openness about just how challenging a target it was. When I look at it now, it is clear that, for the target to have been met, we would have to have had a fair wind on every aspect of the project that we were embarking on. Of course, we did not have a fair wind on every aspect of it. I have no doubt that we will come on to some of the issues, but, for example, the 2014 change of classification of the non-profit distributing model, austerity, Brexit and the pandemic all had an impact.

We encountered a situation of great complexity. We talk about the A9 being a single project, but it is actually 11 major projects in one. A lot of effort went into some of the preparatory stages. One example is public consultation. I do not want to sound as though I am underplaying the challenges, but I think that one of the achievements is that, unlike the situation with the Aberdeen bypass, we have not ended up getting caught up in endless legal processes through challenges and public inquiries.

That is my observation. With any such project that has not been delivered in the timescale that was initially set, it would be appropriate to look back, at an appropriate time—this committee’s deliberations will be part of that process—to see whether there were stages or points at which things could have gone quicker than they did. However, I think that we have progressed the A9 with drive and determination; it is simply that we have encountered significant challenges along the way. Although some of those challenges were foreseeable in a project of such a scale, many of the others that were encountered were not foreseeable at the time that the 2025 target was set.

I think that my reputation—it is for others to decide whether this is accurate—is that I was possibly more of a hands-on micromanager than my predecessor.

I have already made both the points that I would make in response to that question, so you will forgive me if I repeat myself.

First, until that point, the advice to Government was that there was a viable route to 2025. That was the advice, but that viable route depended on capital provision being made available, which was a significant challenge. It is not the case that we were, as you say, just being dishonest.

My second point is one that I made in my first answer to the convener. When I look back on that period, I think that we should perhaps have been airing this more publicly. I certainly think that that is a reasonable question to pose, but if we were guilty of anything at that point, it was of trying our hardest to find the route to 2025, and—I am happy to concede—perhaps taking too long to accept that that was not possible. If that is the case, it happened for the best of reasons.

My condolences and heart go out to every single person who has lost someone on the A9 or who knows someone in that position. The dualling of the A9 has been a priority for the Scottish Government. It has encountered significant challenges; it was always going to, but there were some additional ones. I do not believe that we are sitting here today because Government did not give the issue enough priority, but there is absolutely no doubt that priority must be attached to it until the commitment is met. To go back to Fergus Ewing’s question, I am absolutely of the view that the Government has an obligation to ensure that the revised timetable is now met—and met in full.

I will just leave that there.

Where he is absolutely right is that, in the period around the financial crash and after that, infrastructure was a central priority of the Government. Infrastructure is always a priority of the Government but, in terms of the economic situation that we were facing, trying to drive economic activity through infrastructure projects was absolutely a central focus, and Alex was absolutely pushing that.

As I say, I think that my reputation is probably that I was more of a hands-on micromanager than my predecessor was. I would be involved in issues that needed to be resolved or pushed on. Cabinet secretaries would come to me and I would go to cabinet secretaries where there were issues or where I thought that things were not moving fast enough. That is the nature of how Government works on a day-to-day basis.

Where I would take issue with how you have characterised it is that a lot of the work was on-going at that point. Much of the preparatory work, to use that catch-all phrase, was on-going. We are now in a position where, with the exception of one of the sections of the route, all the orders are in place, so it is not the case that none of that was progressing.

The six-year estimate, of course, was made way back—it was an estimate of the construction period. The significant barrier that we were grappling with at that point was around funding options, in terms of coming up with a private finance possibility versus the pressure on our capital programme. You can have everything else in place—you can have all the preparatory work done—but you need to have routes to funding and procurement. That was the aspect that was the most significant challenge.

I do not think that that would add anything to where we are right now. In fact, I am concerned that, if somebody came in and decided to take a fresh look at everything, that would slow things down. The Government is now in a strong place with funding, the reassessment of the order of the routes and the timescale of the project, so it should be able to get on with that work and be held to account for it. Therefore, that suggestion would hinder rather than help.

If that is practical, yes, I would agree. I have not been in government for more than a year, so it would not be fair of me to comment on whether, if we take all the different factors into account, it is practical. However, if it is, the Government should try to accelerate the timescale. John Swinney’s constituency is on the route of the A9. I am certain that, if it was practical to bring forward completion, he would be very open to doing it, but it is important that I not try to speak for the Government or the First Minister, given that I am not at all close to the detail of those things in the way that I once was.

Indeed.